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INTRODUCTION
On 14 January 1999, members of the U.S. Senate gathered for one of the re-
markable political events of the twentieth century: the trial of President William
Jefferson Clinton on charges of "high crimes and misdemeanors." Although a
presidential sex scandal provided the immediate backdrop, die allegation of cor-
rupt business dealings had prompted the original investigation. A Small Busi-
ness Administration loan intended for "disadvantaged" minorities was at the
heart of the initial probe. David Hale, head of a small-business investment com-
pany, had granted a fraudulent loan to Susan McDougal in 1986. Money from
the SBA-backed loan ended up in the Whitewater Development Corporation, a
firm owned by Mrs. McDougal, her husband, and the Clintons. Hale testified
that then-governor Clinton had asked him to make the illegal loan, a charge
Clinton denied. In 1996, an Arkansas jury convicted the McDougals and Gov-
ernor Jim Guy Tucker of defrauding the SBA. The continued Whitewater in-
vestigation by Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr eventually uncovered evidence
of unrelated misconduct that led to Bill Clinton's impeachment; although the
Senate acquitted him, the episode left a black mark on his presidency.1
Whitewater was only the latest in a series of scandals involving the Small
Business Administration. Long before Bill Clinton entered the White House,
the SBA earned the tide of "Small Scandal Administration," as corruption, fraud,
and incompetence marred its minority enterprise programs. For example, Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan's administration was embroiled in a sensational scandal
involving the incomprehensibly corrupt Wedtech, another minority firm ben-
efitting from SBA largesse. The Wedtech scandal implicated White House aides,
SBA officials, and several congressmen in what one reporter called "an elaborate
soap opera of crime." It also reportedly resulted in Attorney General Edwin
Meese Ill's resignation.2 In the cases of Whitewater and Wedtech, the stated aim
of helping disadvantaged business owners provided a cover for corruption remi-
niscent of the Gilded Age.
2 Big Government and Affirmative Action
Despite the media attention given to these high-profile scandals, few
Americans realize the important role of the Small Business Administration in
promoting affirmative action. Historians have likewise ignored the pioneer-
ing efforts of the SBA in developing racial preferences.3 Led by Eugene Foley,
a young administrator who took office the month Martin Luther King Jr.
marched on Washington, the agency targeted African American entrepreneurs
for aid even before passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The new policy
was technically color-blind, but the riots of the mid-1960s transformed the
program into an emergency remedy to mollify racial discontent. The election
of Republican presidential candidate Richard M. Nixon, who ran on a "black
capitalism" plank, solidified the agency's commitment to racial preferences.
Nixon and his Republican supporters in Congress defended affirmative ac-
tion at a time when it faced a strong challenge from Democrats. Later, the
Reagan administration's self-contradictory stance on the issue—denouncing
"quotas" while establishing them within the SBA—further demonstrated that
the politics of affirmative action made for strange bedfellows.
Researching the history of affirmative action is difficult because docu-
mentation is often lacking and civil rights agencies have resisted opening their
sensitive archives to outside scholars. Nonetheless, this history provides valu-
able insight into the SBA's development of racial preferences by drawing upon
substantial archival research and interviews with officials who created and
administered minority enterprise programs before affirmative action rose to
the heights of controversy. The ensuing history makes for a lively story of
racial and ethnic conflict and fierce debates among policymakers over the
merits of the SBA's inherently divisive policy.
It is important to stress that the SBA was an affirmative action agency
even before becoming involved in racial policymaking. In 1953, Congress
created the SBA to take affirmative action on behalf of small business. By
awarding loans and government contracts to a select group of small firms, the
agency gave them a competitive advantage over other companies. As critics
noted in the early 1960s, the practice of "setting aside" contracts for "small"
firms constituted reverse discrimination against "large" companies. The SBA
responded with arguments that will sound familiar to students of affirmative
action: As a matter of justice, small firms deserved special consideration be-
cause they suffered "institutionalized discrimination" by banks and procure-
ment agencies. SBA officials also argued that statistical disparity in the awarding
of contracts was prima facie evidence of such discrimination. Since then, few
have raised objections to affirmative action for small business.
While nearly everyone in Congress agreed that small business deserved special
treatment, questions remained: What is "small" business? Is it really a group
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with interests separate from "big" business? The latter question is of great
importance, as political scientists usually assume that our modern federal bu-
reaucracy embodies the influence—past and present—of organized interest
groups. Policy historians trace the emergence-of interest-group democracy to
the New Deal era when Franklin D. Roosevelt's recognition of various inter-
ests—labor unions, trade associations, senior citizens, and others—created a
"broker state" with the federal government mediating between conflicting
interests. The proliferation of interest groups accompanying the subsequent
growth of the American government resulted in the term "hyperpluralism,"
which political scientists use to describe the dizzying array of interests seeking
governmental attention.4
Created by Congress in an interest-group vacuum, the Small Business
Administration is one of the most important government agencies to chal-
lenge the assumptions of interest-group democracy. Support for the agency
came from members of Congress rather than small business owners, who were
unorganized and considered classical liberals opposed to the New Deal wel-
fare state. Congressional sponsorship reflected the vitality of a small business
ideology associated with the widely held "American Creed"—a belief in indi-
vidualism, equal opportunity, and democracy. Political scientist Sandra Mary
Anglund notes that "when small business, viewed as an institution, is judged
with these values, it passes with flying colors."5 The SBA embodies this popu-
lar sentiment.
Defining interests is simple in theory, but often problematic in practice.
"Interest-group liberalism," notes political scientist Theodore Lowi, is based
on the questionable assumption that "organized interests are homogeneous
and easy to define, sometimes monolithic." Broker state theory promoted a
crude "myth of the group and the group will." In practice, however, organized
interests conceal splits within their own membership. Furthermore, organiz-
ing large groups is difficult. In The Logic of Collective Action (1965), Mancur
Olson Jr. theorized that small interest groups are easier to organize than large,
heterogeneous ones. Thus, narrow interests seeking special advantages from
the government are better-represented than large groups with diffuse interests
(e.g., taxpayers, consumers).6
The small business community fell into the category of a large group
with conflicting internal interests. "What did a "Mom-and-Pop" grocery have
in common with a "small" manufacturer employing hundreds of people in a
high-tech industry? At what point did a "small" business become a "big" busi-
ness? Was it possible to organize the entire small business community? Small
business owners were notoriously independent and often too busy to monitor
political developments. And the one thing that many small business owners
had in common was a resentment of government interference. For a minority
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of business owners—those who joined national associations—this ideological
animus overcame the "free rider" problem inherent in the "logic of collective
action." The New Deal broker state was anathema to these small companies,
especially since it legitimized the interests of the labor unions.7 Here we con-
front a fundamental paradox: could a federal agency represent the interests of
a group that rejected the underlying premise of the broker state?
By establishing the SBA, Congress declared that a federal agency could
indeed represent small business. But what was a "small" business? The public
definition of small business encompassed "Mom-and-Pop" firms with fewer
than ten employees, yet SBA size standards included companies with hun-
dreds or even thousands of employees because they were "small" within their
industry.8 Congressional pressure to raise size standards eventually allowed
larger companies to benefit from agency resources. Furthermore, the inherent
economies of scale in some programs, including procurement and venture-
capital investment, forced the agency to lift size standards even higher. Critics
charged that the SBA was biased toward these "not-so-smalls." This theme of
the smalls versus the "not-so-smalls" runs throughout the agency's history.
Finally, this book examines an important trend in modern United States his-
tory: the growth of government. In 1913, total government spending accounted
for 8 percent of the Gross National Product (GNP). By 1990, this share had
quintupled to 40 percent. Since the 1970s, budgetary growth has slowed but
regulatory mandates have extended governmental authority over areas once
considered private. This enduring phenomenon has led many observers to
conclude that "big government" is inevitable.9
Scholars attribute government growth to many factors, including inter-
est-group pressure; bureaucratic aggrandizement; economic and military cri-
ses; statist ideology; the breakdown of fraternal organizations; and the
establishment of countervailing powers to deal with big business.10 With the
passage of time, American attitudes toward government have softened. Voters
increasingly expect more from the state. And although they are not always
happy with the results, most Americans have grown accustomed to a large
state role in their lives. Consequently, eliminating government programs has
become nearly impossible; they are approaching immortality.11
Despite the vast literature on government growth, there are few admin-
istrative studies exploring this important topic. As Hugh Davis Graham notes,
historians have neglected a fertile field of research, leaving it to political scien-
tists specializing in public administration.12 Agency insiders have written most
administrative histories. These federal historians have made outstanding con-
tributions to our understanding of American government, yet they are not
free to explore controversial topics that may have political consequences.13
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The present study of the SBA thus offers a rare, in-depth, and comprehensive
analysis of a federal agency over a considerable span of time.
During the past half-century, the SBA has experienced remarkable growth.
Established as a tiny lending agency in 1953, the SBA eventually mushroomed
into a multibillion-dollar financial institution with a significant presence in
credit markets. New programs were later established to provide venture capi-
tal to growth-oriented companies, assist minority entrepreneurs, and lend
management assistance to firms struggling to compete. By the 1990s, the
SBA had become a conglomerate agency pursuing multiple policy objectives.
The piecemeal construction of the American state suggests that no one
theory can explain all incidences of government growth.14 In fact, the SBA's
history reflects a complexity of causes. In an earlier work, I demonstrated how
political entrepreneurs in Congress used crisis rhetoric to secure government
assistance for small business during the Great Depression, World War II, and
the Korean conflict. Congress responded by enacting anti-chain store legisla-
tion and creating two temporary agencies for small manufacturers, the Smaller
War Plants Corporation (1942-1946) and the Small Defense Plants Admin-
istration (1952-1953).15 However, with the establishment of the SBAin 1953,
the crisis rhetoric faded and other factors became prominent. As an outgrowth
of the antitrust tradition, the SBA fit the countervailing theory of govern-
ment. The bureaucratic imperative became evident during the tenure of activ-
ist administrators who exploited the "urban crisis" of the 1960s to promote a
minority enterprise agenda. Partisan, presidential politics also contributed to
the agency's growth, though the stalwart support of the congressional Small
Business Committees is probably the most important factor explaining the
SBA's development during the past half-century.
The agency's political support derived from an ideology that has always
been contested. Conservatives held to the original Jeffersonian conception of
small business as the embodiment of self-reliance; a thriving small business
sector was a bulwark against an overreaching state. For these ideologues, gov-
ernment assistance to "free enterprise" was a contradiction in terms. Officials
in the Eisenhower and Reagan administrations embraced this view yet were
unsuccessful in eliminating the SBA. In fact, when President Ronald Reagan
tried to abolish the SBA in the mid-1980s, Congress defeated him resound-
ingly. This life-or-death struggle highlighted the failure of the Reagan Revolu-
tion, proving how difficult it is for a determined president to cut spending,
even when the presumed beneficiaries support his small government policies.
Reagan's failed attempt at reversing the growth of the SBA provides an object
lesson in the futility of the conservative crusade to roll back government.
The dominant strain of the ideology supported government assistance
to level the playing field between big and small business. According to this
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idea, small business owners deserved assistance because they were morally
worthy and faced what some considered to be unfair competition from big
business. Over time, this statist ideology evolved as small business advocates
offered new rationales for government aid. During the civil rights era of the
1960s, SBA administrators pointed to racial disparities as justification for as-
sistance to disadvantaged businesses. The economic crisis of the 1970s gave
rise to a "small is beautiful" ideology depicting small firms as dynamic job
creators, an image that indirectly benefited the SBA in the long term. This
belief in small business as the engine of economic growth continues to capti-
vate policymakers.
The following chapters trace the growth and evolution of the Small Business
Administration from birth to a near-death experience in the late-1980s. As
the agency grew, it took on new missions to wage war on poverty and promote
affirmative action. Yet the SBA remained controversial with opponents of big
government, including Ronald Reagan and David Stockman, who tried un-
successfully to eliminate the agency. Controversy continues to surround the
existence and nature of the small business interest. Do small business owners
want more or less government, and what role, if any, should the Small Busi-
ness Administration play in fostering their interests? These issues were still
unresolved as the agency entered the new millennium.
In sum, the SBA was and is an affirmative action agency for small and
minority enterprise. By affirmatively discriminating in favor of ill-defined in-
terest groups, the SBA has become embroiled in constant controversy. Prefer-
ences designed to overcome disadvantage have flowed disproportionately to
the not-so-small businesses and affluent minorities. Yet, these programs con-
tinue to grow and have become entrenched in government. Critics have failed
to overcome the presumed moral worthiness of the groups these preferences
serve. To attack the SBA is to malign minorities and "Mom-and-Pop" busi-
nesses. Nonetheless, periodic scandals and policy failures will likely fuel the
continued controversy surrounding this troubled agency.
POLITICS AND PATRONAGE
The Small Business Administration was born as the unwanted offspring of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, an agency eliminated in 1953 by Presi-
dent Dwight D. Eisenhower and a Republican Congress. In principle,
Eisenhower rejected this government interference in the credit markets and
questioned the existence of a separate interest group of small business owners.
Nonetheless, he subsequently approved substantial increases in the SBA bud-
get. Partisan politics explain this apparent contradiction. First of all, Eisenhower
used the SBA to deflect criticism that Republicans were "the party of big
business." The agency also served as a "safety valve" for small business as the
administration pursued a "tight money" policy. Finally, the Republicans used
the SBA to distribute patronage. In short, President Eisenhower reluctantly
accepted the agency's rapid growth because SBA served his political purposes.
The issue of interest-group representation dogged the SBA in its early
years. Most leading business organizations rejected the notion of a small busi-
ness interest, as did the U.S. Commerce Department, which repeatedly tried
to acquire the upstart agency. Political observers considered small business
owners classical liberals opposed to big government; consequendy, the Con-
gressional Small Business Committees filled the interest-group void by be-
coming the prime backers of the SBA. Their support was crucial to the survival
and growth of the agency.
Birth of the SBA
In November 1952, American voters elected Dwight D. Eisenhower presi-
dent and gave his Republican Party control of Congress for the first time in
twenty years. The Republicans were dedicated to balancing the budget and
eliminating unessential federal programs, including the Small Defense Plants
Administration (SDPA), an agency created during the Korean War to help
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small manufacturers secure defense contracts. The resulting debate exposed
sharply differing interpretations of the small business ideology. The Demo-
crats challenged Eisenhower to maintain an independent SDPA, while he fa-
vored transferring the agency to "its proper place in the Department of
Commerce." Conservative Republicans likewise opposed creating a small busi-
ness agency. The chair of the House Appropriations Committee, Glenn Davis
(R-Wis.), noted that "one group of people [in Congress] support the theory that
the only way you can help small business is to create a Government agency. . .
and the other . . . believes the way to help small business is to cut the Govern-
ment expenditures." The conservatives were determined to "take Government
off the back of small business," even if this meant eliminating the SDPA.1
The Republicans' main target was not the SDPA, but the Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation (RFC), a billion-dollar lending agency created dur-
ing the Great Depression. In 1932, Congress established the RFC to make
loans to financially distressed banks and large corporations. During World
War II, the agency lent to defense contractors but lost its emergency rationale
once the war ended. Subsequently, the Republican Congress of 1947—1948
curtailed RFC operations but enacted an amendment authorizing loans to
small business. Nevertheless, with the outbreak of the Korean War, the RFC
returned to its original mission of lending to large corporations.2
Allegations of influence peddling by top aides of President Harry S.
Truman tarnished the RFC's reputation, making it especially unpopular with
Republican voters. In 1949, the Hoover Commission on government reorga-
nization advocated an end to direct lending by government, because it "in-
vites political and private pressure or even corruption." Congressional
investigations confirmed the critics' suspicions that the RFC was guilty of
"favoritism." Republican politicians capitalized on the issue in the 1952 elec-
tions, blaming the corruption on the Democrats' one-party rule.3
Eliminating the RFC would help the Republicans balance the budget
and fulfill their campaign promise to "clean up the mess in Washington."
However, because the GOP held only a slim congressional majority, the
Eisenhower administration considered it "politically essential" to continue
making loans to small business. Although the president believed that a small
business agency should reside in the Commerce Department, he conceded
that there was bipartisan support for an independent Small Business Admin-
istration (SBA).4
Was there indeed an interest group of small business owners deserving
of governmental recognition? Congressional testimony revealed disagreement
over this fundamental issue. The largest small business association, the Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), supported establishment
of the SBA but took little interest in the details. NFIB seemed primarily con-
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cerned with the symbolic importance of having a small business agency. On
the other hand, the Conference of American Small Business Organizations
(CASBO) and the National Small Business Men's Association (NSBMA)
wanted to "get the government out of business," including banking. These
two groups echoed the Republican platform plank advocating "limitation of
competition by governmental organizations." The American Bankers Asso-
ciation (ABA), the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), and the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce also testified against the creation of a lending
agency that competed with private banks. The SBA, they argued, would simply
duplicate the work of the Commerce Department and waste the taxpayers' money.
Moreover, granting preference to one class of business owners was unfair; the
government should not affirmatively discriminate on the basis of size.5
President Eisenhower, while sharing this perspective, accepted political
reality by approving the establishment of a Small Business Administration,
yet his support was equivocal. Thus, Treasury Secretary George M. Humphrey
reacted uneasily when called before a Senate committee to explain the
president's position. Conservatives demanded to know why Eisenhower backed
a measure that contradicted his self-proclaimed opposition to big government.
"In theory," Humphrey admitted, "you ought not to make any loans at all,"
but the SBA could temporarily counter the high taxes that drained invest-
ment capital away from small firms. He agreed, however, that the president's
ultimate goal was to "get out of the Government loaning business entirely."6
Eisenhower made his support of the SBA contingent upon the RFC's
elimination. In April 1953, Senator Edward Thye (R-Minn.) and Representa-
tive William Hill (R-Colo.) introduced legislation to create a Small Business
Administration. A separate bill ended the RFC. Responding to opposition
from the Commerce and Treasury departments, Thye and Hill granted them
each a seat on the SBA's Loan Policy Board. The Republicans aimed to please
their conservative constituents by eliminating the RFC, and by creating the
SBA, "refute the canard of the opposition" that the GOP was the party of big
business. The Democrats' general opinion was that the SBA was "no more
than a sop . . . the administration wanted only to get rid of the RFC."7
The final Small Business Act, signed on 30 July 1953 by President
Eisenhower, abolished the RFC and created a temporary Small Business Ad-
ministration. Congress approved a spending authority of $275 million, in-
cluding $150 million for business loans; $100 million to help small firms
secure government contracts; and $25 million for disaster assistance, a func-
tion carried over from the RFC. Unless Congress took action to extend the
SBA, it would expire on 30 June 1955-8
What did Congress hope to achieve by creating the SBA? The primary
legislative intent was to retain a governmental source of credit for small busi-
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ness. Disappointed with the results of earlier antitrust laws, Congress increas-
ingly adopted affirmative measures favoring small business. According to Sena-
tor Thye, the "only purpose" in creating the SBA was to "equalize the scales."
Others hoped to make a statement about the symbolic importance of small
business. By establishing the SBA, Congress proclaimed that small business
was still "the economic backbone of the nation." Anticommunist ideologues
supported the creation of a small business agency to defend independent enter-
prise from "the Pinkos and the Marxist Reds" who threatened the American
Way of Life.9 Clearly, the shades of meaning invested in the SBA were as varied
as the small business ideology itself. The only losers were the laissez-faire conser-
vatives who viewed the small businessperson as the epitome of independence.
Interest-group Representation
Whom did the Small Business Administration represent? Unlike other gov-
ernment agencies, the SBA did not represent an organized interest group seek-
ing government favors. In fact, the SBA garnered little support from business
organizations. The Chamber of Commerce, NAM, and the ABA rejected any
division of the business community into "small" and "large" companies; ac-
cording to these groups, there was no small business interest. Two of the three
national small business associations also opposed the creation of SBA. The
sociologist Richard Hamilton states that these associations were remarkable
because they were primarily concerned "that the agencies of government not
give their clientele special consideration."10
Were small business owners really so conservative? If so, how could the
SBA represent their interests? Or did these groups represent an ideological
minority? Democratic critics noted that the associations represented only a
tiny fraction of the nation's five million business owners. The autocratic
founders of these associations ran them as for-profit enterprises and took con-
tributions from large corporate interests. In addition, they inflated their mem-
bership totals and issued biased questionnaires to their constituents. For
example, in 1940, the founder of the NSBMA, DeWitt Emery, claimed that
98 percent of small business owners supported Republican presidential candi-
date Wendell Willkie!11
Notwithstanding these questionable claims, most political commenta-
tors believed that small business owners were "conservatives" or "classical lib-
erals" opposed to big government. Surveys taken by the Opinion Research
Corporation (ORC) confirmed the "strongly free market" views of "small
businessmen," a category not defined by the ORC.12 On the other hand, Ri-
chard Hamilton has tried to debunk what he calls the "myth of [small] busi-
ness conservatism." Hamilton cites surveys showing that independent business
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owners were no more conservative than other segments of the middle class.
Hamilton's research revealed a split in the small business community between
very small businesses and the "upper middle-class" independents. The small-
est firms operated on the margin of the economy. Their working-class owners
lived in blue-collar neighborhoods. These companies were so small that they
were exempt from government regulation. They had no paid employees and
faced no threat from the unions. Consequently, these working-class business
owners retained their allegiance to the Democratic Party. Conversely, the "up-
per middle-class" independents felt threatened by labor unions and govern-
ment regulation. They were active in political affairs and identified strongly
with the Republican Party. In short, the conservative business associations did
not represent the entire small business community, but did speak for those
business owners most affected by government.13
Members of the Congressional Small Business Committees sensed that
they were out of step with this segment of the small business population. One
congressional aide stated that "if many small businessmen knew about the
various small business programs [of the SBA], they would be opposed" to
them. After conducting interviews with committee members, C. Dale Vinyard
concluded that "often the Committees rather than acting in partnership with
interest groups appear to be acting as self-appointed spokesmen for small busi-
ness." The committees did not take the small business associations seriously,
because they represented businesspeople who were hostile or indifferent to
government assistance. Thus, the committees represented the true constitu-
ency of the SBA. Over the opposition of business groups, Congress created
the SBA, and the agency became a "creature of Congress." The Small Business
Committees maintained this political monopoly until the 1970s, when a pow-
erful small business lobby emerged from a populist backlash against big gov-
ernment (see chapter 7).14
The Administration of William D. Mitchell
Eisenhower's attitude toward the SBA was less favorable than that of Con-
gress. "While accepting a minimal welfare state, Eisenhower was a fiscal con-
servative whose "underlying ideology was strongly antigovernment." He was
committed to "holding the line" against government growth, unless the ben-
efits clearly justified the costs. Eisenhower sought to reduce taxes by main-
taining a balanced budget, his top priority in domestic policymaking.
Eisenhower's fiscal conservatism thus subordinated the SBA's needs to the
larger goal of achieving a balanced budget.15
The president appointed an administrator on whom he could rely to
limit the demands for funding. Eisenhower selected William D. Mitchell, a
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lawyer for a small Colorado firm and a conservative Republican. Declaring
that the SBA must "work with and not against the spirit of self-reliance,"
Mitchell refused to make direct loans; instead, under its "participation loan"
program, the SBA took part of each loan and backed the rest with a govern-
ment guarantee. Even so, by November the regional offices had endorsed sev-
eral dozen loans, but the Central Office had approved none. Rather than
spend money, Mitchell emphasized management assistance, which amounted
to the publication of pamphlets and the sponsoring of management courses
in business schools.16
The fallacy of assuming a unified interest group of small business own-
ers became evident when Mitchell tried to define "small" business. The agency's
enabling legislation defined a small business as "one which is independently
owned and operated and which is not dominant in its field of operations."
Within these guidelines, the SBA administrator could devise other criteria.
The Congressional Small Business Committees urged Mitchell to adopt a
relative definition, because they hoped to counter big business by helping
firms far larger than "Mom and Pop," especially in concentrated industries.
Consequently, the SBA varied its size standards by industry or trade. A "small"
manufacturer could have as many as one thousand employees; a small retailer
could report annual sales as high as $1 million.17 But despite the SBA's at-
tempts to fairly define "small," very small businesses complained that the agency
neglected their needs. Paradoxically, the SBA gained public support by claim-
ing to represent the "little guy," while its real constituency consisted of the
"not-so-small" independents. Furthermore, the Small Business Act made it
difficult to aid "Mom-and-Pop" enterprises, because "all loans shall be of such
sound value or so secured as reasonably to assure repayment."18 By adopting
an expansive definition of small business and maintaining strict credit crite-
ria, Congress and the SBA caused an unavoidable split between the very smalls
and the "not-so-smalls."
Wendell Barnes Takes Over
In early November, without warning, the president replaced Mitchell with
Wendell B. Barnes, a former small business owner, lawyer, and state represen-
tative from Oklahoma, who was agency general counsel. According to the
press, the White House fired Mitchell because he was "a hard man on lend-
ing," but his tightfistedness was consistent with administration policy. The
real reason for Mitchell's firing was more sordid. He had given a drunken speech
before an audience of small business owners in Minnesota, the home state of
Edward Thye, chair of the Senate Small Business Committee. Mitchell's mis-
conduct horrified Thye, who demanded that the White House remove him.19
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A politically savvy administrator, Barnes mediated the conflicting de-
mands of president and Congress. In a bid for congressional support, Barnes
declared that he was the sole "proprietor" of SBA and that the Loan Policy
Board would not control him. He also authorized regional offices to make
participation loans without waiting for Washington's approval. Yet Barnes
maintained a conservative lending policy. As the administrator of "a public
agency using the taxpayers' funds," he kept an ever-watchful eye on expendi-
tures. Like Mitchell, Barnes stressed the importance of "local self-help" and
emphasized that a balanced budget took precedence over the immediate in-
terests of small business.20
The agency's organizational structure reinforced the Eisenhower
administration's strategy of restraining the SBA. As head of an independent
agency, the SBA Administrator reported directly to the president. The Loan
Policy Board added another check on the potential policy ambitions of top
SBA officials. Also, by concentrating agency personnel and decision making
in Washington, D.C., Barnes kept a tight rein on the field offices.21
Agency staffing strengthened these internal restraints. The SBA hired
lending officers from the RFC and procurement specialists from the SDPA,
who carried over the conservative tendencies of their prior agencies. The loan
officers reflected a "banker's culture"; one official recalls that "they could have
left the agency and gone to a bank and fit in very well." Accustomed to work-
ing with larger corporations, these SBA "bankers" held loan applicants to high
standards. Many procurement specialists were also retired military officers
who tried not to antagonize the Department of Defense.22
While Eisenhower administration officials were pleased with the SBA's
parsimony, the Congressional Small Business Committees criticized the agency's
tightfisted approach. As the Federal Reserve restricted the money supply to
dampen inflation, banks made fewer loans and the committees charged that
small firms could no longer secure credit. According to congressional critics,
the SBA failed to serve as an adequate "safety valve" during this period of
"tight money." After one year of operation, the agency had lent only $35
million to small business.23
Partisan political considerations made Eisenhower more amenable to
these congressional demands. The Republicans were rapidly turning the SBA
into a patronage machine. Barnes reported proudly that his agency "employed
197 persons who have been recommended by the [Republican Party]. These
people constitute approximately 32% [of the agency workforce] . . . there is
no other Federal agency which can approach this percentage of Republicans
employed." The agency's advisory boards served as an "effective political tool,"
because "Republican Senators and Congressmen . . . may have as many ap-
pointments . . . as will serve their particular needs." The SBA also hired nearly
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two hundred Republican attorneys as outside consultants. The chair of the
Republican National Committee, Leonard Hall, praised Barnes for circum-
venting the civil service regulations, "which are presently such a handicap in
employing Republicans." Hall complimented Barnes by stating that "no Fed-
eral agency has worked as closely and as cooperatively with the Republican
National Committee as has the SBA."24
During the 1954 election year, Barnes convinced Eisenhower that the
political gain from boosting the SBA budget outweighed the cost. In March,
Barnes notified Eisenhower that the agency needed additional money and
personnel to handle a surge in loan applications. The SBA had taken on the
combined responsibilities of the SDPA and RFC yet had only 550 employees,
far fewer than the 2,300 employed by the two prior agencies. By stressing the
"political aspects of this situation," Barnes secured Eisenhower's endorsement
of legislation giving the agency an additional $50 million.25
The debate over extending the SBA beyond its 1955 expiration date
highlighted the agency's political importance and renewed the controversy
surrounding the existence of a small business interest. Commerce Secretary
Sinclair "Weeks advised the president to allow the SBA to expire. Weeks wrote
that "no need has ever been expressed for a Department of Small Farmers" or
"Department of Small Labor." Although Barnes agreed "in principle . . . to
the eventual assignment. . . of the [SBA] to the Department of Commerce,"
he cited "Congressional opposition" and the "realities of the political situa-
tion." He noted that the Democrats had just regained control of Congress,
and Eisenhower did not have the votes needed to eliminate the SBA. Mean-
while, several business groups—including the NAM, ABA, and Chamber of
Commerce—lobbied to abolish the SBA in the interest of governmental
economy. The Chamber denounced what it called a government "invasion" of
banking. Uncreditworthy firms should not receive "preferential treatment." A
Hoover Commission Task Force also recommended ending the SBA, because
its "object is to help individual people and businesses gain competitive advan-
tages" over those not so favored. However, the full Commission supported
continuing the agency because it did not want to "take action adverse to a
program which appears to help small business and hence is politically unassail-
able" (italics in original). In August 1955, motivated by this political concern,
Eisenhower signed a bill extending the SBA for two years and doubling its
business loan fund to $300 million.26
During the agency's first two years, congressional criticism and the pros-
pect of short-term electoral gain moved the Eisenhower administration to
increase SBA spending. With the return of a Democratic Congress in 1954,
the administration could no longer consider eliminating the SBA. From then
on, the Democrats put Eisenhower on the defensive by depicting him as a
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"big business" president. In the 1956 election, this partisan debate contrib-
uted to even greater agency growth.
Election-Year Politics
The chair of the Democratic National Committee (DNC), Paul Butler, thought
that his party could exploit the small business theme in the upcoming elec-
tion. DNC surveys of party officials reported strong interest in attacking
Eisenhower's alleged favoritism toward big business. Moreover, the popular
appeal of small business fit well with Butler's overall strategy to "organize the
unorganized" and build "new sources of power" around the Democratic Party.
Therefore, he created a special small business division within the DNC. Small
business issues took up three of the "Top Ten Issues of 1956," as outlined in
Democratic campaign material. Butler's approach reflected the continued vi-
tality of broker state theory. By organizing small business, Butler's DNC hoped
to complete what Franklin Roosevelt began in the 1930s.27
Throughout 1956, Congressional Democrats blasted the small busi-
ness policy of Dwight D. Eisenhower. The House Small Business Committee
chair, Wright Patman (D-Tex.), condemned "a big business Administration"
for its refusal to do more for the "forgotten man," the small business owner.
The chair of the Senate Small Business Committee, John Sparkman (D-Ala.),
joined Patman in denouncing Eisenhower's "tax favoritism" toward big busi-
ness. Other Democrats demanded the elimination of the Loan Policy Board
and an end to "tight money."28
In the presidential campaign, Democratic candidate Adlai Stevenson
and running mate Estes Kefauver promised to make the SBA a more powerful
voice for small business. Stevenson gathered support from the "Independent
Businessmen for Stevenson-Kefauver," a group set up to counter "Small Busi-
nessmen for Ike." On the eve of the election, the Democratic organization
exploited the timely release of a study by the Public Affairs Institute (PAI)
characterizing the SBA as "only one-tenth as effective as [the] R.F.C." (as
measured by total business loans). The pro-Stevenson business owners cited
the PAI study and dismissed Eisenhower's business rhetoric as "nothing more
than political drivel."29
The high visibility of the small business issue placed Eisenhower on the
defensive. In June, he sought political cover by establishing a Cabinet Com-
mittee on Small Business (CCSB) headed by Arthur F. Burns, chair of the Council
of Economic Advisers. The CCSB recommended tax relief for small business,
yet the proposed cuts saved a small corporation a maximum of only $2,500—
hardly enough to stimulate investment. Consequendy, the business press con-
sidered the proposal "politically motivated," and a committee member admitted
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privately that "the chief motive was a political one." The political significance
was not lost on President Eisenhower. Twenty years later, Arthur Burns re-
called that "Eisenhower was anxious to have that Committee's report . . .
because he thought very explicitly that it would help him in the election."30
Eisenhower also countered Democratic criticism by noting that "we—
not they—created the Small Business Administration." The Republicans em-
phasized this point throughout the campaign; their party platform praised the
president for creating "the very successful Small Business Administration."
The Republican National Committee (RNC) produced a campaign film en-
titled "The Republican Small Business Program" used by dozens of GOP con-
gressional candidates. The movie showed a small business owner grateful for
his SBA loan. A narrator intoned, "The film that you are going to see is a film
about small business since 1953 . . . since Ike was elected president. In it you
will meet one small businessman . . . typical of many... who has been helped
by the S.B.A."31
The Republican Party relied upon the SBA, which, according to RNC
workers, "had quietly been performing a task that proved that our administra-
tion is not Big Business minded." Barnes presented the administration case
before groups of small business owners, leading Democrats to complain about
his "political barnstorming." He conceded privately that the relative position
of small business was still "not so good" and blamed the situation on mon-
etary restrictions. Therefore, Barnes persuaded the Loan Policy Board to liber-
alize lending and introduced a new small-loan program ($15,000 maximum)
with relaxed credit requirements. As a result, the SBA doubled its loans to
small business during the last half of 1956.32
Following the election, the Department of Commerce tried once again
to acquire the Small Business Administration. Assistant Secretary of Com-
merce Frederick H. Mueller complained to the White House that the SBA
drained clients away, so that the public now considered his agency "the De-
partment of'Big Business.'" By abolishing the SBA, the administration could
remove this negative label and eliminate the false impression that "big" and
"small" business were antagonistic interests. Mueller failed, however, to con-
vince the president that the political benefits outweighed the criticism that
would result from the SBA's demise.33
Meanwhile, congressional small business advocates favored extending
the SBA. In June 1957, the House Banking and Currency Committee sub-
mitted a bill to make the agency permanent. The legislative debate centered
on the proposal to eliminate the Loan Policy Board. Democrats argued that
the Board placed the agency "under the control of people who do not want to
see the program succeed." The House voted 393-2 to eliminate the Board
and make the SBA a permanent agency. The Senate did not have time to
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consider the bill before the agency's expiration date and agreed to a one-year
extension, postponing further action until the following year.34
The White House debated whether to support a bill to increase the
SBA's total lending authority to $650 million and to raise the loan ceiling to
$350,000. Barnes argued that with participation loans the SBA could limit its
expenditures; at any rate, agency spending amounted to less than one percent
of the federal budget. The president ultimately supported the legislation be-
cause, as one official noted, "It is good politics to be on the side of the numer-
ous little fellows against the large fellows." However, the administration insisted
on retaining the Loan Policy Board; Congress acquiesced, and on 18 July
1958, President Eisenhower signed an act creating the nation's first perma-
nent small business agency.35
The Fourth Banking System
Small business advocates had finally attained a permanent SBA, but failed to
wrest control away from the Loan Policy Board; therefore, they sought the
establishment of a separate body to provide for the long-term credit needs of
small business. Again, presidential opposition forced a compromise that left
the Small Business Administration in full control of the new program.
Since the 1930s, supporters of small business had expressed concern
over the "MacMillan Gap," named after a British politician who noted the
credit gap created when a small firm has grown beyond its own resources but
was still not large enough to issue stock at reasonable cost. Experts debated
whether a "MacMillan Gap" existed in the United States. Studies by a Con-
gressional Subcommittee on Investment and the Federal Reserve found that
many small firms could not secure long-term financing.36 Others disputed the
notion of a shortfall in the supply of long-term credit. Surveys conducted by
the Commerce Department and Dun & Bradstreet revealed no MacMillan
Gap. The problem lay not with an inadequate supply of investment capital,
but with the reluctance of small business owners to give up control by issuing
stock to outsiders.37
Did small business suffer from a venture capital "drought?" The truth is
that no one knew. The above studies were based on limited economic data,
which included only institutional sources of venture capital. Yet small firms
received most of their venture capital from "angels," wealthy individuals who
invested small amounts in promising new ventures. The Federal Reserve con-
ceded that "angels" formed the "backbone of this market," but these individu-
als kept a low profile, fearing that other investors would move in on their
ventures. A congressional staffer recalls that "we knew they were there but
they were really hidden."38
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Whatever the economic reality, many members of Congress believed
that small business needed government investment. In April 1958, Wright
Patman and Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson (D-Tex.) introduced
legislation to create an independent agency with a $250 million investment
fund. This new agency could lend money or purchase debentures from pri-
vately owned small business investment companies (SBICs). In turn, these
SBICs would invest public and private funds in small firms with growth po-
tential. By requiring a minimum capitalization of just $300,000, the bill's
sponsors sought to encourage small investment companies to work with small
clients. They predicted that private capital would eventually take over the
SBICs and that there would then be no need for government investment.
Patman viewed it as "a way to help free enterprise help itself." Johnson stated
that die goal was "eventual private ownership." Senator J. William Fulbright
(D-Ark.) went further; he foresaw an end to all government financing of busi-
ness—including the SBA's loan programs—and anticipated that "the Govern-
ment may be able to work itself out of this [financial assistance] field."39
Conservative small business advocates were skeptical of the claim that
this intervention would be temporary. Republican members of the Senate
Small Business Committee described the bill as "the first step toward the so-
cialization of an important segment of our free enterprise system." Small busi-
ness owners did not want to relinquish control of their companies, they argued,
hence there had been no grassroots demands for additional equity capital.
Likewise, the American Bankers Association and the Chamber of Commerce
feared that these federally subsidized SBICs would outlast their usefulness.
They adamantly opposed "direct equity ownership" by the government of
shares in small businesses.40
President Eisenhower realized it was futile to oppose a measure that had
strong congressional support; however, he demanded that the new organiza-
tion be placed within the SBA, and Congress agreed. On 21 August 1958, the
president signed the Small Business Investment Act. The SBA could license
SBICs and finance them with long-term loans or match private investment
with the purchase of convertible debentures. The goal was to attract specula-
tive investors with low-interest loans and preferential tax treatment. Small
business advocates had great hopes for what Neil Jacoby, a member of the
Council of Economic Advisers, called the "fourth banking system" (after com-
mercial, investment, and mortgage banking). Thus, the SBA was "born a sec-
ond time," with an even bigger role to play in the financing of small business.41
In the midst of this euphoria, the bill's sponsors overlooked serious prob-
lems with this new approach to financing small businesses. Small firms with
growth potential needed equity investment, not more debt, but Congress could
not accept government ownership of business, because it smacked of social-
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ism. It was also questionable whether small investment companies had ad-
equate resources to investigate prospects. For the time being, however, Con-
gress prided itself it on having passed this landmark legislation.42
The Democrats claimed credit for passing this small business legislation
and believed that the bill contributed to their victories in the 1958 midterm
elections.43 Faced with large Democratic majorities in Congress, Eisenhower
redoubled his commitment to a balanced budget. In December 1958, the
Budget Bureau declared that the SBA was "an uncontrollable program" and
asked Barnes to tighten the agency's loan requirements. The SBA directed its
loan officers to "moderate demands for credit." By the end of 1960, business
loan approvals had declined to $207 million, down from the 1958 high of
$250 million.44
Conclusion
Despite these late-term cutbacks, the Small Business Administration grew
considerably during the Eisenhower years. Between 1954 and I960, SBA fi-
nancial assistance quadrupled, and agency personnel expanded from 550
employees to 2,200 employees.45 The addition of the Small Business Invest-
ment Division laid die foundation for further agency growth in the venture
capital markets.
Partisan politics was largely responsible for the SBA's early expansion.
Both parties appealed to small business owners, a large bloc of voters. More
significantly, small business symbolized public concern for the individualistic
values associated with die "American Creed." The historian Ellis Hawley notes
that large corporations were the economic wonder of the world, yet "deep in
their hearts," Americans "retained a soft spot for the 'little fellow."' The Small
Business Administration embodied this public sentiment. Thus, rather than
representing a coherent interest group, the SBA reflected "majoritarian" val-
ues.46 Because the benefits and costs of SBA programs were widely diffused,
politicians had little to lose by supporting increases in the agency's budget.
Conversely, voting against the SBA left a politician vulnerable to die charge
that he or she was anti—small business.
President Eisenhower's reluctant backing of the SBA reflected the sym-
bolic appeal of small business. The election-year timing of his support for
increases in the agency's budget showed his political opportunism. Eisenhower
compromised his conservative principles both for immediate political gain
and to dispel the public impression that he represented big business. By lend-
ing his support to the SBA, Eisenhower promoted an image of the Republican
Party as speaking for "all Americans everywhere."47 Nonetheless, the president
imposed restraints on the SBA. By controlling the Loan Policy Board and the
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newly created Small Business Investment Division, Eisenhower kept the agency
from becoming entirely beholden to Congress.
Nevertheless, from the beginning, the SBA was a "creature of Congress."
Lacking the support of an organized interest group, the Small Business Com-
mittees took upon themselves the role of a small business lobby in Washing-
ton. What did they gain from their support of the SBA? First, the agency
embodied a sincere congressional effort to "do something" for small business.
Second, the committees acted as "complaint bureaus" for small businesspeople
with grievances against the government; committee members frequently re-
ferred disgruntled business owners to the SBA. Finally, members of Congress
used the SBA to distribute "pork" to their constituents. Representatives some-
times pressured the agency to "have an individual business declared small;
others, to have a constituent's competitor declared not small." The counsel for
the Senate Small Business Committee recalls that "everything was political."48
Neither Congress nor the SBA tackled the hard questions of interest-
group representation. The definition of group status had practical conse-
quences—firms declared "small" were eligible for SBA benefits. Yet the smallest
firms complained that the agency was biased toward the "not-so-smalls." SBA
loan officers favored larger firms with well-established credit histories. Con-
gressional pressure to raise size standards reinforced this upward bias. For the
most part, however, the issue of the smalls versus the "not-so-smalls" was lost
in the partisan politicking of the 1950s.
Policymakers were oblivious to other important developments within
the small business population. Controversial issues involving race and gender
lurked beneath the surface calm of the 1950s. In subsequent decades, the SBA
would act as an advocate for an ethnically diverse community of business
owners. During the 1950s, however, the agency was little more than a govern-
ment-financed bank. Nonetheless, the political tide was turning toward poli-
ticians who promised greater activism in domestic policy. In I960, the voters
elected John F. Kennedy, a president who pledged to "get America moving
again." This change in attitude fueled the SBA's rapid growth in the early
1960s and led the agency to extend affirmative action to minority businesses.
SMALL BUSINESS ON THE NEW FRONTIER
During his presidential campaign, John E Kennedy declared, "We stand to-
day on the edge of a New Frontier: the frontier of the 1960s, a frontier of
unknown opportunities and paths, a frontier of unfulfilled hopes and threats."1
Such grandiose rhetoric placed the president in conflict with business leaders
who feared a return of New Deal-style regulation and spending. Kennedy
scholars have explored the resulting conflict between big business and the
White House but have ignored the role played by the Small Business Admin-
istration. Kennedys strong support for the SBA shielded him from criticism
that he was "antibusiness." The agency also served as an outlet for domestic
spending that proved popular with members of both parties in Congress.
These two factors—strong congressional support and presidential im-
age building—contributed to the rapid growth of the SBA in the Kennedy
years. Yet a bitter dispute over procurement preferences underscored the diffi-
culty in defining small business as an interest group. The controversy also
foreshadowed arguments later made to justify race-based affirmative action.
John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Small Business
As a member of Congress, John E Kennedy showed little interest in economic
issues. Although he sat on the Senate Small Business Committee in the late
1950s, Kennedy did not seem to take his assignment seriously. The committees
staff director recalls that Kennedy was "bored with the whole bit of being a
senator." He went along with his Democratic colleagues in supporting tax
incentives for small firms and stronger antitrust measures, but small business
was not one of his top priorities.2
However, during his presidential campaign, Kennedy developed a no-
ticeably heightened interest in small business. Once again, the SBA became
the focal point for the partisan debate over small business. Republicans cited
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the SBA as an example of their "outstanding" record on small business, while
Democrats characterized the agency as "a microscopic dot on the map of
American business." The Democratic Party platform called for a dramatic
increase in SBA loans. This emphasis on small business dovetailed with
Kennedy's desire to portray himself as a New Democrat who would overcome
the traditional hostility that marked relations between business and govern-
ment when his party held the White House. His support for the SBA indi-
cated that he was "anti-administration and pro-business at the same time."3
After the election, Kennedy courted the Congressional Small Business
Committees by nominating John E. Home to become SBA administrator.
Home was the former head of the Small Defense Plants Administration, who
later became administrative assistant to Senator John Sparkman (D-Ala.), chair
of the Senate Small Business Committee. Home had easy access to the presi-
dent and was on good terms with influential members of Congress. His nomi-
nation signaled Kennedy's wish to increase federal spending on small business.4
Congress followed suit by hiking the SBA's budget. In 1961, the total
volume of business loans doubled to a record high of $400 million before
settling back to roughly $315 million in each of the following two years. To
increase spending, Home relaxed loan requirements by emphasizing "ability
to repay" rather than "the liquidating value of collateral." Consequently, the
agency soon faced an avalanche of loan applications, which strained the abil-
ity of SBA personnel to meet the demand. Home therefore offered banks a
chance to participate in a new program guaranteeing up to 90 percent of a
business loan if they processed some of the paperwork. This loan guarantee
program received the endorsement of the American Bankers Association (ABA),
which was slowly warming up to the idea of government backing for small
business loans.5
Other SBA programs enjoyed substantial growth during the Kennedy
era. Attendance at management training seminars quadrupled, and SBIC fi-
nancing skyrocketed as these venture capital firms gained favor with specula-
tive investors. Disaster lending increased approximately fifty percent, as did
loans to local and state development companies. Although the SBA's lending
still amounted to only a tiny percentage of small business loans outstanding,
it was becoming a more significant player in the finance markets, especially in
long-term lending.6
The SBA also took part in the Kennedy administration's efforts to stimu-
late the economies of poverty-struck regions such as West Virginia. The agency
processed loans made by the Area Redevelopment Administration (ARA), a
newly created agency lending financial assistance to businesses willing to relo-
cate in economically distressed areas. The president further directed the SBA
to target "labor-surplus" regions and sick industries, including textiles and
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lumber. Thus, the SBA became an instrument of U.S. industrial policy as well
as an agent in the early War on Poverty.7
To reflect the new growth strategy, Home altered the agency's structure.
He initiated a long-term trend of decentralization by giving regional directors
greater loan approval authority. In addition, to publicize agency services, Home
appointed an Assistant Administrator for Public Relations and established
Small Business Advisory Councils at the regional, state, and national levels.8
Decentralization improved SBA visibility in the small business community
but eventually caused problems with staffing and inadequate Central Office
oversight. For the moment, however, the SBA enjoyed a reputation as a com-
petent, customer-oriented agency.
The SBA's standing within the executive branch improved dramatically,
with the agency receiving strong backing from both President Kennedy and
Secretary of Commerce Luther H. Hodges. Kennedy was pleased with the
SBA's growth; Home recalled that "he wanted me to keep on pushing for
loans and contracts to go higher." Moreover, the Commerce Department tem-
porarily abandoned its attempts to take over the SBA. A former small busi-
nessman, Secretary Hodges admitted that his department had historically
ignored small business. He looked approvingly on the expansion of the SBA,
saying, "It has now grown big, as a strapping boy gets bigger than his daddy."9
Congressional criticism of the SBA dissipated as a Republican presi-
dency gave way to a Democratic administration. C. Dale Vinyard even went
so far as to term the relationship between the SBA and Congress during the
Kennedy years as a "love feast." John Sparkman lauded the agency's "energy
and vigor," while Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.) praised its "unprec-
edented performance."10 And even though the Small Business Committees
grumbled about the continued existence of the Loan Policy Board, it exerted no
influence over SBA policymaking (President Lyndon B. Johnson abolished the
board in 1965).n In general, the agency's performance pleased the committees.
The Smalls Versus the "Not-So-Smalls"
This positive assessment did not go unchallenged, with criticism emanating
from predictable sources. The editors of the Wall Street Journal repeatedly
denounced the SBA as a "highly questionable venture" that kept marginal
businesses alive when they should have died a natural death. The Journal was
dismayed at the agency's growth and lamented that "small" was a "stretchable
word, whether for measuring small business or its appointed shepherd." In
fact, Journal editors advocated eliminating the SBA altogether.12
Yet, surprisingly, it was a Democrat, Senator William Proxmire (D-Wis.),
who emerged as the SBA's chief congressional nemesis. Proxmire described
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himself as an "eclectic middle-of-the-roader" who favored "economy in gov-
ernment" and hated "special privilege." He spent a thirty-year career in the
Senate waging a one-man war on government waste. The senator also chaired
a Subcommittee on Small Business. In 1964, he published Can Small Business
Survive?, warning that the littlest businesses faced a crisis.Not only did they
generally lack long-term capital, but they were also excluded from suburban
shopping centers and often met with stiff competition from discount stores.
Proxmire advocated a national "fair trade" law to equalize the prices of chain
stores and independents. His book drew attention to the difficulties of "Mom-
and-Pop" firms. Although "small" businesses (defined as companies with fewer
than five hundred employees) maintained their position vis-a-vis big busi-
ness, the tiniest establishments (zero to three employees) were rapidly losing
market share.13
Proxmire's fiscal conservatism and preference for "little" business led
him to oppose increases in SBA spending. The maverick senator raised the
issue of interest-group representation: whom did the SBA represent? He char-
acterized the SBA as a "big-spending agency" that offered only a modicum of
support to the "truly small businessman." In Proxmire's eyes, the SBA had
"become a medium-size or even a big business administration."14
Congress faced the issue of the smalls versus the "not-so-smalls" when a
financial crisis struck the SBIC industry in 1962. The near-collapse of the
SBICs showed that the economies of scale inherent in organized venture capi-
tal investment made it impossible to aid very small firms. Congress resolved
the crisis by expanding the program to include much larger firms. Hence,
there was a certain irony to the idea of a "small business" program serving an
interest group of "big" businesses.
Between early 1961 and mid-1962, the SBIC industry rode a spectacu-
lar "popularity bubble." SBIC stock prices increased as much as 250 percent.
President Kennedy told investors that the program had "great potential as a
Fourth Banking system" and directed the SBA to publicize the advantages of
SBICs. Moreover, Congress increased SBA leverage and raised the ceiling on
SBIC investment in a single company to $500,000. During the ensuing "stam-
pede" for SBIC stocks, speculators convinced themselves that they were "get-
ting in on the ground floor of the growth companies of the future."15
But the euphoria was short-lived. In May 1962, the stock market crashed
and the bottom fell out of the SBIC sector. The bright optimism of 1961 gave
way to the dark pessimism of 1962 and 1963. Angry investors blamed the
SBA for overpromoting SBICs and not properly policing the industry. Many
inexperienced venture capitalists established SBICs for "the wrong reasons
and with the wrong abilities." One investment banker commented that "SBIC
stock issues were too often sold to people who didn't know what they were by
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people who didn't know what they were." Rumors of "shady goings-on" circu-
lated on Wall Street. And in July 1963, The Wall Street Journal reported cases
of "self-dealing" by SBIC directors who invested in their own companies.
Subsequent investigations brought more examples of wrongdoing to the sur-
face (see chapter 4).16
The crash revealed serious structural problems in the program. It was
evident that the SBA relied too heavily on low-interest loans to attract inves-
tors into the industry. Many SBICs, in turn, provided debt to small compa-
nies that needed equity investment. Although Congress had originally hoped
to channel investment dollars through small SBICs to very small businesses,
the diseconomies of scale made this impossible. The "minimum capital" SBICs
could not afford the staff needed to evaluate prospects and advise companies.
Furthermore, the costs of investigating small firms proved prohibitive. Ulti-
mately, industry analysts urged the SBA to abandon its emphasis on smallness
and concentrate on financing large SBICs serving large corporations.17
Senator Proxmire was virtually alone in his defense of the very smalls.
He called for structural reform, including possible elimination of the pro-
gram, because it offered "little or no help to the really small businesses, which
the SBICs were set up to serve." Other members of Congress were reluctant
to admit that the program had failed to meet its original objectives. In April
1963, the Small Business Committees submitted legislation increasing the
SBA debt available to SBICs and lifting the ceiling on investment; there were
no longer any limits on the amount an SBIC could invest in a single com-
pany. The authors of the legislation hoped that throwing money at the SBICs
would solve the problems of the industry—a hope that proved illusory.18
Procurement Preferences
The Kennedy years witnessed another debate over the fundamental principles
underlying SBA programs. The president's aggressive use of procurement pref-
erences for small business sparked an intense controversy over the equity of
size-based discrimination. Historians of affirmative action have cited prece-
dents—such as veterans' preferences—that violated the merit principle to as-
sist some "deserving" group, but they have overlooked one of the largest
nonracial preferences in existence prior to the mid-1960s: the small business
set-aside program.19 The theoretical justifications for set-asides bore a striking
resemblance to arguments later advanced in support of racial preferences. Pro-
ponents maintained that affirmative action was necessary to overcome past
and present discrimination against small business. Opponents of set-asides
maintained that this was a form of reverse discrimination that benefited the
"not-so-small" independents but did not help truly small businesses. This de-
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bate offered rare insight into the reasoning behind SBA preferences for small
business.
The Small Business Act authorized the SBA to "set aside" contracts for
small firms and prevent larger companies from bidding. During the 1950s
and early 1960s, the SBA resorted to two types of set-asides—total and par-
tial. A total set-aside reserved an entire contract for bidding by small firms
only. A partial set-aside broke procurement into two categories: competitive
contracts (open to large and small firms) and set-aside contracts. The military
negotiated a set-aside contract with a small company, but the firm's bid had to
be within 120 percent of the highest award made in the competitive-bid cat-
egory. The SBA and the procurement agencies "jointly determined" which
contracts would be set-aside. The volume of small business set-asides increased
steadily between 1954 and I960, from $161 million to nearly $1 billion, but
the program failed to reverse the long-term decline in the small business share
of military procurement dollars, which dropped from 25 percent to 16 per-
cent (small firms did much better in civilian procurement, securing half the
dollars spent by civilian agencies).20
The Small Business Committees constantly complained that small firms
did not receive a "fair proportion" of military contracts. They hoped the set-
aside program would boost the small business share and inject greater price
competition into government contracting by breaking up the cozy arrange-
ments that allegedly existed between procurement officers and large corpora-
tions. As a U.S. Senator, Kennedy devised additional uses for set-asides. In
1957, he proposed that government contracts be placed with firms operating
in poor communities. Three years later, he made a campaign pledge to signifi-
cantly increase the use of set-asides, a promise he implemented in his first year
in office.21
On 16 February 1961, Kennedy directed the Department of Defense
(DOD) to increase the small business share of defense contracts by 10 percent
in the coming fiscal year. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara devel-
oped "goals" and "quotas" for every branch of the military, "with a further
breakdown . . . going down to individual installations, activities, and bases."
Furthermore, the president ordered the military to use a little-known clause
in procurement regulations allowing the military to award a contract to the
smallest of companies making identical bids. Kennedy also backed legislation
granting preference to prime contractors who outsourced much of their work
to small firms.22
Concerned with achieving "tangible results," Kennedy appointed a White
House Committee on Small Business (WHCSB) to monitor the program's
progress and publicize the administration's efforts in this area. John Home
served as the chair of the WHCSB, which also included assistant secretaries
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from key government agencies. The WHCSB s agenda soon expanded be-
yond procurement to include a range of issues related to small business. The
group met monthly to develop a policy agenda and provide "sufficient grist
for programs and publicity statements."23
Kennedy's program of quotas and set-asides produced the desired result:
for the first time in seven years, the small business share of defense dollars rose
from 16 percent to 17.7 percent, thus meeting the goal set by the president.
The share of civilian procurement dollars awarded to small business also in-
creased substantially. The timing of the increase was critical because Congress
was becoming as quota-minded as the president. The Senate Small Business
Committee threatened to mandate a 20 percent quota if the president's target
was not met. Members of Congress could not agree on percentage goals; nev-
ertheless, there was general agreement—even among archconservatives such
as Barry Goldwater and Homer Capehart—that goals might be required.24
John Home warned the president not to oversell the set-aside program.
It was possible to achieve short-term results (hence the political popularity of
the program), yet set-asides failed to address the long-term problems of small
business in government contracting. Many small firms knew too little about
the defense sector, lacked legal advice about contractual obligations, and were
unprepared for the high volume of work often required by the military. Home's
warning was prescient—one year later, the small business share of defense
dollars dropped back to 15.8 percent.25
The set-aside program was beset with difficulties. First, it was debatable
whether small firms were "under represented." Advocates of set-asides pointed
to the disparity between the small business share of the private sector and its
share of military contracts. Overall, small manufacturing firms received less
than their comparable share of the private sector, but in half of all industries,
the smaller firms were actually overrepresented in military procurement. There
was no disparity in civilian procurement. Second, the set-aside program in-
creased the small business share in markets already dominated by small com-
panies, but did not significantly increase small-firm participation in industries
dominated by big business.26 The nation's largest corporations suffered no loss
of business; the set-aside burden fell upon firms that were large by industry
standards yet small when compared to the business population as a whole.
Set-asides penalized companies that had never "discriminated" against small
business, unless competition is synonymous with discrimination. Third, there
was the issue of "fronts"—subsidiaries of large corporations that qualified for
set-asides. "Fronts" also took the form of small companies that received a set-
aside and then subcontracted the work to a large corporation. The SBA lacked
the personnel to investigate whether small firms were "affiliated" with large
corporations; the agency relied on self-certification and policing by competi-
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tors.27 Fourth, the set-aside program did nothing to improve the profitability
of government contracting by small businesses, which one expert said was
"shockingly and appallingly poor."28 Finally, the demand for set-asides came
primarily from members of Congress rather than small contractors. Two large
surveys of small defense firms, taken in 1959 and 1960, found that the vast
majority rejected the idea that the military was biased in favor of big business.
Two out of three respondents believed that small companies could compete
effectively with large defense contractors. There was strong support for less
government regulation of procurement.29
The issue of preferences for small business turned controversial in 1961.
The Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) startled the SBA in November,
when it circulated a draft report highly critical of the agency and its role in the
economy. The CEA argued that by providing "subsidies" and "special treat-
ment" the SBA was "repealing the decisions of the market." For the first time,
SBA officials were called upon to provide a theoretical justification for gov-
ernment assistance to small business.30
The SBA and WHCSB relied heavily upon claims of "discrimination"
against small firms. First, they denied that an "ideal competitive system" ex-
isted. John Home stated that "small business today clearly does not have the
equality of economic opportunity" that it deserved. "It is," he wrote, "illusory
to speak of the 'market' as if it were a discrete entity." The government was
already so involved in the economy that it could not leave small business
unassisted. Since big business received its share of "special treatment," it was
only fair that the SBA counter with affirmative discrimination favoring small
firms. The WHCSB echoed Home's arguments by declaring that "an impor-
tant element of a positive policy toward small business is the elimination of dis-
crimination against the small firm" (italics in original). In the short term, this
meant the continuation of programs discriminating against "big" business.31
Supporters of the SBA believed that small business suffered from a "mani-
fold complex of discriminations," including the bias of procurement officers
and bankers who refused contracts and loans to qualified firms simply be-
cause they were small. The old belief in the self-reliance of small business
subsequently gave way to a new view that "small business cannot permanently
survive these discriminations" without government aid. Furthermore, advo-
cates of size-based preferences pointed to the alleged "institutional" discrimi-
nation evident in the disproportionate share of contracts awarded to big
business. Home admitted that small firms were less "efficient" than some
large corporations but attributed their inefficiency to the lingering effects of
past discrimination ("unfair practices, mergers which are harmful to competi-
tion, etc."). Small business advocates maintained that by favoring big business
the government was the greatest discriminator of all, partly because the subsi-
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dies provided to large firms gave these corporations a "headstart" in the com-
petitive race against small business. Military procurement, in particular, con-
stituted a "set-aside program for big business" because only large companies
could manufacture weapons systems. This "technological fact" necessitated
the creation of a small business set-aside program to "balance the scales."32
Proponents of preferences argued that institutional discrimination was
built into the American economy and government. Education and good-faith
efforts at eradicating discriminatory practices were not enough, because indi-
viduals were often not aware that they were discriminating against small busi-
ness. The antitrust laws dealt with overt discrimination on a case-by-case basis,
but "other forms of discrimination may escape prosecution because they dis-
criminate only indirectly among firms with regard to size." Thus, according
to the WHCSB, the only way to focus attention on the problem of discrimi-
nation was to set "percentage goals." (Advocates of race-based affirmative ac-
tion have made similar arguments. Barbara Bergmann, for example, states
that statistical goals are "energizing devices" that awaken institutional actors
to the problem of racial discrimination).33
Advocates of small business preferences contended that set-asides served
the national interest by promoting competition and decentralizing the indus-
trial base in case of "a red hot nuclear war." Actually, set-asides reduced compe-
tition in government contracting, but supporters feared oligopolies would
result if small firms were not given protection—an unlikely scenario in indus-
tries dominated by small business (e.g., janitorial services, construction). But,
above all, set-asides promised to preserve the "social and cultural values" asso-
ciated with small-scale enterprise. The House Small Business Committee de-
clared that preferences promoted "economic diversity." "Historically," the
committee reported, "America's strength has resulted in large part from her
diversity, from the fact that we are . . . a pluralistic society." Higher prices or
less competition in contracting were a small price to pay for "diversity."34
Of course, one person's "fairness" is another person's "discrimination."
Opposition to set-asides was concentrated in the construction industry, where
set-asides constituted a high percentage of government business. The SBA set
aside all military construction contracts under $500,000 for small business
bidding. Firms with a gross income exceeding $5 million could not compete
for these contracts. These "big" companies complained of reverse discrimina-
tion. In 1961 and 1962, the Associated General Contractors of America
(AGCA) convinced Representative Philip Weaver (R-Nebr.) and Senator
Harrison Williams Jr. (D-N.J.) to introduce legislation repealing the set-aside
program in military construction. Williams criticized the SBA for subsidizing
"inefficient and marginal small business contractors at the expense of solid
and responsible businessmen." Weaver argued that set-asides raised prices and
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violated the merit principle as well as the Fifth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion, which prohibited the arbitrary taking of property. He stated that "the
set-aside program . . . deprives all contractors who do not qualify as small
business of the right to bid . . . and thereby limits or destroys their constitu-
tional right to carry on a legitimate business."35
The AGCA lost its legislative bid to repeal the program but convinced
the SBA to hold hearings to evaluate whether the current size standards in
construction were "fair and equitable."36The hearings, held in February 1962,
revealed the contradictions of the set-aside program. The so-called "big" firms
complained of inflated bids and the low-quality work done by "inexperienced
contractors." Although their gross income exceeded $5 million, these compa-
nies relied on many small jobs. Their wholesale exclusion from small-scale
contracting had a negative impact on their bottom line. The big firms also
challenged the competitiveness rationale that underlay the set-aside program.
The president of Warren Brothers Company, R.F. Conard, pointed out that
there was no advantage to bigness in the construction industry and no threat
of oligopoly. On the contrary, small firms dominated the industry because
they had lower overhead costs. More significantly, the opponents of set-asides
argued that this "class distinction" violated the principles of a "competitive
free enterprise system." Consequently, they urged the SBA to adopt a policy
of size-blindness.37
The set-aside controversy exposed sharp lines of division within the small
business community. The NFIB reported that its membership was split be-
tween very small businesses—which claimed the set-asides helped only the
"not-so-smalls"—and the "larger independents," who felt discriminated against
because they had grown beyond the size standard set for their industry. The
NFIB leadership supported the set-aside program, while the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce joined the AGCA in opposing "preferential treatment" based on
firm size. The SBA ultimately rejected the AGCA's challenge. The agency
claimed that set-asides were necessary because several hundred large construc-
tion companies formed a "monopoly" in government contracting. According
to SBA statistics, ten percent of the construction firms in the nation received
over half of all military construction awards.38 This was hardly a "monopoly";
nonetheless, the agency considered this statistical disparity prima facie evi-
dence of a bias against small firms.
The debate over procurement preferences revealed the ironies of affir-
mative action for small business. In the name of "competition," Congress and
the SBA reduced the number of competing firms by excluding "big" business.
The AGCA pointed out the contradictions of this policy, but to no avail.
Politicians loved the set-aside program because it provided a tangible expres-
sion of their commitment to small business; it did not matter that most of
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these contracts would have gone to small firms anyway. Set-aside recipients
supported the policy because it eliminated the competitive threat of larger
rivals. Administrative considerations led SBA officials to rely upon set-asides
rather than reform the procurement process by expanding the scope of com-
petitive bidding. The agency's procurement specialists could not visit all of
the military installations in the country, nor could they eliminate the sup-
posed presence of discriminatory attitudes among the military's contracting
officers. Indeed, the SBA admitted that the primary benefit of the set-aside
program for the agency was that it saved time and effort.39
In his history of affirmative action, John David Skrentny writes, "The
most important thing one can know about a people is what they take for
granted." For example, during and after World War II, Congress approved a
"comprehensive affirmative action package" for veterans, with little or no de-
bate. After decades of controversy, policymakers agreed that veterans deserved
special treatment.40 Likewise, small business set-asides were immensely popu-
lar with members of both parties, because they took the inherent value of
small business "for granted." Although racial set-asides would later become
extremely controversial (see chapters 5-8), virtually no one applied the same
objections to procurement preferences for small business.
Perhaps military procurement officers were prejudiced against small
business, though the evidence was equivocal (why were civilian procurement
officers not equally prejudiced?). Perhaps the military relied too heavily upon
negotiated bidding, to the detriment of small business (though most small
firms preferred negotiated contracts to competitive bidding).41 Perhaps it was
impossible to make the defense sector truly competitive because of the
oligopolistic nature of military-related industries.42 Still, there was something
disheartening in the way the Small Business Committees treated small firms
as wards of the state. The rhetoric of free enterprise remained, but the sub-
stance was gone.
Kennedy, Big Business, and the SBA
One reason the SBA grew so rapidly in the Kennedy years was that it had the
strong backing of the president. Like Eisenhower, Kennedy recognized the
symbolic and political usefulness of the agency. The SBA played an important
role in shielding die president from charges that he was "antibusiness." John
Home defended Kennedy during and after several high-profile presidential con-
frontations with big business. He also lobbied for Kennedy's proposed tax cuts,
a successful measure that improved relations with the business community.
John F. Kennedy's presidency was marked by extreme hostility between
big business and the White House. Historians sympathetic to Kennedy have
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characterized the business reaction as a misunderstanding. They cite policies,
such as the tax cut of 1963—1964, as evidence of his "corporate liberalism."
An early chronicler of the Kennedy presidency went so far as to declare that he
was "one of the best friends the business community ever had." According to
this interpretation, America's corporate leaders misconstrued the president's
sloganeering ("get the country moving again") as a call for greater government
interference in the economy.43 The historical reality was more complex—
although Kennedy made overtures to big business, he also initiated actions
that provoked legitimate fear in the business community. Consequently, as
administrator of the SBA, John Home spent much of his time defending the
president from criticisms that he was "antibusiness."
During his presidential campaign, Kennedy portrayed himself as a new-
style Democrat who would cooperate with corporate America, and in his first
months in office, Kennedy called for a "full-fledged alliance" between busi-
ness, labor, and government. Privately, he told aides, "I'm not against busi-
ness. . . . I want business to do well. If they don't, we don't."44 But the president
did not really understand business. As historian Kim McQuaid puts it,
businesspeople "confused him. He did not know what made them tick, or
how to go about the job of reassuring them." Kennedy's top-level appoint-
ments reflected his discomfort with business. In contrast to Eisenhower, he
appointed more academics and fewer businessmen to high office. Many cor-
porate executives, in turn, considered Kennedy "an arrogant rich kid from
Harvard who had never met a payroll and would never care to learn."45
Some of Kennedy's economic policies antagonized business. He was
friendlier to labor unions than his predecessor had been, and he secured a
minimum wage hike in 1961. More importantly, in the first year of his ad-
ministration, the Justice Department filed over forty antitrust suits. Antitrust
advocates also grew more active in Congress and on the Supreme Court. Even-
tually, President Kennedy decided "to let sleeping antitrust laws lie." Thus, in
retrospect, historians have concluded that business's fears were unfounded,
yet there was no way of knowing this at the time.46
The Kennedy administration's first major confrontation with corporate
America involved the issue of small versus big business. In February 1961,
Luther Hodges attacked the privileged position of the Business Advisory Coun-
cil (BAC), a semi-official body made up of the nation's leading corporate ex-
ecutives. The BAC was a self-selecting body resembling a gentlemen's club of
millionaire managers. The commerce secretary demanded the right to ap-
prove new members, open BAC meetings to the public, and add small busi-
ness owners to the group. Hodges told the BAC that he represented "all the
businesses, big and little" and that they should, too. The Council refused to
go along, arguing that it was not an official government body, then went
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completely private and established a working relationship with other govern-
ment agencies. In the end, Kennedy decided to "kiss and make up" by siding
with the reconstituted Council rather than with Hodges.47
The "steel crisis" of 1962 proved even more damaging to Kennedys
reputation in the business community. In March 1962, the president secured
a noninflationary wage agreement between labor and management in the steel
industry. When several steel companies announced an increase in prices ten
days later, Kennedy claimed that they had "double-crossed" him (the steel
executives denied promising not to raise prices). Declaring that "this is war,"
Kennedy gathered a "crisis council" to face down the recalcitrant steel compa-
nies. He ordered the Defense Department to deny these firms government
contracts and directed the Justice Department to investigate them for possible
antitrust violations. The Federal Bureau of Investigation sent its agents on
predawn raids of the steel executives' homes, while Attorney General Robert
Kennedy placed wiretaps on their phones. To make matters worse, the news
media reported President Kennedy's statement that the steel men were "sons
of bitches." Kennedy terminated his war on the industry after the companies
agreed to retract their price increases, leading some critics to note the arbi-
trariness of his actions.48
Kennedy's "war" confirmed the worst suspicions of his critics. The issue
became a rallying point for opponents of Kennedy's economic policies. A poll
taken in 1962 found that 88 percent of the businesspeople surveyed thought
that the administration was antibusiness. Business executives began wearing
"S.O.B." buttons (for "Sons of Business" or "Save Our Business"), and many
blamed the subsequent stock market crash on the steel crisis. Meanwhile,
Republican congressional leaders accused the president of actions that were
"more characteristic of a police state than a free government."49
As SBA administrator, John Home publicly defended the president
against the charge that he was "antibusiness." Both Home and Kennedy ar-
gued that there was a silent majority of small business owners who supported
the president's policies. Kennedy drew a distinction between the self-appointed
"business spokesmen" and the mass of businesses (mostly small) who "ask the
Government for assistance." Home likewise complained of the business press
bias against the president. He commented that most small business owners
did not have the time to read Barron's, but "are nonetheless a remarkably en-
lightened group on the subject of the Government's relationship with busi-
ness." They knew, argued Home, that the conflict between government and
business was "imaginary."50
Shortly after the steel crisis, the White House Committee on Small Busi-
ness issued its final report, Small Business in the American Economy, written
largely by Home.51 The Kennedy administration used the report to wrap itself
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in the mantle of small business. Thus, Kennedy, like Eisenhower, used the
political symbolism of small business to deflect the criticisms of his oppo-
nents. The WHCSB report catalogued the many virtues of small enterprise,
including its ability to create jobs and spawn technological innovation. The
WHCSB extolled the political benefits of small business, which "decreases the
likelihood of excessive economic and political control." The committee also
associated small business with America's Cold War aims, a favorite theme of
President Kennedy. The report further suggested that small business was rhe-
torically useful "in the never-ending battle for the minds of men" and that
"the great American dream" of owning a business was "a devastating concept
to the promoters of Communism." The White House committee ended by
recommending that the federal government redouble its efforts to promote
small business.52
The president's relations with business improved in 1963, as the stock
market recovered and media attention turned to his proposal for a massive tax
cut. In January, Kennedy asked Congress to lower the income and corporate
tax rates to boost consumption and increase investment in business. The presi-
dent designed the corporate tax cut so that it would be "particularly benefi-
cial" to small corporations. He admitted that there was no general credit crunch
but noted that the aggregate statistics "mask the fact that thousands of small
or rapidly growing businesses" needed investment capital.53
John Home found it easy to sell the president's proposed tax cuts to
small business groups. The president received the support of the NFIB and
the National Advisory Council of the SBA. The Congressional Small Business
Committees also heartily endorsed the measure. Home believed that the sup-
port of the SBA and the Small Business Committees was crucial to the even-
tual passage of the legislation in February 1964. This orchestrated support
swayed members of Congress by showing that the tax cuts would benefit "a
great multitude of their [small business] constituents back home." Kennedy's
successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, also understood the popular appeal of small
business. When he signed the bill into law, Johnson stated that "business, as
well as individuals, benefit by this tax cut. And small business benefits the
most."54
Toward "The Other America"
The lingering business hostility toward the president did not reflect the pros-
perity of the Kennedy era. By 1963, the American economy was growing at a
record pace. The Senate Small Business Committee cheerfully reported that
"the brightest chapter in the annals of American business history was written
in 1963. The national economy gave a dazzling performance of capitalism at
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full throttle." Profits were up, business failures were down, and the stock mar-
ket was on the rise. The boom eventually lasted into 1969, making it then the
longest period of expansion in American economic history.55
Liberal policymakers within the Kennedy administration looked on the
prosperity as a challenge and opportunity to eliminate poverty. The last burst
of welfare-state building was a response to the economic desperation of the
Great Depression. By contrast, the Kennedy administration's nascent War on
Poverty was born of optimism and guilt. Reformers were confident that they
could eradicate poverty if the federal government devoted adequate resources
to the effort. Conscience-stricken liberals argued that the world's richest na-
tion had a moral responsibility to elevate the living standards of the poor.56
But most Americans were not interested in the issue of poverty; they were
leery of welfare spending and skeptical about the government's ability to abolish
poverty. Nevertheless, the movement for a "war on poverty" gained steam in
1963, as the "elite wisdom" moved in the direction of greater social activism.57
As presidential aides prepared for the War on Poverty, the administra-
tion faced a rising tide of civil rights demonstrations. In I960, black college
students conducted "sit-ins" at segregated lunch counters, hotels, libraries,
and swimming pools. One year later, "Freedom Riders" challenged the de
facto segregation of interstate busing by traveling to the Deep South, where
they met violent attacks from racist whites. In 1962 and 1963, the governors
of Mississippi and Alabama resisted the court-ordered desegregation of their
state universities, thus forcing the president to send in troops. In early 1963,
Martin Luther King Jr. led a successful campaign to desegregate the city of
Birmingham, Alabama, but only after the nation watched televised coverage
of the police attacking teenage demonstrators. These demonstrations culmi-
nated in the 28 August 1963 "March on Washington." King and others orga-
nized the march to demand passage of a law guaranteeing civil rights to all
Americans, regardless of race, color, or creed. This grassroots pressure forced
the president and Congress to consider stronger civil rights legislation. The
resulting Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited employment discrimination and
banned segregation in public accommodations, including those owned and
operated by private individuals or businesses.58
The events of 1963 moved the Kennedy Administration in a new direc-
tion. It was also time for a change at the SBA. In August 1963, Kennedy
appointed John E. Home to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLB)
and replaced him with Eugene Foley, an idealistic protege of Senator Hubert
Humphrey. The thirty-five-year old administrator was one of the youngest per-
sons to head a federal agency. Humphrey's influence on Foley was substantial.
The young administrator described himself as a "midwestern egalitarian . . . a
liberal Democrat, and a Hubert Humphreyite." He had served as Humphreys
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counsel on the Senate Small Business Committee and was one of the few Irish
Catholics to back Humphrey in his primary race against Kennedy in 1960. As
assistant secretary of commerce (1961—1963), Foley worked with the black
business community and was active in the civil rights movement. The March
on Washington, which took place the month Foley took office, galvanized
him.59
Accounts differ as to whether Foley used his influence with Humphrey
to remove Home from the SBA. A close friend of Home claimed that "he
didn't want to leave. Foley really engineered John being pushed out" (Foley
denies this charge). According to this source, the move to FHLB was a "sen-
tence to Siberia" for Home. However, Foley insists that the president wanted
someone at the SBA who would advance an agenda of social reform.60
In retrospect, Foley's appointment to the SBA was one of the most sig-
nificant actions taken by President Kennedy in the area of small business.
Three months later, Kennedy fell to an assassin's bullet, and his successor,
Lyndon Johnson, carried through on his promise to wage "war on poverty"
and racism. Eager to make his mark, Foley took advantage of the changed
political climate to advance his own version of the War on Poverty by promot-
ing the establishment of black businesses in the ghetto. In the next two years,
he transformed the agency into a vehicle for social change. Thus, Foley's ar-
rival marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of the SBA.
THE ENTREPRENEURIAL ERA
The years 1963 to 1965 marked the high tide of American liberalism. Policy-
makers were confident that they could solve problems—poverty, racism, ur-
ban renewal—that had confounded previous generations of reformers. Eugene
Foley was a product of these heady times. Young, idealistic, and unconstrained
in his vision of government-directed change, Foley led the SBA into new policy
terrain. Under his leadership, the agency developed antipoverty programs and
created a national network of volunteer counselors to provide free manage-
ment assistance to small businesses. Foley demonstrated the importance of
bureaucratic entrepreneurship as a cause of government growth.
During this period, the SBA pioneered race-conscious affirmative ac-
tion by promoting "disadvantaged" businesses, hiring minority employees,
and monitoring the hiring practices of SBA loan recipients. Agency officials
hid these developments from public view as they circumvented the color-
blind dictates of law and custom. By recognizing minority entrepreneurs as a
separate interest group, the SBA created a potential conflict with nonminority
business owners. These social programs also divided agency personnel.
Foley's Innovations
When Eugene Foley took over the SBA, he faced a propitious political envi-
ronment. The new administrator enjoyed the support of several key members
of Congress and the president. In 1963, Senator John Sparkman (D-Ala.) and
Representative "Wright Patman (D-Tex.) took over the congressional Banking
and Currency Committees; both men favored spending more on small busi-
ness. In November of the same year, the assassination of John F. Kennedy
elevated Lyndon B. Johnson to the presidency. As Senate Majority Leader,
Johnson had sponsored the SBIC program and advocated a bigger role for
the SBA. Johnson's running mate in the 1964 election, Senator Hubert
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Humphrey, was also a longtime champion of small business and Foley's politi-
cal mentor.1
Eugene Foley used this external political support to transform the SBA
into an innovative federal agency. First, he restructured the SBA to carry out a
reform agenda and eliminate internal opposition from conservative elements.
Foley was a "policy man," who disliked the day-to-day details of administra-
tion; therefore, he created an Office of the Executive Administrator to handle
routine administrative duties. He placed Ross D. Davis, a career bureaucrat,
at the head of this office. John Home's efforts at decentralization had left the
loan approval authority in the hands of fifteen regional directors, many of
who were conservative political appointees. Foley weakened these directors by
placing eight new area administrators above them and expanding the number
of Regional Offices to sixty-three. He then devolved greater authority to the
newly constituted regions. In public, Foley made a virtue out of political ne-
cessity by declaring, "We are taking SBA out of Washington. We are moving
it to Main Street." Yet his real motive was to clear a path for a series of innova-
tions he had planned for the agency.2
The young and ambitious administrator was determined to pioneer
uncharted policy terrain. Upon taking office, he asked agency staffers for new
ideas. Addison Parris, an economist whom Foley brought over from the Com-
merce Department, recommended offering financial assistance to needier ap-
plicants, including those who lacked the collateral to qualify for regular loans.
Officials in the Financial Assistance Division opposed this proposal, because
applicants would be risking little of their own money; the government would
be the loser if such a plan failed. However, Foley thought that the agency was
too conservative. He believed that the real beneficiaries of SBA lending were
the banks who had the risk taken out of their loans to small businesses. He
agreed with Parris that "our loans aren't reaching the risky type of business
that really needs it so badly." Consequently, Foley established a Small Loan
Program offering $15,000 loans based upon "character" rather than collateral.
There was a huge demand for these small loans; within six months, the agency
made $42 million in direct loans under the program. Fiscal conservatives feared
higher loss rates, but Foley took an optimistic view, noting the low delin-
quency rate in the first several months of operation.3
The Management Assistance Division was undoubtedly the weakest unit
of the SBA, with fewer than one hundred management counselors serving a
population of five million small businesses. Foley revolutionized management
assistance by developing the Service Corps of Retired Executives (SCORE), a
network of retired managers and owners who lent their expertise to "sick com-
panies" that could not afford a management consultant. In early 1964, the
agency established the first SCORE chapters in New England and quickly
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expanded the program nationwide. Within three years, more than thirty-five
hundred part-time volunteers were participating. Never before had the SBA
been able to offer one-on-one counseling on such a large scale.4
The Evolution of Affirmative Action
The SBA also participated in a civil rights revolution that transformed the
meaning of racial equality. During the Johnson years, federal agencies—in-
cluding the SBA—abandoned color-blindness (race neutrality) for color-con-
sciousness (race preference). The historian John David Skrentny attributes
this change to "administrative pragmatism." Earlier civil rights commissions
had dealt with racial discrimination on an individual basis, but officials even-
tually concluded that "discrimination was an injustice that was simply too
difficult to prove." Consequently, in the 1960s they found it simpler to keep
statistics on minority employment and cite any disparity as prima facie evi-
dence of discrimination, thus coercing employers into hiring minorities.
Herman Belz argues that this shift in emphasis was a "politically expedient re-
sponse" to the urban riots of die mid-1960s. Critics of affirmative action con-
tend that liberal bureaucrats and judges subverted die legislative intent of the
Civil Rights Act by imposing de facto "quotas." Such detractors argue that there
was litde popular support for racial preferences, even among civil rights groups.5
All three factors—pragmatism, crisis management, and elitism—explain
the evolution of affirmative action at the SBA. The SBA used statistics to
boost minority hiring within the agency and detect racial discrimination by
loan recipients. Although the civil rights agencies urged the SBA to adopt
results-oriented affirmative action, Foley needed no coaxing; he was eager to
promote this new conception of equality, even diough there was no basis for
preferences under the Civil Rights Act. The "urban crisis" of the mid-1960s
reinforced the preexisting bias in favor of affirmative action.
The SBA was historically slow to take action against borrowers who
practiced racial discrimination. In 1960, the General Counsel ruled that the
SBA had no authority to deny loans to businesses that discriminated against
minorities. In March 1961, President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10925
requiring federal contractors to take "affirmative action" to ensure that they
treated minorities fairly, but the directive did not authorize the SBA to penal-
ize companies guilty of discrimination. Two years later, the issue reemerged as
die Kennedy administration confronted southern governors who resisted court-
ordered desegregation. In April 1963, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission asked
the president to "explore his legal authority" to cut off federal spending to
Mississippi because of that state's opposition to desegregation. Kennedy criti-
cized the commission for suggesting such a radical proposal, which he thought
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was unconstitutional. Concurrently, the SBA's legal counsel determined that
the agency had no authority to deny financial assistance to a single state. Still,
the issue refused to die. In November, Senators Philip Hart (D-Mich.) and
Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.) asked Foley to withhold assistance from southern com-
panies that discriminated against African Americans. Foley concluded that he
did have this power but feared a sharp drop in lending if the agency enforced
a nondiscrimination rule. He preferred a policy of constructive engagement—
the SBA would continue lending to southern businesses that practiced dis-
crimination "with an eye to compliance by borrowers in accord with [Executive
Order 10925]. "6
As the SBA considered issues of nondiscrimination, civil rights leaders
debated the merits of racial preferences. Before 1964, most African American
leaders sought the elimination of segregation and other legal discrimination.
Martin Luther King Jr. cultivated white support by expounding upon a uni-
versalistic American Creed. Other activists, including A. Philip Randolph and
Bayard Rustin, worked to create a transracial alliance of poor whites and blacks.
White liberals, meanwhile, considered "the color-blindness of the Constitu-
tion as a settled thing." Yet a growing number of activists favored employ-
ment preferences as compensation for past discrimination. In 1963, the head
of the National Urban League, Whitney Young, called for a "domestic Marshall
Plan" to achieve economic equality for black Americans. The proposed plan
would compensate for "300 years of deprivation." But Youngs comments
aroused a firestorm of criticism from civil rights leaders, and he soon backed
away from his proposal.7
Other supporters of the civil rights movement recognized the historical
effects of discrimination and moved cautiously to endorse racial preferences.
For example, in 1962, Fortune writer Charles E. Silberman depicted African
Americans as victims of poverty and white racism. He concluded that "these
are sins for which all Americans are in some measure guilty and for which all
Americans owe some act of atonement." Silberman advocated "positive dis-
crimination" in education, job training, and outreach but skirted the issue of
employment preferences. During the next two years, the mainstream press
treated racial job preferences as a respectable, if not popular, position. In his
influential book Crisis in Black and White (1964), Silberman came out in
support of "reverse quotas" to counter the institutional racism that pervaded
the economy. Furthermore, given centuries of discrimination, Silberman
wrote, it was "unrealistic to assume that Negroes would be qualified. . . . The
only solution, therefore, is to hire unqualified Negroes and to train them on die
job." Similarly, in Why We Can't Wait (1964), Martin Luther King Jr. advocated
"compensatory or preferential treatment," but was careful to include the "for-
gotten white poor" in his proposed "Bill of Rights for the Disadvantaged."8
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Meanwhile, the Kennedy administration's civil rights bill provoked the
longest-recorded debate in congressional history, with the issue of racial pref-
erences at the center of the controversy. Title VII prohibited discrimination in
private employment, but critics insisted that it required employers to hire
minorities even if they were not the most highly qualified applicants. John C.
Satterfield, a past president of the American Bar Association, feared the pros-
pect of "racism in reverse." Senator Herman Talmadge (D-Ga.) maintained
that the proposed Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
could force employers to "give special preference to a particular class of people
or face loss of contracts or potentially severe penalties in Federal courts." Hubert
Humphrey denounced the bill's opponents for raising the "bugaboo" of quo-
tas to "frighten well-meaning Americans." He and the other sponsors of the
Civil Rights Act denied that the law required anything other than equal treat-
ment. Nonetheless, they assuaged critics by adding section 703 (j), which clearly
rejected the concept of racial preferences: "Nothing contained in this title
shall be interpreted to require any employer . . . to grant preferential treat-
ment to any individual or group."9
John David Skrentny notes that the "acceptance of the color-blind prin-
ciple of equal employment opportunity was at an all-time high in 1964." But
the victory proved short-lived. Even before the Civil Rights Act went into
effect (on 2 July 1965), there were renewed calls for preferences as compensa-
tion for past discrimination. In March 1965, Assistant Secretary of Labor
Daniel Patrick Moynihan issued a report advocating "national action" to deal
with the "tangle of pathology" associated with the black family. Moynihan
argued that the color-blind approach to civil rights was bound to fail, because
"equality of opportunity almost insures inequality of results." He predicted
that there would be "no social peace" if the federal government failed to secure
"equality of results" for black Americans. Several months later, Lyndon Johnson
told a graduating class at Howard University, "You do not take a person who,
for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the
starting line of a race and then say, 'You are free to compete with all the
others,' and still justly believe that you have been completely fair." Johnson
went on to say, "We seek . . . not just equality as a right. . . but equality as a
fact and equality as a result."10 Proponents of racial preferences now claimed
that the president supported their cause.
The EEOC moved away from a color-blind model of civil rights almost
immediately. The underbudgeted, understaffed agency faced a huge backlog
of complaints. After only one month in operation, the EEOC considered
ways to deal with broad racial disparities in employment rather than focus
exclusively on individual complaints. The new approach required the use of
employment surveys to measure minority representation in the workforce.
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The agency used these numbers to pressure employers into hiring African
Americans and other ethnic minorities. The riots of the mid-1960s intensi-
fied the pressure to achieve results. By the end of the decade, the EEOC had
become focused on numbers. As for the antipreferential provisions of Title
VII, they were, as one employee put it, "a big zero, a nothing, a nullity. They
don't mean anything at all to us."11
The SBA was an enthusiastic participant in this civil rights revolution.
Agency officials were deeply disappointed with the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
because it "seemed to fall short of the ambitious goals for uprooting discrimi-
nation . . . which were envisioned by President Johnson." Foley believed that
the act "did not go far enough." He was determined to "make a clean sweep of
racial discrimination by SBA borrowers," but the Civil Rights Act exempted
small businesses with fewer than twenty-five employees. Furthermore, Title
VI specifically exempted insurance and guaranty programs from the nondis-
crimination provisions of the law. Agency officials were horrified to learn that
these loopholes "prevented the denial of an SBA loan to a Birmingham, Ala-
bama, restaurant famous for its refusal to serve Negroes." Consequently, on 9
July 1964, Foley asked the Justice Department whether he had the authority
to regulate employment practices. In response, the Justice Department ruled
that section 4(d) of the Small Business Act gave the administrator broad pow-
ers to set policies "with reference to the public interest." Foley subsequently
used his authority to impose nondiscrimination requirements on recipients of
SBA assistance; specifically, new agency regulations prohibited discrimination
in employment and other business activities. Thus, the SBA was the first fed-
eral agency to use its general administrative authority to regulate the employ-
ment practices of loan applicants. These civil rights regulations served as a
model for other agencies.12
The SBA initially emphasized casework and voluntary compliance.
Agency oflPicials investigated complaints of racial discrimination and conducted
on-site reviews to identify potential violations. Upon discovering discrimina-
tion, the SBA could accelerate the loan maturity or take the borrower to court.
The agency also distributed pamphlets informing recipients that "passivity
equals noncompliance." One agency publication, in a reference to the riots of
1965-1966, noted the loss of business that resulted from economic boycotts
and social unrest. Voluntary compliance with the law, therefore, was good
business. But, like their counterparts at the EEOC, agency officials soon came
to rely upon workforce statistics to measure "discrimination." According to
one official, statistics were needed, because "there is quite a bit of unconscious
discrimination in all parts of our society."13
SBA officials used the above regulations to promote the hiring of mi-
nority workers by borrowers. The agency also used "affirmative action" to
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increase the percentage of loans granted to minority business owners. Here
the initial pressure came from above. One week after the Civil Rights Act
went into effect, Vice President Humphrey and the Civil Rights Commission
directed the SBA to collect "minority group data" on loan applicants.
Humphrey and the commission were "interested in the minority groups which
are significant in size . . . and which are known currently to be subject to
discrimination." They left no doubt as to which groups were to be included,
"These minorities are: Negro, American Indian, Mexican-American, and Puerto
Rican" (the SBA added a category for "Asian"). The agency needed little prod-
ding from the White House; Foley was already thinking in terms of racial
proportionalism. On 8 September 1965, he issued a directive explaining that
"when qualified applicants and employees who are members of a minority
group are numerically fewer than normally should be expected in a geographical
area, attempts should be made to discover the cause" and come up with plans
to "overcome this problem."14
The new racial reporting requirements placed the agency in a difficult
situation. Civil rights advocates had spent decades fighting against racial clas-
sifications because they were used to discriminate against African Americans.
When the EEOC argued for racial reporting in August 1965, there was an
uproar among liberals and civil rights groups. Racial classification, however
"benign," smacked of Jim Crow. Clarence Mitchell of the National Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), declared that "the
minute you put race on a civil service form . . . you have opened the door to
discrimination." He feared the use of racial categories would "put us back fifty
years."15 Consequently, SBA loan officers were told that they could not ask for
racial data. The staff director for the Civil Rights Commission, Howard
Rogerson, told members of the agency's Civil Rights Working Group that "in
setting up procedures we do not want the following to occur:
a. The placing of a question on race or national origin on any
application. . . .
b. Asking an applicant to state his race or national origin;
c. Marking racial or ethnic identification on any form or record
in the presence of an applicant."
Asking such questions could result in "possible embarrassment." In order to
gather the required information, loan officers would have to use "a little imagi-
nation and common sense."16 An agency historian, writing in 1968, described
the problem and solution in some detail. He wrote that "identification of
minorities was a serious problem. Practices of the day were opposed to di-
rectly involving a minority member in any formal identification procedure,
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since such procedures in the past had been used by others as a tool of discrimi-
nation." The agency therefore came up with "a method of visual observation."
Agency interviewers simply "made note of their ethnic background and later
recorded the information. As a result, a precise [!] evaluation of the effective-
ness of economic opportunity was made possible. . . . This system of identifi-
cation is unique in government, and is still in use at SBA."17
Eugene Foley also made affirmative action within the agency a "top pri-
ority." In 1963, he created the position of Special Assistant for Minority Groups
and selected Randall L. Tyus to fill the post. Tyus met with minority leaders
and recruited on college campuses. He used internal statistical reports to goad
area administrators into hiring minorities. By requiring reports, Tyus sent a
message that "we really mean business." The statistics allowed Tyus to identify
twenty "problem offices"—mostly in the southeast—that had few minority
employees. In March 1965, he directed area administrators to set hiring "goals"
and explain how they would achieve them. Tyus told the administrators that he
was interested in "getting results" and finding the most "effective methods" to
do so. Foley meanwhile set aside positions for "competent" minorities and women.
These preferences produced the desired result: between 1963 and early 1965,
the number of African American employees increased from 180 to 250 (roughly
7 percent of the agency workforce). The emphasis was clearly on African Ameri-
cans; Hispanics accounted for less than 1 percent of SBA employees.18
African Americans were not the only beneficiaries of affirmative action.
Foley sought a "break-through" in advancement for female employees and de-
clared that a special effort would "mark us as a leader" in women's rights. He set
aside top-level positions for women and created a "Women's Speaker's Bureau"
made up of female employees who toured the country to discuss careers in
government and business. Foley also authorized loan officers to make microloans
to women-owned businesses. As a result, the number of loans to female business
owners increased from 2 percent to 5 percent of the agency total.19
Black Enterprise and the War on Poverty
Eugene Foley's most significant advance in affirmative action was his ambi-
tious plan to promote the start-up of African American businesses. He was
primarily interested in the advancement of minority enterprise but was quick
to sense that "poverty was in the air" when he took over as administrator.20
Foley expanded his minority enterprise program by wedding it to the War on
Poverty. The high hopes of 1964, however, soon gave way to disillusionment.
The program suffered from bureaucratic bickering, budgetary restrictions,
internal opposition, an agency financial crisis, and above all, a naive optimism
in the agency's ability to groom entrepreneurs among the disadvantaged.
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Foley first became involved with African American business during his
days at the Commerce Department. In July 1961, Asa Spalding, president of
North Carolina Mutual Life, asked Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges to
hold a conference on Negro business. Spalding argued that the federal gov-
ernment could no longer afford to neglect the needs of black business. Hodges
agreed to sponsor a conference in late November and sent Foley to act as his
deputy. The meeting attracted a diverse group of business owners, academics,
and government officials.21
The political climate had changed considerably since the last conference
on Negro business in 1946. Energized by the civil rights movement, the con-
ferees rejected the "separate-economy" philosophy of the past and focused on
ways to integrate African American business into the economic mainstream.
The decline of a segregated market meant that black business owners needed
to seek new opportunities outside their communities. The conferees agreed
that black businesses should consider relocating and hiring white employees
to compete more effectively in an integrated economy.22
Conference speakers also discussed black business's role in the Cold War.
The chairman of the conference, Representative Charles C. Diggs Jr. (D-Mich.)
stated that the Kennedy administration was "including us in the drive . . . to
help in the Nation's global struggle with the Sino-Soviet block" (sic). Asa
Spalding believed that black entrepreneurs served as role models for the Third
World; they were capitalist success symbols for the "underprivileged peoples
and underdeveloped nations." Other speakers saw an opportunity to combine
politics with profit making. LeRoy W Jeffries, the vice-president of Johnson
Publishing Company, noted the business opportunities in the newly indepen-
dent nations of Africa. But, equally important, black business owners could
act as economic ambassadors to Africa: "Who can be a better salesman of
democracy in Africa," he asked, "than an American Negro businessman with
some worthwhile product or service to offer?"23
In 1961, African American business leaders made few demands upon
the federal government. They continued to emphasize self-help and embraced
a color-blind model of business—government relations. Their goal was one of
equal access to existing services, rather than the creation of separate programs
for African Americans. The conferees were aware of white racism and its nega-
tive impact on black business. For example, African American firms were not
welcome in most national trade associations; consequently, they lacked access
to technical and managerial aids. The conferees therefore urged the Com-
merce Department and SBA to publicize the financial and managerial assis-
tance available from the government. There was also discussion of a proposed
"Marshall Plan" to raise venture capital through a national nonprofit founda-
tion, but the concept of government financing never arose. The general con-
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sensus was that African American businesses would have to rely upon the
private sector.24
During the early 1960s, several government officials proposed establish-
ing a separate program for black enterprise, yet the SBA initially rejected their
proposals. In May 1961, Ross Davis wrote a memorandum to John Home
urging him to increase assistance to African American business, but Home
was uninterested. One year later, the Drexel Institute of Technology contacted
the agency's regional office in Philadelphia with a proposal to promote small
businesses run by members of "certain socio-economic groups," but the agency
declined their proposal. The Executive Director of the President's Commis-
sion on Equal Employment Opportunity, John Feild, also sought SBA spon-
sorship for a pilot project to aid black business. When Home rejected his
request, Feild turned to the Area Redevelopment Administration (ARA), where
George H. Robinson, Special Assistant for Minority Affairs, had conceived
similar plans of his own. In June 1963, the ARA joined with several Philadel-
phia groups—including the Drexel Institute, the city government and the
Philadelphia Fellowship Commission—to establish a Small Business Oppor-
tunities Corporation (SBOC). The ARA granted technical assistance to the
SBOC, but the new corporation lacked financial support.25
Eugene Foley was enthusiastic about the SBOC project. On 28 January
1964, he held a press conference in Philadelphia announcing the creation of a
new microloan program under SBOC auspices. Participants received man-
agement training and a $6,000 loan with a six-year maturity. These "6-by-6"
loans were open to all businesses, but Foley made a special effort to reach the
black business community, which the agency had long neglected (according
to an informal survey, the SBA had made only seven loans to black businesses in
Philadelphia during the previous ten years). Although the program was techni-
cally color-blind, Foley spoke of "Negro loans" and "jobs for minorities."26
There was a huge demand for these low-interest loans. In the first month
of operation, the SBOC received more than one thousand applications. Most
of the initial demand came from white applicants, but the number of applica-
tions from African Americans quickly and substantially increased. During 1964,
the agency approved nearly one hundred loans to black businesses in Philadel-
phia. The early statistics looked good—the regional office reported "abso-
lutely no delinquency" in the first six months. Encouraged by his success,
Foley set up additional pilot loan programs in San Francisco, New York, Wash-
ington, and Camden, New Jersey.27
The Philadelphia project had a dual mission: to generate jobs for die
poor and to create symbols of African American success in business. It was not
enough to increase the number of black firms—the Philadelphia area already
had over four thousand; the SBA wanted to elevate the standing of the busi-
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ness owner in the black community. Agency officials held a low opinion of
black business. Randall Tyus lamented that the "Negro businessmen do not
. . . represent very useful models" for African American youth. Foley charac-
terized the typical black entrepreneur as "a very small businessman—who is
generally not a very good businessman and, frankly, not a very significant
factor in the Negro community." The federal government, he argued, was the
only institution capable of improving upon this dismal record of entrepre-
neurial failure.28
The microloan program gained a big boost from the Johnson admin-
istration's War on Poverty. In March 1964, President Johnson submitted leg-
islation to Congress creating an assortment of antipoverty programs, with the
Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) as the chief coordinating body. The
War on Poverty stressed opportunity ("a hand up, not a handout") in the form
of job training. But it was not enough to create jobs that lifted people barely
above the poverty line; the administration raised expectations by promising
upward mobility. Hubert Humphrey stated that "any training program calcu-
lated to make them successful janitors and housemaids for the rest of their
lives is simply not going to be acceptable." Based on his brief experience with
the Philadelphia project, Foley convinced Senator Humphrey to insert a small-
loan provision in Title IV of the Economic Opportunity Act, the enabling
legislation for the War on Poverty.29 The agency proposed a "15-by-15" loan
program with a 100 percent loan guarantee (rather than the usual maximum
of 90 percent). The SBA would offer loans to people with "very low incomes"
and to businesses that hired the hard-core unemployed. The sponsors of Title
IV maintained that it was a profitable investment in the poor. Humphrey
defended the program by stating, We are making loans to people, not because
we like them, not because we feel sorry for them, but because we think they
can put the money to good use." Yet the agency would have to relax credit
criteria by focusing on the "character" of applicants rather than their business
experience. Conservatives predicted that the Economic Opportunity Loan
(EOL) program would be a money-loser for the government. If banks re-
fused to make loans to these applicants, they asked, how could the SBA
assure that they would be repaid? But the measure had the backing of liberal
Republicans in the Senate, including Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.), who amended
the bill by increasing the maximum loan amount to $25,000. Title IV passed
easily and was generally disregarded in the heated debate over the War on
Poverty.30
The SBA used Title IV funds to pursue the dual mission of creating jobs
and "advancing the Negro in the business world." Foley was careful to note
that poor people of all races could apply for EOLs, but an agency official later
admitted that "the program was definitely oriented toward minority groups,
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particularly Negroes." Title IV also embodied the "community action" ele-
ment of the War on Poverty. The law mandated the creation of Small Business
Development Centers (SBDCs) to locate applicants for EOLs and provide
them with management assistance. These community boards consisted of
business owners, poor people, and social workers.31
The EOL program was beset with difficulties, including several acts of
God. In March 1964, a massive Alaskan earthquake drained nearly $100 mil-
lion from the agency coffers. A record-high demand for business loans inten-
sified the financial strain on EOL. The situation worsened over the course of
the year. In fiscal year 1965, the agency spent over $200 million on disaster
aid—more than in all previous years combined—but only $10 million on
EOL.32
One of the major problems the agency faced was the lack of personnel
needed to run the antipoverty program. The Bureau of the Budget (BOB) had
set a ceiling on the number of SBA employees, forcing Foley to cannibalize
existing departments. The president's drive for economy in government op-
erations made it difficult for Foley to hire the workers he needed. Foley espe-
cially wanted African Americans to work on the frontlines of EOL, but he
could not locate qualified loan officers to fill these positions.33
The SBA's "banker culture" worked against this social experiment. Loan
officers were accustomed to applying relatively stringent credit criteria to loan
applications; EOL violated everything they knew about the economics of lend-
ing. These "old-line employees" did not like the new way of doing business.
As one participant observed, the agency's war on poverty was defeated by "an
old structure, old policies, and old methods of operation."34
The EOL program suffered from bureaucratic bickering with OEO and
the Budget Bureau. OEO provided the funding for SBDCs but set a low
priority for the small business part of the War on Poverty. Foley wanted to
establish one hundred SBDCs throughout the country, but OEO limited them
to cities that already had "community action" programs. Consequently, the
agency had only thirty-five SBDCs in operation at the end of 1965. Further-
more, the Budget Bureau ruled that the SBA could offer EOLs only through
SBDCs, thus limiting the reach of the program (Congress repealed this re-
striction two years later). Foley lost further control of EOL funds as cities
outside his targeted areas demanded and received EOL money.35
Most important, the selection criteria used to judge EOL applicants
were fundamentally flawed. Foley assumed that capable business owners lay
"often hidden, under layers of poverty, racial prejudice, and undeveloped tal-
ent." With a little assistance, he argued, these individuals could "bloom" into
successful entrepreneurs.36 But how was the SBA to locate this undiscovered
talent? The instructions to agency loan officers were sentimentally vague. The
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Deputy Administrator for Financial Assistance, Logan B. Hendricks, set forth
the EOL credit criteria in a memorandum to all agency loan officers. He
stated that the "character" of loan applicants was more important than their
business experience or assets. Loan officers were to investigate an applicant's
"honesty, morality, family stability, [and] personal habits." Yet they should
not automatically disqualify applicants who had a criminal record. Hendricks
wrote that "poverty breeds law infractions." An applicant's "character must be
judged . . . in relation to the environmental conditions that have created or
established the character of the individual in the first place." Hendricks then
provided a concrete example of an ex-convict accepted into the program: "a
woman convicted of mail fraud was found to be an acceptable applicant be-
cause of a complimentary letter from her probation officer who mentioned
the fact that the woman was a victim of an extended liaison with a man of
poor character, which was contributory to her wrongdoing. The probation
officer offered a favorable prognosis, too, for the woman's eventual rehabilita-
tion."37 Thus, guilt over poverty and racism caused agency officials to "blame
the system" while excusing the bad behavior of poor people.
SBA loan officers faced a dilemma. On the one hand, they were to give
applicants every benefit of the doubt. However, Hendricks warned that loans
to "persons of questionable character" could result in negative public relations
for the agency.38 How could loan officers determine "character" when the
system was to blame? When was an individual responsible for his or her be-
havior? This conundrum was symptomatic of the time—holding the poor
accountable for their actions was considered "blaming the victim."39 Little
wonder, then, that loan officers thought the EOL program was an exercise in
wishful thinking.
The events of summer 1965 transformed EOL from an experiment in
social policy into a program designed to alleviate the "root causes" of the "ur-
ban crisis." The SBA had some forewarning of urban violence; during the
summer of 1964, black rioters had clashed with police and looted hundreds of
stores in Harlem and several other northern cities. And in March 1965, SBA
General Counsel Philip Zeidman informed Foley that knowledgeable people
were predicting a "long, hot summer of race relations." Zeidman outlined a
possible role for the SBA in "future racial controversies," including the estab-
lishment of SBDCs in riot cities. Zeidman's letter was prescient. On 11 Au-
gust, a routine arrest of a drunk driver in the Watts section of Los Angeles
sparked a riot that lasted five days and took the lives of thirty-four people.
Rioters looted and set fire to stores, as bystanders chanted, "Burn, baby, burn!"
The Watts riot ushered in four "long, hot summers" of mayhem. Between
1965 and 1968, there were over three hundred riots resulting in two hundred
deaths and the destruction of several thousand businesses.40
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One week after the Watts riot ended, President Johnson sent a team of
federal officials—including a representative from the SBA—to visit the riot-
torn city. The White House promised substantial assistance in rebuilding Los
Angeles. The president's goal was to "eliminate the deep seated causes of riots"
by promising massive aid to Los Angeles and other "distressed" cities.41 Black
rioters had elicited a sympathetic response from the nations leaders. This com-
bination of black rage and white guilt signaled the beginning of the end for
the moderate civil rights movement. Rioters learned that the police could not
contain mob violence. Militants perceived that violence attracted the atten-
tion of political leaders and the media. This vicious cycle continued until the
end of the decade, when the riots faded from the urban scene.
The Watts riot marked the end of Foley s tenure at the SBA. Lyndon
Johnson selected him to head the newly created Economic Development Ad-
ministration (EDA) within the Commerce Department. Among his duties,
Foley was a "troubleshooter" in cities experiencing racial unrest. His first as-
signment was Oakland, California, which the Federal Bureau of Investigation
designated as the city most likely to become the "next Watts." As he headed to
Oakland, Foley did not conceal his sympathy for the Watts rioters. He and
assistant Amory Bradford believed the riot was "a reaction of justified anger
and despair." Foley used the rhetoric of black militants to justify a dramatic
increase in federal aid to the cities, proclaiming that "the Negro's sounds of
'NOW!' are not irrational or threats; they are a cry of desperation; a plea for
help." The only solution to the riots was the creation of "jobs with dignity."
Consequently, Foley secured $23 million in economic development grants for
Oakland. One year later, he left the EDA to pursue a successful career as a
consultant to small companies, but he and Bradford claimed an early victory.
In Oakland's Not for Burning (1968), Bradford admitted that "while the EDA
program has not yet placed anyone in a job," it was the "real turning point" in
Oakland. There was never a riot in Oakland, but if joblessness was the "root
cause" of civil disorder, then the EDA contributed little to the peace, since the
project produced only twenty new jobs!42 Perhaps the mere gesture of gener-
osity forestalled violence, though similar initiatives failed to prevent other
cities from burning.
Before leaving the SBA, Foley proposed merging it with EDA. He had
initially refused the president's request to take over EDA, because it involved
a cut in pay. Johnson promised that he would try to transfer the SBA so that
Foley could retain his salary. Fierce congressional opposition dissuaded the
president from delivering on his promise. Nevertheless, for nearly a year after
Foley's departure, the SBA lacked an Administrator. Ross Davis served as de
facto Acting Administrator, but as a career bureaucrat he lacked the imprima-
tur of a presidential appointment.43
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Conclusion
The Foley years were exciting ones for the SBA. The young administrator
exuded energy and enthusiasm for new ideas; he was a "policy entrepreneur"
par excellence. Policy entrepreneurs "identify new missions and programs for
their organizations" then cultivate external (and internal) constituencies to
support their policies.44 In the space of two years, Foley created a national
network of management consultants (SCORE), waged a small-scale war on
poverty (EOL), and pioneered new forms of affirmative action. He also se-
cured a broad increase in funding for the agency's lending programs (the total
volume of business loans hit a record high of $468 million in 1964).45 He
achieved these administrative successes by circumventing internal opposition
and drawing upon external political support.
Foley took advantage of policy initiatives tangentially related to small
business and thereby expanded his bureaucratic domain. He succeeded de-
spite the declining salience of the traditional small business agenda. The "bread-
and-butter" issues of small business (financing, management assistance,
taxation) receded into the background for the duration of the 1960s, as presi-
dent and Congress grappled with more pressing problems, including civil rights
and the War on Poverty. Yet Foley successfully exploited these issues and turned
them to his advantage.
Like other bureaucratic entrepreneurs, Foley saw a "window of opportu-
nity" develop as the political climate turned in favor of activist government.
During this period, President Johnson won an impressive series of legislative
victories by engaging in the "politics of overpromise." The Eighty-ninth Con-
gress created innumerable agencies and enacted countless laws addressing ev-
erything from poverty to pollution. James Sundquist notes that, in the space
of two years, the liberal view of government's potential went "from gloom to
euphoria." The affluence of the 1960s contributed to the "hope and hubris"
of Great Society liberalism. Expectations were high, and public faith in the
government's ability to deliver on its promises was equally high.46
This optimism and "can-do" attitude imbued Foley and his associates at
the SBA. He, too, pledged to attack poverty and racism through lending pro-
grams and new racial preferences. But by promising to do so much, Foley
raised the stakes for the SBA. Could the agency deliver in so many unrelated
areas? Or would the bureaucracy buckle under the strain of too many respon-
sibilities? How much internal support did Foley really enjoy? Most important,
could the agency adapt to the ever-changing circumstances of the 1960s? Or
would future administrators be locked into programs that showed initial prom-
ise but soon outlived their usefulness?
Policy entrepreneurs are often admired for their boldness and willing-
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ness to represent the "voiceless," but as political scientist James Q. Wilson
observes, "Such a process. . . can result in programs that do not work well, or
work at all."47 In addition, zealous policy innovators frequently lack the ad-
ministrative skill or desire to carefully implement and monitor new programs.
Foley relinquished this role by creating a new Office of the Executive Admin-
istrator but failed to construct an effective organizational structure.
Foley also ran into a bureaucratic culture leery of change, a problem that
worsened with time. SBA lending officers maintained a "banker's mentality"
and were skeptical about the social programs initiated by Foley and his associ-
ates. Employees of the Financial Assistance Division were accustomed to fol-
lowing formal rules concerning eligibility and loan criteria; their perceived
mission was to keep loss rates low. On the other hand, the agency's poverty
warriors bent existing rules to achieve social change as rapidly as possible. The
two factions served different interest groups: loan officers had built a clientele
of firms with well-established credit histories, while the poverty officials reached
out to African American groups. These two conflicting subcultures—tightfisted
"bankers" and social activists—coexisted uneasily. The tensions between them
increased as the "urban crisis" worsened in the late 1960s.48
The SBA took part in a civil rights revolution that turned the "plain
meaning" of the Civil Rights Act on its head.49 Swiftly and self-consciously,
SBA officials abandoned the color-blind tradition of the civil rights move-
ment by classifying applicants according to race. How could such an unpopu-
lar policy—opposed by conservatives and liberals alike—become the de facto
law of the land? Part of the answer is administrative pragmatism. The SBA
began informally collecting racial statistics on borrowers as early as 1964. These
statistics provided agency administrators with a crude measure of civil rights
compliance and highlighted the importance of reaching out to the minority
community. But the numbers also sanctioned a color-consciousness that was
previously unimaginable. For nearly a century, civil rights activists had held to
a philosophy of color-blindness embodied in Justice John Marshall Harlan's
famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson ("There is no caste here. Our Constitution
is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens").50 None-
theless, the practical administrative logic of record keeping overcame ideologi-
cal scruples. The SBA, like the EEOC and other federal agencies, simply lacked
die personnel needed to monitor civil rights compliance on a case-by-case basis.
Although the record keeping of the Foley era did not produce "hard and fast"
quotas, it did inject a new race-consciousness into the agency's operations.
The EOL program, with its emphasis on "Negro loans," reinforced this
tendency. The color of an applicant's skin now mattered, because it repre-
sented victimhood. But if African Americans were victims, how could the
SBA distinguish between those who had the ability to succeed in business and
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those who did not? Would SBA officials let sentiment impair their judgment?
Certainly, the admission of ex-convicts did not bode well for the future suc-
cess of the program. Were good intentions enough? Could the agency simply
wish away the harsh realities of a competitive economy?
Agency officials still had not decided whether the program's aim was one
of integration or separation. The "Negro loan" program attempted to achieve
two contradictory aims. On the one hand, Foley insisted that firms catering
to a segregated market had a "limited future." The black business owner had
to "cut racial ties and move his enterprise out into the mainstream." Yet the
SBA sought to create role models within existing black neighborhoods, thus
intensifying their reliance upon a "Negro market."51 If the goal was integra-
tion (i.e., creating success stories in the larger business world) the agency would
have to encourage the "best and brightest" African Americans to start their
own businesses, but SBA officials made no attempt to do so. Moreover, the
government's affirmative action programs worked at cross-purposes: federal
agencies and government contractors recruited college-educated managers from
African American businesses and offered them better pay and benefits; few
were willing to exchange the security of a salaried position for the risks of
starting a small business.52
Administrative pragmatism only partly explains the changes in the
agency's civil rights policy. Before 1964, SBA officials recognized legal limits
on their ability to enforce nondiscrimination in hiring. The success of sit-ins,
the March on Washington, and the passage of the Civil Rights Act changed
the tenor of the movement by raising expectations for immediate progress.
These exhilarating victories quickly transformed American liberalism. In the
early 1960s, liberal supporters of the civil rights movement had admired the
"amazing patience" of African Americans, who had endured centuries of ra-
cial oppression. By 1965, there was a new emphasis on achieving "equality as
a fact." Many moderate civil rights advocates, like Eugene Foley, were now
liberals in a hurry. Patience and perseverance gave way to haste in the execu-
tion of policies that were untried and unproven. Foley's personal ambition
contributed to this change in attitude, but the agency also faced pressure from
the White House and the various civil rights agencies.
Foley's abrupt departure in August 1965 left the agency leaderless and
adrift. The SBA had nearly exhausted its financial resources as well as its em-
ployees. But with Foley gone from the scene, agency officials had time to
ponder the legacy of his administration. Foley's eventual successor reorga-
nized and reformed agency operations, just in time for another round of policy
entrepreneurship in response to the terrible riots of 1967-1968.
CRISIS AND CONSOLIDATION
"The Sixties" conjures up images of a nation torn nearly asunder by racial and
political conflict; popular memory flickers with televised footage of police
brutality and riots, assassinations and antiwar demonstrations. The years be-
tween 1965 and 1968 were among the most tumultuous of this crisis-filled
decade. The easy, can-do confidence of the early sixties gave way to over-
heated rhetoric and apocalyptic predictions of race war, yet America survived
the upheavals of this period.
This was similarly a period of crisis and consolidation for the SBA.
The "urban crisis" forced the agency to expand its affirmative action pro-
grams and make them explicitly race-based. The SBA's interest-group repre-
sentation became more heterogeneous as officials increased size standards to
bail out SBICs and rescue one of the nation's largest corporations from bank-
ruptcy. Through it all, the agency's traditional programs expanded and
grew more reliant upon the private sector. In short, the SBA emerged from
the crucible of the late 1960s far different from the agency that entered the
decade.
Time of Troubles
For nearly a year after Eugene Foley's departure, the SBA lacked an adminis-
trator. This continued uncertainty produced a crisis of confidence. On 4 May
1966, Executive Administrator Ross Davis called a meeting of area adminis-
trators and regional directors to discuss the agency's mission. He and others
questioned the rationale of the SBA's direct loan program. The agency found
it difficult to "weed out" creditworthy borrowers who sought SBA loans in
lieu of bank financing. Davis also criticized the "irrationality" of subsidized
interest rates—the agency should charge higher rates on money lent to high-
risk borrowers. An agency economist, Padriac Frucht, echoed this concern
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over the unsound economics of direct lending. He further noted that below-
market rates created an insatiable demand for agency funds. Frucht predicted
that if current trends continued, the agency would soon be "using billions and
billions of taxpayer dollars with no limit in sight with a tremendous vested
interest block [sic], a strong Congressional group, and no apparent means of
[budgetary] control. . . . This is a terrifying thought." Looking back on the
rapid growth of the Horne-Foley years, Frucht declared that "we are getting
into the big leagues. We are on the edge."1
SBA officials also questioned the agency's role in the War on Poverty.
The early flush of success gave way to disillusionment with a program that
pleased no one. By the end of 1965, nearly one-third of the original "6-by-6"
loans were delinquent or in liquidation. The head of the EOL program, Ben-
jamin Goldstein, reported that "we've had a tremendous amount of com-
plaints—from [SBDCs], from Negro businessmen, from Congressmen, from
everybody." Regional directors especially hated EOL, because the credit stan-
dards were "exceptionally low"; they did not like making loans to "extremely
small businessmen" with little or no collateral.2
These controversies highlighted the need for a strong administrator to
impose order on agency operations and give the SBA a sense of direction. In
May 1966, President Johnson selected Bernard Boutin to become the next
head of the SBA. A strong-willed, effective administrator, Boutin had served
as head of the General Services Administration (1961—1964) and later as
Deputy Director of the OEO (1965—1966). Loyal to Johnson and on good
terms with Congress, the White House counted on Boutin to "shake up SBA"
from top to bottom. His appointment heartened congressional small business
advocates and put to rest the lingering rumor of a hostile takeover.3
Boutin's no-nonsense management style contrasted sharply with that of
his predecessor. Unlike Foley, he believed in a hands-on approach to agency
administration. It was clear that the SBA desperately needed new leadership.
Within months of taking his post, Boutin notified the White House that the
agency was "almost completely adrift," morale was "at an all time low," and
the organizational structure was "chaotic." Moreover, serious personnel prob-
lems existed, with job training "practically nonexistent." Employees arrived
late to work and took long "Martini luncheons." The bureaucracy was riddled
with "political hacks" who contributed little to the organization. In short, the
SBA was "knee-deep in incompetence."4
Reversing recent trends, Boutin centralized responsibility for loan liq-
uidation, procurement, and computer data gathering. He also imposed "in-
ternal discipline" on malingering employees, especially those at the higher
ranks. Boutin reassigned workers to positions for which they were qualified
and instituted job training for those who needed to upgrade their skills. The
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goal, according to Boutin, was to put "square pegs into square holes," an
elementary task that the agency had avoided for much of its existence.5
SBICs and the Redefinition of "Small"
Boutin's greatest challenge was to revive the moribund SBIC industry. These
venture capital companies had never recovered from the stock market crash of
1962. Several SBA-sponsored studies showed that SBIC investment had in-
creased the profits, sales, and net worth of client companies, yet the SBICs
continued to report losses. They remained plagued by high operating costs,
illiquidity, and a lack of investor confidence. Consequently, many SBICs had
become inactive and were holding money in cash accounts rather than invest-
ing in new ventures.6
The summer of 1966 saw persistent rumors of corruption in the indus-
try erupting into a full-fledged scandal. The SBA official responsible for polic-
ing the SBICs, Deputy Administrator Richard Kelley, had overlooked serious
violations of agency regulations. In July, Boutin reported to Congress that there
were more than two hundred "problem" companies, and he suspected that many
of them were guilty of criminal activity. He estimated the agency would lose
approximately one-sixth of the $300 million it had invested and pledged to
"clean out the mugs" to salvage what remained of the industry's reputation.7
Boutin ordered a massive investigation of SBICs. He dedicated all of the
SBA's auditors to the effort and borrowed an additional one hundred investi-
gators from other federal agencies. Their findings were shocking: nine out of
ten SBICs had violated agency regulations, and dozens of companies had com-
mitted criminal acts, including money-laundering for organized crime and
"sweetheart deals" with companies owned by individuals sitting on their board
of directors. Most of the "problem" companies were small, privately held SBICs
("one-man operations").8
Officials in the SBIC industry feared that Boutin's investigation might
result in the elimination of the program. Yet, despite the demonstrated failure
of the SBIC program, Congress never seriously considered abolishing it, be-
cause doing so might hurt small business. Instead, Congress strengthened the
SBA's police powers by authorizing the agency to issue cease-and-desist orders
against violators and to revoke licenses of companies that "knowingly breach
the law." Congress also raised the ceiling on SBA financing of a single SBIC to
$10 million and increased the ratio of government-to-private financing. A
"small" firm could now have up to $5 million in assets and still be eligible for
SBIC investment. The reformers hoped to encourage the formation of large
SBICs in place of the small companies that then dominated the industry.9
The fundamental problem with the SBIC program was that politicians
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did not understand the economies of scale inherent in the venture capital
market. Ignorance produced unintended consequences. In their study of poli-
tics and bureaucracy, William Mitchell and Randy T. Simmon observe that
often those "who believe themselves to be promoting the public interest are
led by an invisible hand to promote other kinds of interests." In the case of the
SBIC program, the original goal was to aid small business, but it had become,
as William Proxmire feared, a "medium-size or even a big business" subsidy.10
The early history of the SBICs also illustrates how government growth
sometimes results from efforts to deal with the failure of existing programs. In
1958, the sponsors of the Small Business Investment Act described the pro-
gram in terms of self-help. They predicted that the government would even-
tually "work itself out" of the SBIC industry. During the 1960s, however,
Congress reacted to each crisis by expanding the government's role and mak-
ing SBICs more dependent on SBA assistance. Scandals might seem to favor
advocates of retrenchment, but this is rarely the case. Once programs are cre-
ated, their existence is no longer debated, and the range of policy options
narrows considerably. Liberals must contend with the inefficiencies and unin-
tended consequences of their policies, while conservatives recognize that a
program, once created, is here to stay; therefore, they too seek to reform rather
than abolish. Thus, the ideological debate over the SBIC program gave way to
"rationalizing policies," defined as a "government-led search for solutions to
governments problems."11
The effort to reform the SBIC industry highlighted two continuing
themes of the agency's history: first, the paradoxical expansion of the SBA's
role in the credit markets despite evidence of its incompetence; and second, a
redefinition of "small" business to include companies much larger than the
"very smalls" for whom Congress originally intended the program. Thus, the
"smalls" grew bigger, as did their federal representative.
Boutin's reforms strengthened the SBIC industry by removing the weakest
firms. The stock value of the survivors underwent an amazing turnaround in
late 1967. In June, the business press had dismissed the SBIC program as a
"flop" and "the Dream that Failed"; six months later, Forbes reported that
SBICs were back in favor with speculative investors—stock values were "go-
ing up, up, up." In 1968 and 1969, the industry produced "extraordinary"
profits. However, the boom was short-lived—during the next two years, the
SBICs lost nearly all of the ground gained in the bull market of the late 1960s.
The overall rate of return for the 1960s was a disappointing 5 percent, far less
than the 10 to 15 percent earned by commercial finance companies. The SBA
made money on the program because the costs were "exceedingly small," but
the interest paid by borrowers hardly justified such a high-risk venture.12
By the end of the 1960s, the private venture capital market had eclipsed the
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SBICs. Between 1966 and 1970, private venture capitalists created 119 in-
vestment firms, compared to only ten new SBICs. Aggressive growth mutual
funds also entered the market. These firms provided clients with equity, whereas
the SBICs continued to make loans. Private venture capitalists grew confident
in their ability to meet the needs of speculative investors. Their trade association
recommended tax and securities reform as a substitute for SBICs and called for
the eventual elimination of federal financial assistance to the industry.13
Sizing up Small Business
Bernard Boutin generally opposed policy innovations because he wanted to
avoid promising what the agency could not deliver. Thus, he rejected propos-
als for a White House Conference on Small Business, because it "could raise
demands for new programs." Similarly, he opposed creating preferences for
Vietnam veterans, because he was "leary [sic] of programs that when announced
carry a lot of promise and then . . . do not even begin to fulfill that promise.
This agency has suffered from this type of thing too many times in the past."
In 1966, Boutin made one notable exception by expanding the definition of
"small" business to admit the financially troubled American Motors Com-
pany (AMC) into the agency's set-aside program. The SBA adopted new size
standards for the automobile and tire industries based on market share (a
"small" company had less than a 5 percent market share). AMC had only a 3
percent share of the automobile market but was huge in absolute terms, with
over 30,000 employees and almost $1 billion in sales. Boutin defended his
action by stating that the new size standard "represents the world of today, not
the world of the early fifties." The Congressional Small Business Committees
raised no objections to the expansive new definition; in fact, they had long
urged the SBA to scale the standards upward.14
The AMC decision exposed the confused state of the agency's interest-
group representation. The economic rationale was sound—the SBA was sup-
posed to promote competition in highly concentrated industries—but AMC
offered a poor test case. Boutin devised the new standards to bail out an
uncompetitive company. Furthermore, the announcement of this policy re-
vealed what Washington insiders already knew—that the SBA served me-
dium- and large-sized companies. This revelation threatened to undercut
popular support for the agency. The policy may have also violated the Small
Business Act, which limited SBA assistance to companies that were "indepen-
dently owned and operated." Yet, except for William Proxmire, the congres-
sional small business advocates acted disingenuously by supporting a definition
of "small" that departed so sharply from their speeches, which were often
peppered with references to "Mom-and-Pop" grocers and corner druggists.
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The SBA had historically operated in the gray area between the smallest
and the largest businesses in the country. Surveys showed that most Ameri-
cans thought a small company had fewer than 25 employees (less than 3 per-
cent thought that a "small" business might exceed 100 employees).15 On the
other hand, Americans thought a "big" business had 5,000 employees or more,
thus leaving a great middle section of the economy that the SBA could de-
scribe plausibly as "small" or "not big."16 Yet the AMC decision violated any
reasonable conception of smallness and left the agency open to the charge that
it ignored the needs of the "truly small" businesses.
In 1967, as a follow-up to the AMC decision, Boutin established a task
force to study ways of incorporating competitiveness into the agency's defini-
tion of small business. The existing arbitrary size standards pleased no one.
Critics charged that the standards were too high, while relativists argued for
even bigger size standards in concentrated industries. One year later, the task
force sputtered out of existence and an agency historian commented that "it
has not been possible to develop small business size standards . . . in a way that
is satisfactory to everyone, or to a high percentage of those most interested."
This issue continued to bedevil the agency into the 1980s and beyond.17
Bernard Boutin tendered his resignation on 27 June 1967, citing finan-
cial considerations as his primary reason for leaving government service (his
position as SBA administrator did not pay enough for him to support a family
often children, several of who were then in college).18 He left the agency in a
much stronger position to deal with the administrative challenges posed by its
various programs. During his thirteen months at the SBA, Boutin never prom-
ised more than he could deliver. Subsequent events—including the worst ri-
ots of the decade—forced his successors to raise expectations once again, with
disastrous consequences for the agency's reputation.
The Urban Crisis and Affirmative Action
Boutin selected Deputy Administrator Robert C. Moot to be his successor.
Moot was a military procurement officer before arriving at the SBA in 1966
to inherit an agency that was still growing. In calendar year 1967, the SBA's
business loan volume hit a record $600 million. A new "Simplified Blanket
Guaranty Plan" boosted the percentage of business loans guaranteed by banks,
thus leveraging agency funds and securing the political backing of the bank-
ing community. The SBIC industry was beginning a two-year upswing. Readers
Digest published an article on SCORE, and the program "took off like a run-
ner hyped up on steroids."19 The U.S. economy was booming. In short, the
future looked bright for small business and the SBA.
This rosy picture did not extend to America's inner cities, which were
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enduring the worst civil violence in a half-century. Black rioters looted and
burned thousands of buildings—mostly small businesses—and clashed with
police, the National Guard, and the federal troops sent to quell the disorder.
The extent of the rioting was enormous; in the summer of 1967, there were
176 disturbances. The total number of riots for the year numbered well over
200, with 71 major riots occurring in 82 cities. The worst riot of the decade
took place in Detroit, just days after Robert Moot took office. A police raid on
a "blind pig" (illegal after-hours bar) sparked a violent upheaval that took the
lives of 43 people and resulted in the partial or total destruction of 2,500 stores.20
The cause of the riots was widely debated. Conservatives blamed the
unrest on a breakdown in "law and order." They argued that the looting was
done "mainly for fun and profit." By responding paternalistically to the riots
and refusing to take a hard line against violence, liberal policymakers spawned
a self-fulfilling prophecy that encouraged self-destructive behavior. In effect,
rioters were granted a moral holiday and their neighbors paid the price.21
Black militants and their white sympathizers, on the other hand, con-
sidered these "rebellions" a form of political violence aimed at forcing conces-
sions from governmental authorities. The rioters were "political dissidents" who
targeted "hated examples of outside oppression and exploitation." They alleg-
edly embraced a "riot ideology" based on the use of "negative political power."22
The dominant liberal explanation incorporated the riot ideology and
stressed a "revolution of rising expectations." The "root cause" of the violence,
they argued, lay in a lack of "good" jobs; therefore, liberal policymakers re-
sponded by promising aid to the cities. Improving conditions in the inner city
would, Johnson argued, "make us all a happier and more guilt-free people."
Consequently, an increasing percentage of federal antipoverty dollars went to
the ghettoes, thus turning the color-blind War on Poverty into a series of
"black-oriented" programs.23
The riots also challenged the taboo against public discussion of racial
preferences. Advocates of affirmative action considered it "the price society
had to pay to prevent further violence." Politicians of all stripes advanced
race-conscious policies to address the causes of the riots. The "elite wisdom"
of the time was fast moving away from the color-blind consensus of the early
1960s toward racial redistribution of jobs and government benefits. Though
many Americans disagreed with this "soft" response—half of those surveyed
thought that shooting looters was "the best way" to deal with riots—
policymakers were intent on formulating a more benevolent response to the
violence in the cities.24
The civil disorder forced the SBA to expand its commitment to Eco-
nomic Opportunity Loans (EOLs) even as officials admitted publicly that the
program was foundering. SBA employees were making loans without care-
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fully evaluating credit records or the borrower's prospects. The agency financed
new businesses in fields already crowded with competitors. Political commen-
tators from the left and right criticized the impracticality of the program. The
Wall Street Journal editorialized that "if a man who wants to start his own
business is a good bet to go broke, saying 'no' may be the most charitable
response a lender can give." Likewise, a writer for the Nation observed that
very small businesses had a high failure rate and that the hard-core unem-
ployed did not make good business owners. It was not an issue of money—the
agency spent the Lilliputian amount of $30 million a year on the program—
but of insuperable obstacles to success. Nearly everyone agreed that spending
more on the program was a waste of taxpayers' dollars.25
The primary impetus for expanding the program came from African
American activists and white officials responding to the riots. Bernard Boutin
had initially resisted their demands for racial preferences. In July 1966, he
expressed "complete disagreement" with Padriac Frucht's suggestion that the
agency make more "Negro" loans. Boutin maintained a color-blind approach
to civil rights, stating that a "major emphasis on loans to minorities . . . bor-
ders on reversed discrimination." He told Frucht that "all programs of SBA
will be equally available to all American small businessmen . . . but never one
race to the exclusion of another." Yet, apparently, many agency officials still
considered EOL a "Negro" program. At a conference of area administrators
and regional directors, Boutin reproached those who "don't seem to under-
stand what is meant by being disadvantaged. You don't have to be Negro or
Chinese, you don't have to be a Mexican-American, or any other nationality
or race, ^bu have to be disadvantaged!" He urged the administrators not to be
blinded by racial consciousness or to ignore rural poverty.26
Nonetheless, the pressure for race-based loans continued to build. Boutin
directed SBA employees to "go out into the ghettos" and assigned African
Americans to work on EOL teams. But this was not enough to please black
militants. Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton, in their book Black Power
(1967), denounced the SBA as a representative of the "white power struc-
ture." By denying African American businesses a fair share of loans, the SBA
embodied "institutional racism" and perpetuated "economic colonialism."27
Traditionally conservative figures also demanded that the SBA do more
for black business. The National Business League (NBL), for example, trans-
formed itself into a supplicant for federal aid. Established by Booker T. Wash-
ington in 1900 as a self-help organization for African Americans, the NBL
abandoned Washington's philosophy once government aid became available.28
To capitalize on the growing concern with the inner city, League President
Berkeley Burrell adopted the militants' rhetoric. The SBA's failure to help
black business owners was an "expression of racism in its most rabid form."
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The income restrictions on EOLs rendered the program a "phony, fraud, and
hoax." If the SBA was interested in creating role models, Burrell argued, it
should help existing black business owners rather than "go down to the unem-
ployment compensation boards to find entrepreneurs standing in line." Burreli's
criticisms had the desired effect. Boutin responded by creating an "EOL-II"
program for those with higher incomes who "have been disadvantaged by
factors beyond their control," a thinly veiled reference to race. Meanwhile, in
1967, Congress doubled the EOL loan appropriation to $60 million. Thus,
the pressure to "do something" about the urban crisis overwhelmed the well-
founded concern that the program was unworkable.29
The year 1968 witnessed the apotheosis of the riot ideology. After leav-
ing the Commerce Department, Eugene Foley published The Achieving Ghetto
to promote a massive "Marshall Plan" to develop America's inner cities. Be-
sides jobs programs, he recommended "an aggressive small business program
for the ghetto," including a dramatic expansion of EOL and establishment of
race-based set-asides in government contracting. This "self-help" was preferable
to welfare because it provided "local, neighborhood success symbols." Foley
touted his book as the "first word" on black business, but it was not trie last.30
In February, the president's National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders, chaired by Otto Kerner, issued its famous report on the riots. The
Kerner Commission blamed "white racism" for the uprisings and declared
ominously that the U.S. was "moving toward two societies, one black, one
white—separate and unequal," ignoring the economic and educational gains
of African Americans in the 1950s and 1960s. Furthermore, the Kerner re-
port enshrined the liberal riot ideology: rioters were not to blame for the
conditions that caused them to riot. The civil disorders were regrettable but
understandable; they were essentially a "political act of protest by the power-
less." Thus, along with jobs programs and welfare spending, the commission
recommended giving "special encouragement to Negro ownership of busi-
ness" by expanding the EOL program.31
Meanwhile, African American leaders grew increasingly militant in their
demands for government assistance, including aid to black business. Jesse Jack-
son declared that "the black ghetto must be controlled by black people." There
would be no peace, Jackson warned, if "the colonial powers—the white own-
ers" continued to "take profits and leave poverty" in the ghetto. (This colonial
metaphor was de rigeur in radical circles—African Americans allegedly lived
in an "internal colony" and worked in a "de facto slave economy").32 A few
black businessmen urged self-help and warned of becoming too dependent
upon the government but were drowned out by the loud, angry voices seeking
racial entitlements.33
Advocates of black business continued to criticize the SBA for its alleged
Crisis and Consolidation 63
indifference to the ghetto. Of course, many borrowers were grateful for their
Economic Opportunity Loans.34 But, in the eyes of its critics, the agency
could do nothing right. They attributed delays in loan processing to racism,
because "whites seem to get their money much faster." Critics accused loan
officers of condescending to African American applicants and treating them
disrespectfully. When Charles Kriger, the New York Regional Director, made
a "visual demonstration" of black loan officers before the Senate Small Busi-
ness Committee, he was called on the carpet by a New York city official who
took "great exception" to the public display of these "Hertz Rent-A-Negros."
The chief complaint was that the SBA was too conservative in its loan criteria.
Proponents of minority enterprise invoked the urban crisis as justification for
relaxed standards. And a Newark official voiced the typical sentiment that
"these are emergency days, and we must provide emergency solutions."35
The presidential election of 1968 underscored the growing importance
of minority enterprise. In April 1968, Republican candidate Richard Nixon
announced a "black capitalism" agenda for the ghetto. In a radio address en-
titled "Bridges to Human Dignity," Nixon echoed the militants' demand for
a "piece of the action." He proposed federal assistance to create new busi-
nesses and expand existing ones. In his August acceptance speech at the Re-
publican national convention, Nixon reiterated his commitment to "black
capitalism," noting that African Americans did not want to exist as "a colony
in a nation." They wanted an "equal chance" to own businesses and homes,
and he promised them "new programs which will provide that equal chance."36
Was Nixon motivated by political opportunism or a sincere belief in
racial preferences? Critics charged that Nixon's program was nothing more
than a "star-spangled hustle," a campaign gimmick. There is some evidence
that Nixon hoped to split the labor movement along racial lines and attract
black votes in the process (the AFL-CIO denounced "black capitalism" as
"apartheid, antidemocratic nonsense"). He sought southern white votes (by
opposing forced integration of schools) while also promising "more black
ownership, black jobs, black opportunity." But although Nixon failed to sway
many African American voters with his proposal—he received only 3 percent
of the black vote—his vision of "black capitalism" struck a chord with liberals
and conservatives alike. The Wall Street Journal hoped that the new policy
would make Republicans out of rioters. William F. Buckley Jr., the conserva-
tive editor of National Review, also approved of the plan. Racial preferences in
lending and contracting would soon become controversial, but in the tumul-
tuous year of 1968, "everybody seemed to be for it."37
Political factors cannot entirely explain Nixon's motivations. He sin-
cerely believed in racial preferences to promote the economic advancement of
minorities. During the 1950s, as chair of the President's Committee on Gov-
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ernment Contracts, Nixon advocated "limited preferential hiring" of minori-
ties.38 The idea appealed to him because he could expect no appreciable gains
in the African American vote. Nixon considered himself a moderate
"unbeholden to the major pressure group involved," who could do the "right
thing" by bridging the gap between the races. It would later be said that "only
Nixon could go to Communist China"; similarly, in Nixon's eyes, only he
could breach the great racial divide in America. Contemporary critics focused
on his "southern strategy," an overt attempt to court southern white voters,
but ignored this other side of Nixon's civil rights policies. As for "black capi-
talism," it was, according to biographer Stephen Ambrose, "an idea he had
adopted enthusiastically, and one that he would stick with."39
Nixon's "black capitalism" speech forced his Democratic opponent, Vice
President Hubert H. Humphrey, to accelerate the implementation of his own
minority enterprise program. In March, Humphrey had established an inter-
agency task force to develop a "National Program for Promoting Minority
Entrepreneurs." The task force concluded that the riots were sparked in part
by "Negro bitterness at being economically dominated" by white business
owners. Therefore, the new minority enterprise program should emphasize
ownership, rather than job creation. During the next several months,
Humphrey offered proposals that were similar to those advanced by Nixon,
with an emphasis upon creating role models in the ghetto.40
One member of the task force, Undersecretary of Commerce Howard J.
Samuels, was keenly interested in controlling the new program. Samuels, an
ambitious, self-made millionaire, was active in the civil rights movement. In
June 1968, Samuels proposed an aggressive program of aid to black business.
He convinced President Johnson to appoint him SBA administrator to carry
out his vision of black capitalism (Robert Moot was leaving to become Comp-
troller of the Defense Department). Consequently, on 1 August, Samuels took
over the SBA, announcing that he wanted it "to become known as the Federal
Agency that made the greatest contribution to social change" in the 1960s.41
On 13 August, Samuels introduced Project OWN, an ambitious at-
tempt to create twenty thousand new minority-owned businesses a year. His
ultimate goal was to close the gap between white and minority business own-
ership by the end of the 1970s. Samuels estimated a total annual cost of $500
million to reach this seemingly unattainable goal. His unbridled enthusiasm
was reminiscent of the Foley years, when hope triumphed over reality. In speak-
ing before the National Business League, Samuels declared that the SBA was
writing "a new page in world history." The agency was once again "on the
move. We've got a new religion, a new motivation, a new commitment."42
Samuels offered every conceivable justification for a new round of racial
preferences. First, he argued that white Americans owed minorities, especially
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African Americans, compensation for past and present discrimination. Hence,
he spoke of "compensatory capitalism" as the basis for Project OWN. Equal-
ity under the law was insufficient because it perpetuated existing inequities.
Second, Samuels cited the statistical disparity between white and minority
business owners; minorities were 15 percent of the population, but owned
only 1 to 3 percent of the nation's businesses and accounted for less than 1
percent of total business receipts. Third, he maintained that minorities were
"like the inhabitants of an underdeveloped nation" and therefore deserved
"foreign aid." But the chief political appeal of "compensatory capitalism" was
as a response to the riots. Project OWN, Samuels argued, would "help turn
the tide of lawlessness."43
But Project OWN was fraught with difficulties. The agency abandoned
any pretense of "mainstreaming" minority businesses into the larger economy
and focused entirely upon establishing minority businesses in the ghetto. Busi-
ness prospects were extremely poor in the ghetto even before the riots broke
out, and the violence and a soaring crime rate exacerbated the plight of inner-
city business owners. The SBA had to lower its loan criteria to reach a greater
number of prospective entrepreneurs. Samuels insisted unrealistically that the
loss rate would not exceed six or seven percent.44
The SBA revised its standards in other ways, one of which was reversing
its longstanding policy against financing "buy-outs" of existing businesses—
the new goal was to get "whitey" out of the ghetto by replacing him with a
black business owner. This zero-sum strategy created no new jobs and may
have created a less productive local economy, because the new owners lacked
business experience. Samuels also overturned the existing ban on loans to
liquor stores and bars, a touchy issue that angered members of Congress and
threatened to inflame hostilities in the ghetto (liquor stores were the number
one target of rioters).45
The linchpin of Project OWN was its emphasis upon guaranteed loans—
the only way the SBA could finance $500 million a year in new loans to
minority-owned businesses. In fiscal year 1969, the agency quintupled the
amount of guaranteed EOLs to $22 million, a sum that fell woefully short of
the $500 million goal. Banks were unwilling, even with a 90 percent govern-
ment guarantee, to risk their capital on such high-risk ventures. According to
Samuels, these loans made good economic sense, but the businesses with the
greatest expertise in this area—the banks—disagreed.46
Samuels tried unsuccessfully to appease African American critics, who
complained that the SBA stood for "Stop Black Advancement." First, he es-
tablished two advisory councils on Black Economic Development and Span-
ish American Economic Development. Declaring that the SBA must become
"black conscious," he hired African American employees to work in the ghetto.
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Samuels also ordered the agency's Minority Enterprise Teams to undergo "Sen-
sitivity Training" to overcome stereotypical attitudes toward people who lived
in the ghetto (ironically, the trainers discovered that white team members
were more sympathetic toward minority loan applicants than were the black
team members). Yet, despite the agency's best efforts at outreach, the carping
of the critics continued.47
During his brief tenure at the SBA, Howard Samuels introduced one
innovation in minority enterprise policy that had a lasting impact: the Section
8 (a) program for minority contractors. This provision of the Small Business
Act authorized the SBA to take prime contracts and let them out to small
companies. Section 8 (a) lay dormant until 1967, when a Defense Depart-
ment official suggested that the agency use it to help minority business. Samuels
immediately saw its potential for promoting minority firms. The original goal
of the program was to benefit minority business enterprises in areas of high
unemployment. White-owned corporations could sponsor minority firms by
providing capital and management assistance but were to relinquish control
once these companies were on a solid footing. There was some concern that
the 8 (a) companies would become permanently dependent upon the govern-
ment; therefore, the agency required each applicant to formulate a "program
for future independence from SBA assistance." The agency also realized that
the 8 (a) program could undercut small, white:owned contractors; thus 8 (a)
officers were to select contracts for goods and services previously produced by
the government or by large corporations. The initial output of 8 (a) was mod-
est—the SBA awarded eight contracts in 1968—but it soon became the larg-
est, and most controversial, program benefiting minority business.48
During the "long, hot summers" of the 1960s, few public officials were
willing to voice their doubts concerning the effectiveness of the government's
"black enterprise" policy. However, critics within the Budget Bureau did point
out the flaws inherent in this approach. In August 1968, the economist V.L.
Broussalian wrote a progress report on the various minority enterprise pro-
grams of the SBA. He concluded that low-income people made poor entre-
preneurs. The most ambitious and talented individuals were taking salaried
positions in large corporations and government agencies, a direct result of
affirmative action. Furthermore, it was hard to justify major expenditures on
"black capitalism," given the economics of the ghetto. The SBA's experience
with EOL confirmed the commonsense belief that ghetto enterprise was dif-
ficult to sustain. The agency had succeeded only in creating a class of business
owners permanently dependent upon government support.49
Two months later, another Budget Bureau economist, Bob Weinberg,
offered similar criticisms of EOL and 8(a). He noted that the real purpose of
"black capitalism" was to overcome the alienation of ghetto residents, but
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these programs had backfired by producing conspicuous failure rather than
success. Ghetto entrepreneurs experienced "personal misfortune" when their
businesses folded, the community blamed the SBA for their failure, and the
general public lost faith in the government's ability to deal effectively with the
urban crisis. Racial hostility was compounded by the resentment of rejected
loan applicants who accused the SBA of racism. While the critics clamored for
more aid to black business, Weinberg concluded that the SBA was already in
danger of "moving too fast" with a program that was a "catastrophe."50
There were early signs of opposition to the conspicuous racial prefer-
ences embodied in "compensatory capitalism." The authors of an SBA-spon-
sored study admitted that Project OWN constituted "discrimination in reverse,"
yet, they wrote, "the notion of compensatory capitalism is now firmly rooted
in our society" (italics in original). But the question was far from resolved. A
Time magazine writer observed that the consensus favoring racial preferences
resulted from emergency conditions and that whites were "bound to com-
plain that such aid gives Negroes an unfair competitive advantage." Similarly,
Bob Weinberg advised the White House that "antidiscrimination law works
both ways"—de jure preferences violated the rights of white business owners,
although informal targets were "probably legal."51
The House Small Business Committee was adamantly opposed to "re-
verse" racial discrimination, for a variety of reasons. Representatives Laurence
Burton (R-Utah) and James Corman (D-Calif.) did not want the SBA to
"ghettoize the ghetto" by limiting loans to black businesses in the inner city.
Other committee members complained that the SBA had ignored the rural
poor, black and white. But the chief objection was moral: by making racial
distinctions in lending, the SBA undermined the principle of equal protec-
tion under the law. Thus, in its final 1968 report, the committee warned that
"if any such 'discrimination in reverse' policy is permitted to develop, the
reputation of the agency for fair dealing could become tarnished." Samuels
and other agency officials responded that EOL was legal because it was theo-
retically open to all races; in practice, however, the SBA applied lower stan-
dards to applications from minorities. This tactical dodge offered the agency a
legal defense but did not end the controversy surrounding racial preferences,
a debate that raged on into the 1970s.52
Conclusion
The publicity associated with "black capitalism" masked the steady growth of
the SBA's traditional loan programs. The agency was more "black conscious"
than ever, but most of its loan dollars still went to white-owned firms (in fiscal
year 1969, minority enterprises received 75 percent of the EOL budget but
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only 15 percent of total loan dollars approved). The SBA approved general
business loans amounting to $550 million (excluding EOL), up from $420
million just four years earlier.53 This growth rate was much more modest than
in the Horne-Foley years but still significant.
The SBA's growth did not come at the expense of the private sector. On
the contrary, the agency privatized portions of its financial and management
assistance programs. In fiscal year 1969, loan guarantees accounted for 70
percent of general business loan dollars, up from less than 20 percent in fiscal
year 1965. The absolute value of direct business loans (excluding EOL) de-
clined from $285 million to $110 million.54
The SBA also relied upon SCORE to provide management counseling
to small businesses. The earliest studies found that the volunteers boosted
client companies' sales and profits. But the paperwork required to run this
"free" service initially overwhelmed the agency's management assistance offic-
ers. In 1967, the SBA solved the problem by turning over administrative re-
sponsibilities to SCORE, which created a formal organization made up of
local chapters. SCORE was a rare example of genuine self-help operating suc-
cessfully within the loose confines of the federal government.55
In his history of government growth, Crisis and Leviathan, the economic
historian Robert Higgs stresses the importance of crisis and ideology.56 There
is no better example of this crisis-ideology effect than the government's re-
sponse to the "urban crisis." Many high federal officials succumbed to the riot
ideology. The authors of one survey found that "a majority or near-majority
of influentials in each of these [government] agencies felt that violence was
advantageous to social change."57 Consequently, they responded to the riots
by increasing assistance to the ghetto. Reform-minded administrators at the
SBA shared this belief in a riot ideology and used it as a pretext for expanding
the "black capitalism" programs. The SBA also officially recognized "black"
and "brown" capitalists as a separate interest group served by their own pro-
grams. Unfortunately, this approach was counterproductive; it locked agency
officials into futile policies that ostensibly appeased rioters but did little to
enhance black enterprise. In fact, the EOL program played a cruel joke on
poor African American entrepreneurs, who often lost their entire life savings.
In one of the earliest studies of EOL, the economist Timothy Bates reported
that the delinquency rate for new businesses was a shocking 70 percent. Worse,
delinquent borrowers remained responsible for their SBA loan payments even
after liquidating their businesses. Bates concluded that EOL was "a device for
perpetuating rather than alleviating poverty among low-income, disadvan-
taged entrepreneurs."58
By attempting to "gild the ghetto," the SBA overlooked the far greater
opportunities for black enterprise in the economic mainstream. In one of his
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earliest essays, the economist Thomas Sowell analyzed the shortcomings of
separatist economics. The concept of "keeping money in the community" was
foolhardy, he wrote, if African Americans found better business prospects else-
where.59 The key to African American business success was integration, not
separation. Advocates of "compensatory capitalism" viewed blacks as helpless
victims of discrimination who could not compete without government aid.
They failed to realize that the decline in racial discrimination opened up new
opportunities in high-growth fields, including manufacturing and business
services. The educational gains achieved by African Americans in the 1960s
enabled them to exploit these business opportunities in subsequent decades.
But the resulting black business boom did not take place overnight; it was
built upon the hard work of individuals pursuing their own self-interest. The
loud, impatient cry for immediate results concealed the steady progress made
throughout this period.60
Advocates of "black capitalism" adhered to what Thomas Sowell has
called the "anointed vision" of the policymaking elite. Good intentions sub-
stituted for hard thinking about the limits of public policy and the dangers
inherent in romanticizing violence and sanctifying a new form of race-con-
sciousness. The initial promise of EOL was a "hand up," not a handout, but it
soon evolved into a racial entitlement, joined by the Section 8(a) program in
1968. SBA administrators denied the obstacles to success and downplayed the
losses, both to the agency and the prospective beneficiaries. They proclaimed
the righteousness of their cause and refused to evaluate the empirical evidence
demonstrating the failure of their policies. "Doing good" ultimately became
an end in itself.61
Meanwhile, the SBA failed to help the real victims in the inner-city—
small business owners who experienced the triple threat of urban renewal,
rioting, and a soaring crime rate. By equating disadvantage with skin color,
the riot ideology privileged one group of small business owners while
marginalizing others.62 These unseen "others" were the forgotten men and
women of the 1960s.
The immediate legacy of the urban crisis was to leave the incoming
president Richard M. Nixon with a "Pandora's box of civil rights questions."63
Nixon promised to restore "law and order" to the cities. He also pledged to
promote "black capitalism" through the SBA. During the next several years,
the agency navigated between the Scylla and Charybdis of black militancy
and white resentment of "reverse discrimination." Yet the 1970s brought not
only a continuation of old conflicts but the emergence of new issues, includ-
ing deregulation, the rise of a powerful small business lobby, demands by
women business owners for a "piece of the pie," and scandals galore.
THE AGONY OF HILARY SANDOVAL
President Richard M. Nixon had high hopes for achieving policy successes
through the Small Business Administration. The agency catered to small busi-
ness, an important constituency in Nixon's "Silent Majority." The SBA also
provided a showcase for the administration's highly visible "black capitalism"
initiative. Nixon's unusually keen interest in small business ensured the sur-
vival and growth of the SBA into its third decade.
Unfortunately, the spotlight of media attention illuminated the failings
of SBA leadership. Nixon's choice of administrator, Hilary Sandoval, was sick
and ill-equipped to manage a government agency. The SBA subsequently be-
came embroiled in scandals that undermined agency morale and created orga-
nizational chaos. Furthermore, a white backlash against "reverse discrimination"
set the tone of debate over affirmative action. An interest-group rivalry also
simmered between Hispanics and African Americans, both claiming status as
"disadvantaged" business owners. Consequently, the SBA found it more diffi-
cult than ever to define whom it represented.
Nixonomics and the Politics of Small Business
When Richard Nixon took office, contemporaries characterized him as a "con-
servative" who would reverse the liberal domestic policies of his predecessor.
Instead, the Nixon years ushered in another era of government growth. Nixon's
partisan attacks on the Great Society had misled many into thinking that he
opposed big government. Philosophically, Nixon was ill-disposed to wage an
assault on the welfare state. Throughout his career, he identified with the
moderate wing of the Republican Party and despised "far right conservatives."
Furthermore, as a political strategist, Nixon believed that voters would always
choose the Democratic Santa Claus over the Republican Scrooge. He there-
fore adopted a philosophy of "relaxing and enjoying the inevitable" tendency
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of Congress to spend more money on domestic programs. Simultaneously,
Nixon courted conservative voters, who were the backbone of the Republican
Party. Consequently, his domestic policies were a mishmash of liberal "zigs"
and conservative "zags" appealing to both ends of the ideological spectrum.
Political pragmatism took precedence as Nixon sought to construct a new
coalition cutting across traditional liberal-conservative lines.1
Nixon's economic policies were likewise incoherent. Though disdaining
economics, he realized that his political support rested on continued prosper-
ity. As the economy stumbled, Nixon lurched from one policy to another to
save his presidency. At different times, he embraced monetarism, Keynesianism,
laissez-faire, and wage-price controls. He practiced what one writer called "the
most comprehensive economics in the history of the world"! At the end of his
first term, Nixon went on a spending spree to boost the economy before the
election, a move that greatly benefited the Small Business Administration (see
chapter 6).2
Nixon's preference for small business was the one constant in his politi-
cal economy. His father owned a small grocery and taught Nixon to value
economic independence and distrust large corporations. Presidential economic
adviser Herbert Stein recalled that Nixon was "no fan of big business." Con-
versely, small business fit Nixon's conception of the "Silent Majority." An aide
later wrote that small business owners were "our constituency"—they were
'"grassroots' people" who "oppose massive street demonstrations and riots."
Nixon believed that it was the government's responsibility to aid and protect
these "independent" enterprisers. This sympathetic attitude made the Small
Business Administration a natural vehicle for increased spending.3
The SBA also benefited from Nixon's unwavering commitment to "black
capitalism." Despite congressional opposition, Nixon persisted with a contro-
versial program that promised little short-term political gain. He institution-
alized a form of affirmative action that might have withered in the face of such
strong resistance. Ultimately, by the end of the Nixon presidency, racial pref-
erences had become a permanent feature of agency operations.
Hilary Sandoval, 1969-1970
Given the SBA's high profile, the selection of an administrator was important,
particularly after the high turnover of the past few years. Nixon blundered by
appointing Hilary Sandoval, a Mexican American businessman from El Paso,
Texas, to head the SBA. The president chose Sandoval to please his congres-
sional backer, Senator John Tower (R-Tex.) and to reward Sandoval for gath-
ering support among Mexican Americans. Unfortunately, Sandoval lacked
leadership skills and was suffering the debilitating effects of a stroke, a condi-
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tion that he covered up with the assistance of a few trusted aides. His irratio-
nal behavior resulted in one of the most agonizing periods in the agency's
history.4
Several White House aides expressed strong opposition to Sandoval's
appointment, alleging that he was not competent to run a government agency.
Leonard Garment, the presidential aide responsible for minority enterprise,
observed that Howard Samuels had turned the SBA into "one of the most
sensitive agencies—technically and politically." We can expect "major trouble,"
Garment wrote, if we do not make "bullet-proof appointments" to the "black
capitalism" agencies. What the SBA needed was a take-charge leader who would
be "very aggressive in pushing a dead bureaucracy." Other White House staff-
ers echoed this assessment of Sandoval's abilities and noted that he had suffered
some unknown illness. Furthermore, they emphasized that the appointment of
a Mexican American to an agency responsible for "black capitalism" was bound
to upset African American leaders. But Nixon insisted that he owed Senator
John Tower this appointment. The SBA would have to live with the conse-
quences of this presidential decision.5
Personal insecurity and health problems contributed to Sandoval's para-
noid distrust of agency employees. He declared, "I am new to government—
I do not quite understand it," and therefore surrounded himself with people
whom he felt he could trust, including a personal priest who had an office in
SBA headquarters. Sandoval had no administrative experience, other than
running his small magazine business in El Paso, and the SBA bureaucracy
overwhelmed him. Moreover, Sandoval was recovering from the effects of a
stroke that had paralyzed his right hand. He underwent violent mood swings
and suffered severe insomnia. It was later revealed that Sandoval had a malig-
nant brain tumor.6
The new administrator, an "Arch-Republican," distrusted Democrats
and tried to purge them from the agency. He ordered a record number of
"reassignments, reclassifications, and transfers" of employees. This organiza-
tional shake-up sent agency morale plummeting. Union membership doubled
in the first year of Sandoval's administration. The National Federation of In-
dependent Business (NFIB) and the Small Business Committees were up in
arms over the confusion at the SBA.7
Meanwhile, the president's decision to hand leadership of "black capi-
talism" over to the Commerce Department embittered relations between that
agency and the SBA. Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans was Nixon's chief
campaign fundraiser and one of his closest advisers. Stans was excited about
"black capitalism" and persuaded the president to hand him authority over
the new program. On 5 March 1969, Nixon issued an executive order estab-
lishing the Office of Minority Business Enterprise (OMBE) within the Com-
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merce Department. The OMBE was set up to help "blacks, Mexican Ameri-
cans, Puerto Ricans, Indians, and others" deprived of the opportunity to own
their own businesses. Lacking any resources of its own, OMBE coordinated
the activities of other federal agencies, including the Small Business Adminis-
tration. SBA officials resented this arrangement because their agency provided
most of the services to minority business but received little of the credit.8
The creation of the OMBE renewed congressional concern over a pos-
sible Commerce Department takeover of the SBA. On 5 March, Secretary
Stans appeared before the National Press Club and stated that "by definition"
the SBA belonged within his department. Stans's comment caused an uproar
among congressional small business advocates. The Small Business Commit-
tees were jealous of any encroachment on the agency's responsibilities; they
feared that the OMBE represented "an ever present danger to SBA's indepen-
dence." The White House realized Congress would never allow a merger, but
absent a presidential statement to the contrary, rumors of a takeover lingered
through the end of Nixon's first term.9
The president hoped that the SBA would focus its attention on minor-
ity enterprise, but the agency was embroiled in one embarrassing incident
after another. In March, Sandoval confirmed the reinstatement of Charles
Kriger as Regional Director in New York. Howard Samuels had fired Kriger
in late 1968 because he allegedly resisted making loans to minority-owned
businesses. His dismissal angered Representative John J. Rooney (D-N.Y.),
Kriger s mentor and chair of the House Appropriations subcommittee over-
seeing the SBA budget. Two days before Sandoval took office, Acting Admin-
istrator Howard Greenberg reinstated Kriger. Fearful of Rooney's wrath,
Sandoval let the reinstatement stand, thus provoking criticism that the Nixon
administration was not serious about minority enterprise.10
The Kriger fiasco coincided with revelations that the SBA had lent money
to mobsters. During the early 1960s, Charles Kriger approved nearly $500,000
in loans to a company partly owned by the teenage son of "one of the country's
most vicious loan sharks." In 1966, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
informed SBA officials of the "hoodlum domination" of the company, advis-
ing them not to take action until the investigation was complete. The public
disclosure of these Mafia ties in March 1969 embarrassed the SBA, as critics
accused the agency's New York office of being more generous toward mob-
sters than minorities.11
In response to these revelations, Hilary Sandoval instituted procedural
reforms to screen out loan applicants with mob ties. SBA auditors uncovered
two-dozen borrowers with underworld connections and turned their cases
over to the Justice Department. Still, stories of Mafia influence continued to
appear. In 1974, a New York Times investigation revealed that the New Or-
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leans office had made loans to Mafia figures. An anonymous employee alleged
that these mobsters had offered bribes to SBA loan officers. The mafiosi re-
portedly used SBA loans to finance their "front" businesses.12 Unfortunately,
the agency's decentralized field structure prevented the Central Office from
detecting these abuses.
The mob scandal took place on Sandoval's watch, but he was not ac-
countable for loans made in the past. However, he was responsible for select-
ing Albert Fuentes to be his special assistant. Fuentes, a Sandoval crony, used
his influence within the SBA to secure a large loan for an El Paso firm. Fuentes
and his partner, Eddie Montez, demanded company stock as compensation.
In April 1969, the FBI launched a probe when the owner complained of ex-
tortion. Fuentes argued that he was only trying to help a minority enterprise,
a defense that outraged Representative Henry Gonzalez (D-Tex.), who chided
Fuentes for exploiting his "la raza" (race). Fuentes held press conferences de-
nying his guilt and calling Gonzalez an "unmitigated liar." The resulting con-
gressional outcry forced Sandoval to dismiss his troublesome aide on 20 May.
Six months later, a jury convicted Fuentes and Montez of conspiracy.13
An angry challenge from black activists followed the Fuentes fiasco. The
Black Advisory Council established by Howard Samuels included such no-
table figures as Ralph D. Abernathy, Whitney Young, Dick Gregory, Marion
Barry, and Jackie Robinson. These African American leaders did not trust the
Nixon administration to keep its commitment to "black capitalism." In late
May, they asked to meet with Sandoval, but he refused, stating that the Coun-
cil had been created "mainly for show purposes." Council members reacted by
holding a press conference in the lobby of SBA headquarters to protest
Sandoval's abrogation of their organization. A spokesperson for the group
declared that the SBA was "the greatest menace" to the minority enterprise
program, because Sandoval failed to follow through on Samuels' annual pledge
of $500 million in minority loans. Marion Barry appeared dressed in African
garb to demand Sandoval's resignation. This turn of events caused great dis-
tress to the White House. The head of the Urban Affairs Council, Daniel
Patrick Moynihan, informed the president's advisers that Republican mem-
bers of Congress were "up in arms on the whole SBA situation" and that the
White House might have to take action soon to contain the damage.14
The White House was embarrassed again in July 1969 when the head of
the SBA Office of Minority Entrepreneurship, Philip Pruitt, resigned, alleg-
edly in protest of Nixon's refusal to approve the agency's request for $200
million in direct loans to minority businesses. Pruitt accused the president of
offering "rhetoric, rhetoric, rhetoric, but no support." In truth, Pruitt was
denied clearance by the Civil Service Commission. Moreover, during his six
months in office, Pruitt faced unrelenting criticism from African American
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leaders. There were strong partisan overtones to their criticism. NAACP offi-
cial Charles Evers asked Pruitt, "How could you as a black man sit in that
[Nixon] administration?" Clearly, Democratic civil rights activists were not
going to give Nixon the benefit of the doubt.15
Pruitt s fiery exit prompted White House intervention in SBA manage-
ment. President Nixon sent Leonard Zartman to act as SBA General Counsel.
Zartman had previously worked as minority affairs specialist for Daniel Patrick
Moynihan. Nixon also appointed W. Donald Brewer, an aide to Maurice Stans,
as Deputy Administrator and de facto head of the agency. Because the White
House feared the political consequences of firing the highest-ranking His-
panic within the administration, Brewer and Zartman were to "run the shop"
while Sandoval posed as a "front man." The organizational disarray at SBA
continued, however, and in February 1970, presidential advisor John
Ehrlichman called Sandoval to the White House and offered him the chair of
the Cabinet Committee on Opportunities for Spanish-Speaking People.
Sandoval, in turn, blasted Brewer for his "arrogance" and refused to step down.
Brewer remained at SBA to keep an eye on Sandoval and to warn the White
House whenever another "public atomic explosion" seemed imminent. He
stayed at SBA until May 1970, when President Nixon rewarded him with a
seat on the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).16
The Sandoval-Brewer feud created tremendous turmoil within the SBA.
Agency employees had no idea who was in charge. One employee who re-
ceived conflicting orders was asked by Brewer, "Are you working for Sandoval
or me?" Brewer tried to reorganize the agency, but Sandoval countermanded
his orders. In a final "Memorandum for the Record," Brewer noted that the
Central Office had little control over the field and that the agency used an
obsolete accounting system. "It is impossible," he wrote, "to determine the
true condition of the very large loan portfolio at any time." Brewer further
complained that Sandoval's "emotional and intransigent" behavior had frus-
trated his attempts at reform. Future administrators would have to deal with
the legacies of this organizational chaos.17
During the fall of 1970, the White House grew alarmed at Sandoval's
increasingly "irrational conduct." In November, presidential aide Tod R. Hullin
relayed FBI reports of Sandoval's alleged "moral indiscretions." The SBA ad-
ministrator allegedly had a love affair with a woman who was "a Cuban spy
presently living in South Africa" and had carried on affairs with women while
on official trips. Hullin also reported that when Sandoval's family was out of
town, he would host "wild parties" that lasted up to three days (there is no
evidence of any such report in Sandoval's FBI file).18 The beleaguered
administrator's medical problems worsened and aides had to read to him.
Hullin concluded that "Mr. Sandoval presents a scandal potential that appears
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imminent and incapable of being matched by any other member of this Ad-
ministration." SBA Deputy Administrator Einar Johnson and General Coun-
sel Anthony Chase urged the White House to place Sandoval on administrative
leave. On November 18, Sandoval tendered his resignation citing poor health.
He died of a brain tumor three years later.19
Sandoval's tragic tenure as administrator was a painful one for support-
ers of the SBA. His incompetence and inexperience contributed to a comedy
of errors that made headline news. Temperamentally, he was ill-suited for a
position that required diplomatic relations with the Democratic majority in
Congress. His paranoid style bred hostility and mistrust within the agency,
and his recruitment of old El Paso cronies brought further embarrassment to
the SBA.
But Sandoval was not responsible for all of the agency's problems. Previ-
ous administrators had made a virtue of decentralization by devolving author-
ity to the field, but the lack of central control allowed abuses to occur, such as
the making of loans to mobsters. Charles Kriger typified the politically well-
connected regional director who ruled his own little fiefdom and was unac-
countable to his official superiors. Sandoval's predecessors had also formed
close relationships with black militants, who exploited the politics of racial
grievance. No action taken by the SBA was enough to appease their insistent
calls for massive aid to minority enterprise. There was a subtext of interracial
conflict between the organized black leadership and the Mexican American
administrator. Nixon's decision to broaden "black capitalism" to include other
minorities antagonized civil rights activists who thought that he was depriv-
ing African Americans of their "piece of the action."
The ultimate blame for the Sandoval saga lay with the president. Nixon
had demonstrated poor judgment in selecting Sandoval to head such a politi-
cally sensitive agency. The warning signs were apparent to Nixon's advisers,
yet the president refused to consider their concerns over Sandoval's health and
lack of leadership ability. Once in office, Nixon was reluctant to remove
Sandoval, because he was sensitive to criticism from minority groups, who
were already up in arms over Nixon's controversial nominations to the Su-
preme Court and his foot-dragging on desegregating southern schools.
Affirmative Action Controversy
The SBA did not stand still during this scandal-ridden period; the agency
evolved in a difficult environment. As the economy slumped and inflation
accelerated, the Federal Reserve attacked inflation with a "tight money" policy
that restricted the credit available to business. The SBA served as a safety valve
by expanding its business loan volume 30 percent in 1969-1970. The agency
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continued to increase its reliance on guaranteed loans, while cutting direct
loans by two-thirds.20
Responding to presidential direction, the SBA made minority enter-
prise a top priority. In his first proposed budget, Nixon designated 40 percent
of SBA business loans to minority business. The agency concentrated this
assistance in urban areas, thus maintaining the ghetto focus of the 1960s. The
Economic Opportunity Loan program, theoretically color-blind, became de
facto race-based. This emphasis on minority-owned companies boosted their
share of all business loan dollars to 23 percent, up from six percent just two
years earlier. In contrast, lending to nonminority businesses declined through
fiscal year 1970.21
The SBA also created new minority enterprise programs. Rather than
wait for congressional direction, agency officials used their administrative dis-
cretion to institute innovative policies. Beginning in 1969, the SBA guaran-
teed surety bonds for minority contractors, although there was no express
legislative authority to do so until the following year. Likewise, the Minority
Enterprise Small Business Investment Company (MESBIC) program oper-
ated informally for three years before Congress authorized subsidies for SBICs
specializing in "disadvantaged" businesses.22
The Section 8 (a) program, still in its infancy, gained a big boost when
the White House advocated increased use of minority set-asides. Budget Di-
rector George P. Schultz provided the SBA with additional funds to cover the
difference between the competitive bids of nonminority firms and the higher
bids of 8(a) companies. Later, beginning in fiscal year 1972, Congress ap-
propriated money to subsidize 8 (a) companies. Funds were limited, how-
ever, and procurement agencies often took a loss on 8 (a) contracts, a
concession that made the program unpopular with Department of Defense
procurement officers.23
Nixon's minority enterprise program drew partisan lines of support and
opposition. Conservative politicians, including James L. Buckley of New York
and Governor Ronald Reagan of California, praised the "boot strap" approach
taken by the SBA. Groups associated with the Republican Party—including
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Business League (NBL)—
also backed the president's preferential programs. Under "lifelong Republi-
can" Berkeley Burrell, the NBL secured millions of dollars in OMBE grants
and dramatically expanded the organization's operations. Meanwhile, the
Congressional Black Caucus, made up entirely of Democrats, blasted the Nixon
administration for doing too little for African American business.24
The honeymoon that "black capitalism" enjoyed during the 1968 cam-
paign soon gave way to criticism from all sides. While praising Nixon for
taking up the cause of black business, Berkeley Burrell lobbied for more aid.
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African Americans needed special assistance, he argued, until the day that
black and white business owners sat "across the table, millionaire to million-
aire." Burrell beat the drum of racial grievance by calling the U.S. a "racist
country" and advocating a "Marshall Plan" for minority businesses. Burrell
also reiterated the NBL's longstanding complaint that the SBA neglected the
more successful African American firms. Jackie Robinson, a one-time sup-
porter of Nixon, testified that he was "scared" of a racial civil war developing
if the SBA and OMBE did not increase spending on minority business. Black
Democrats were even less charitable. Representative William Clay (D-Mo.),
for example, likened the SBA to the KKK: "We know better than to apply for
loans with the SBA just as we know better than to apply for membership in
the KKK."25
Nixon's advisers were frustrated at the slow implementation of the mi-
nority enterprise initiative and the resulting criticism thus generated. Privately,
they berated SBA officials for failing to "get their part of the show on the
road" and for engaging in a protracted bureaucratic struggle with the OMBE.
The anticipated public relation benefits never materialized; instead, the ad-
ministration was repeatedly embarrassed when its predictions of success turned
to failure. A typical letdown occurred in June 1970, when the White House
had scheduled a ceremony to commemorate the creation of the 100th
MESBIC, but discovered that there were only nine in operation.26
The Nixon administration anticipated criticism from black activists but
downplayed the prospect of a white backlash against minority enterprise pref-
erences. Stans predicted that there would be no "severe negative impact on the
majority community, as is often the case with civil rights issues."27 On the
contrary, a fierce debate over "reverse discrimination" ensued in Congress, the
courts, and in public discussion of race relations. In truth, the SBA had been
practicing "reverse discrimination" since 1964, but the sixties riots had sub-
merged questions of equity. The cessation of civil disorders and Nixon's high-
profile attention to affirmative action brought this controversial issue to the
surface.
The Congressional Small Business Committees protested that the SBA
was discriminating against nonminority small business owners by denying
them access to EOLs and Section 8 (a) set-asides. With Republican members
dissenting, the House Committee charged that 8 (a) preferences possibly vio-
lated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. The Small Business Committees were responding to the outcry of
businesspeople denied direct loans and set-asides on the basis of dieir race.
Spokespersons for the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB)
opposed "compensatory discrimination" and argued for color-blindness in SBA
programs. Furthermore, businessmen and women testified that "I went to
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SBA for a loan and I was told I was the wrong color" and asserted that "you
can't get a loan if you aren't black." This was an exaggeration—financially
strong companies were eligible for guaranteed loans—but it is true that nearly
all direct loans and 8 (a) set-asides were reserved for minority businesses. Thus,
the minority enterprise program redistributed agency resources away from
some disadvantaged white firms.28
In congressional testimony, Sandoval walked a fine line between de-
fending racial preferences and denying that they existed. He declared, "We are
not discriminating because of color in either direction." Theoretically, all
"minority" programs were open to "disadvantaged" business owners regard-
less of race. Thus, when asked for the definition of "disadvantage," Sandoval
responded, "The term 'minority' is a short form for the phrase 'socially or
economically disadvantaged.'" He went on to say that disadvantage was not
based on such an "irrational classification" as race. Agency regulations, how-
ever, stated that "in many cases," members of the following groups were dis-
advantaged: "Black Americans; American Indians; Spanish-Americans; Oriental
Americans; Eskimos and Aleuts."29 In theory, poor whites were eligible for
assistance, but in practice, agency officials conflated race and disadvantage.
The fallacy of equating skin color with disadvantage was evident in the
case of Lou Brock, a well-paid African American baseball star who received a
"minority" loan in 1969. Brock used the loan to open an auto dealership in
East St. Louis, Illinois. When the news media reported on this loan, the SBA
responded in a confused manner, initially admitting an error only later to
defend its decision. The director of the St. Louis office said, "We are con-
cerned about creating a black example here, and we're damned enthused about
it." But Brock was unaware that his application was routed to the minority
program. He commented that "if they made the loan just so they'd have a
'black example,' I think it was a terrible thing to do." Agency officials faced
hostile questioning from members of Congress who thought Brock was not
the "disadvantaged" business owner they had in mind, but the SBA stood its
ground and allowed Brock to keep his loan.30
The Lou Brock case revealed the dissonant definitions of "disadvantage"
used by the agency. Was "social" disadvantage based on skin color enough to
qualify an applicant for aid? Or was "economic disadvantage" also required?
Was the goal of the minority enterprise program to make a rich black man
even richer in the hope that his success would inspire the poor? A few propo-
nents of affirmative action rationalized that the government had enriched
wealthy white men, and that minority millionaires might have been more
successful if they, too, had benefited from corporate welfare. Yet such cynical
reasoning undermined the legitimacy of a program clearly intended to aid the
underprivileged. Furthermore, the awarding of contracts and loans to well-to-
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do individuals displaced the assistance available to entrepreneurs who were
truly disadvantaged. The controversy over "disadvantage" added a new di-
mension to the agency's longstanding difficulty in defining its interest-group
constituency. What was a "small" business? Who was "disadvantaged"? These
issues continued to plague the agency throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
The commitment of manpower to the minority enterprise program re-
inforced affirmative action hiring within the agency. Sandoval stated, "I don't
think anyone knows the problems of the Black-American . . . better than
another Black-American, a soul brother. . . . I don't think anyone knows the
problems of a Mexican-American . . . better than a Mexican-American, a
compadre."31 There was grumbling among African American employees that
Hispanics had "jumped on the bandwagon" by taking advantage of the civil
rights gains of the black community.32 Nonetheless, this form of affirmative
action proved less controversial than the preferences in contracting and lend-
ing, because it was less visible and did not negatively effect the interests of
white business owners.
The SBA also helped the Nixon administration impose de facto quotas
on government contractors. In retrospect, it seems ironic that a Republican
president and his allies in Congress instituted employment "goals and time-
tables" over the opposition of congressional Democrats. But Nixon was pre-
disposed to think along racial lines. According to historian John David Skrentny,
Nixon was "obsessed with the idea of diversity. He kept track of the ethnicity
and gender of all of his political appointments, to a degree of specificity that
made many in government uncomfortable." Yet, in Nixon's mind, hiring "goals"
and minority set-asides were not signs of big government, because they did
not require die creation of large government bureaucracies.33
These hiring mandates did, however, require monitoring by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and other federal agencies.
The SBA was responsible for supervising the civil rights compliance of small
subcontractors, a task that proved nearly impossible given the frequency with
which these companies came and went on construction projects. By 1975, the
agency was monitoring firms with a total of 450,000 employees, second only
to the Department of Defense. More important, the SBA routinized civil
rights compliance among its own clients. In the past, the agency had surrepti-
tiously gathered racial data by noting the physical appearance of loan appli-
cants. But during the Nixon years, the SBA's Office of Equal Employment
Opportunity and Compliance began to collect racial data by distributing a Form
707 to agency clients. A gross statistical disparity between a firm's minority
employment and the minority share of the local labor market could trigger an
on-site review. After examining recruitment sources, agency EEO officials rec-
ommended methods to increase the minority applicant pool. Occasionally, if
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the firm was still "grossly deficient" in minority employment, the SBA nego-
tiated voluntary "goals and timetables." In rare circumstances, the agency re-
ferred possible cases of discrimination to the EEOC.34
The SBA considered its methods highly successful and touted the sup-
posed overrepresentation of minorities in client workforces. In its annual re-
ports, the SBA claimed that ethnic minorities constituted 23 percent of the
employees of SBA borrowers. Despite the fact that these numbers were skewed
by the agency's concentration on cities with large minority populations, the
SBA continued to judge the success of its EEO program by citing similar
statistics. Like the federal civil rights agencies, the SBA had become number-
conscious.35
Yet the agency's small business mission tempered its approach to civil
rights compliance. The EEOC's mission was to place discriminatory employ-
ers in a negative light. The Commission had the power to impose fines and
punitive measures. In contrast, the SBA's mission was to help small businesses,
not "strong-arm" them. The SBA could not afford to alienate its constituency;
therefore, it exempted very small businesses (those with fewer than fifteen
employees) from the Form 707 paperwork requirement and stressed the busi-
ness benefits of widening applicant pools. Agency officials cooperated with
small employers to make them aware of any "vulnerabilities" to EEOC dis-
crimination complaints, but the primary emphasis was on outreach and edu-
cation, an emphasis that continues to this day. Even if they had wished to
punish employers who hired few minorities, agency officials had few sanc-
tions available. The SBA could conceivably revoke a loan after a lengthy pro-
cedure, but a firm could pay off the loan and seek financial assistance in the
private sector.36
Racial issues remained controversial long after the departure of Hilary
Sandoval, who left behind problems for the SBA in other areas. His successor
found an agency suffering from an overload of responsibilities, with severe
deficiencies in management assistance, procurement, SBICs, and disaster lend-
ing. As a presidential election approached, SBA officials enjoyed a boom in
spending, followed by the worst series of scandals in the agency's history.
THE SMALL SCANDAL ADMINISTRATION
Following the Sandoval debacle, the SBA desperately needed competent lead-
ership. Sandovals successor, Thomas S. Kleppe, improved agency operations
and presided over an election-year surge in spending that reflected the politi-
cal cycle of agency growth. With presidential backing, the SBA also expanded
its affirmative action programs over opposition from Congress. Yet the agency
still suffered longstanding problems, including a disorganized bureaucracy
and a decentralized field structure that produced several scandals.
The SBA's interest-group environment was also beginning to change.
Historically, the agency and its congressional allies had failed to organize small
business owners into a group with strong ties to the federal government. The
small business community remained a voiceless, unorganized presence out-
side the Broker State. During the early 1970s, however, a growing grassroots
movement of small businesspeople protested big government. The SBA re-
mained a weak advocate for these disaffected business owners, thus creating a
political vacuum soon filled by the emergence of an influential small business
lobby.
Restructuring a Disorganized Agency, 1971-1972
After discharging Sandoval, President Nixon was concerned with rehabilitat-
ing "an important but faltering agency." The SBA's standing with Congress
was at an all-time low. By appointing Thomas Kleppe SBA administrator, the
White House hoped to ameliorate relations with the Small Business Commit-
tees. Kleppe was a former member of the House of Representatives, who was
well liked on both sides of the aisle. The SBA post was Kleppe's reward for
agreeing to run for the U.S. Senate in North Dakota, a race that he had lost in
1970. The "peppery" westerner was a colorful figure—a rodeo rider and self-
made millionaire, who displayed six-shooters in his office. He believed in
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decentralized management, asserting, "I am a delegator. I trust." Unfortu-
nately, several subordinates later betrayed that trust.1
Kleppe devoted his first two years to overhauling the SBA bureaucracy.
He first established a task force to deal with the "duplication and administra-
tive inefficiency" that he saw as the agency's number one problem. The task
force reported that there was little coordination of the various SBA divisions.
During the past ten years, SBA administrators, presidents, and Congress had
dumped programs into the agency without fitting them into the existing or-
ganizational structure. "Questionable promotions" and a top-heavy incentive
structure had hurt employee morale, as had excessive paperwork. Administra-
tive operations were overstaffed and there were personnel shortages in other
areas. Therefore, Kleppe shifted Central Office workers to the field and granted
regional and district directors greater autonomy. The danger was that these
field directors were "often as loyal to their district Congressman as to the
agency."2 This conflict of interest later erupted into a terrific scandal.
Kleppe also restructured management assistance by increasing the SBAs
reliance on the private sector. In 1970, the agency signed agreements with
four professional associations to provide counseling to small businesses. Two
years later, Kleppe established the Small Business Institute (SBI), a consor-
tium of universities empowering business students to act as consultants to
troubled firms. The SBA paid the colleges several hundred dollars for each
successful case, while students received academic credit and real-world train-
ing. The SBI was an immediate success. By 1975, there were 400 colleges and
20,000 students assisting 8,000 business owners at a cost of only two million
dollars.3
SBI represented a creative approach to the management "gap"; however,
the mainstay of management assistance, the Service Corps of Retired Execu-
tives (SCORE), faced an organizational crisis. In 1971, President Nixon trans-
ferred all volunteer services—including SCORE—to the American Committee
to Improve Our Neighborhood (ACTION). SCORE now served two mas-
ters; ACTION reimbursed SCORE for expenses, while SBA set policy. SCORE
was the only business-oriented service under ACTION, which treated the
organization ungenerously—first by denying it adequate funds, and then urg-
ing the retired executives to focus exclusively on the inner-city. Meanwhile,
die SBA directed the volunteers to give up management counseling and col-
lect the agency's bad loans. SCORE membership declined as volunteers re-
fused to deal with "deadbeats." The SBA learned its lesson. In 1973, Kleppe
returned SCORE to the Office of Management Assistance; and two years
later, President Gerald Ford gave the SBA sole control of SCORE. Neverthe-
less, the crisis prompted SCORE officials to establish a separate organization.
In 1971, they created the SCORE Council; four years later, SCORE incorpo-
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rated as a nonprofit association. These moves reflected the growing indepen-
dence of SCORE, because despite the lip service given to the importance of
management assistance, the SBA offered little support and leadership.4
The SBA also failed to provide steadfast supervision of the SBIC indus-
try. Agency funding was erratic, and turnover was a problem; the SBIC divi-
sion had had twelve administrators in twelve years. The chairman of the
National SBIC Advisory Committee complained that "we have all too often
felt like yo-yos at the end of SBA's string." Rather than deal with fundamental
problems, SBA and Congress responded in time-honored fashion by increas-
ing the public debt available to investors. But throwing low-interest money at
SBICs did more harm than good. The investment companies parked much of
their capital in interest-earning accounts rather than invest it in high-risk ven-
tures. They underperformed the broader stock market and posted substan-
tially negative returns on their capital. Furthermore, SBICs continued to violate
SBA regulations in near-record numbers. The miserable performance of the
past fifteen years led the Small Business Committees to question whether the
whole enterprise was worth it.5
The procurement program posed another perennial problem: how could
the SBA boost the small-business share of contract awards when the Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) viewed the agency as a detriment to efficient pro-
curement practices? The SBA could not coerce the DOD, nor could it change
the procurement mix. The agency's Procurement Center Representatives, who
barely numbered forty, matched small firms with appropriate contracts, rec-
ommended set-asides, and encouraged procurement officers to break up large
orders so that small companies could compete. Yet policymakers never estab-
lished a yardstick for success. Since 1947, Congress had resolved that small
business was entitled to a "fair proportion" of procurement dollars but never
defined what this meant. Members of Congress occasionally expressed adher-
ence to rigid proportionalism—small firms should receive the same share of
government dollars that they received in the private sector. This focus on
aggregate statistics obscured the inflated set-asides used in some industries
("over 90 percent" of clothing purchases) and the minuscule share set aside in
others (as low as one percent). However, in sharp contrast to the furor evoked
by racial preferences, there was no debate over small business set-asides. SBA
officials rarely voiced concern that small firms were too dependent on govern-
ment. The universal admiration of small business muffled qualms about the
equity or effectiveness of these affirmative action programs.6
The first two years of Kleppe's administration produced a mixed record.
The Small Business Institute was an important innovation, but SCORE suf-
fered through an ili-advised reorganization. There were no improvements in
the SBIC or procurement divisions. Agency personnel were stretched thin
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over an ever-growing array of programs. On the other hand, employee morale
recovered under Kleppe's confident leadership, and the SBA maintained good
relations with Congress. The agency also enjoyed the support of a president
up for reelection. Partisan presidential politics contributed to the enormous
growth of SBA lending in 1972. However, once elected, Nixon reversed course
and imposed fiscal restraint.
The 1972 Election
Perhaps more than any other president in the twentieth century, Richard Nixon
cynically manipulated the economy in pursuit of short-term electoral gain. In
1971, he imposed wage-price controls to subdue inflation. Then, in the first
half of 1972, Nixon reversed his fiscal policies to boom the economy in time
for the election. According to economic adviser Herbert Stein, the president
urged all government agencies to "get out and spend." The SBA profited from
this fiscal ease; in 1972, the business loan volume increased 50 percent, hit-
ting a record $2 billion. The agency made an additional $1.2 billion in disas-
ter loans, largely in response to Hurricane Agnes. During the campaign, Nixon
touted this increased spending. The president's policies seemed to work—the
economy enjoyed growth and price stability—and the voters rewarded Nixon
with a landslide victory over George McGovern.7
The president's proclivity for spending did not last beyond election day.
In 1973, Nixon became a born-again fiscal conservative. He responded to a
widening budget deficit by vetoing appropriation bills and impounding funds
authorized by Congress. The president's policy reversal affected SBA opera-
tions. The agency significantly reduced its lending volume; by fiscal year 1975,
business lending was down 25 percent. The SBA did not attain its 1972 peak
again until the Carter years.8
Nixon's austerity measures included a major reform of the SBA's disaster
loan program. The huge expense of Hurricane Agnes highlighted the need for
cost savings. The SBA typically forgave the loans of needy disaster victims. In
1969, Congress granted "forgiveness" of the first $1,800 of a disaster loan. In
the aftermath of Agnes, however, President Nixon approved a politically popular
bill that increased the "forgiveness" amount to $5,000 and eliminated the
means test. This change cost the government over $500 million in disaster
grants during 1972-1973. But, after the election, when Congress passed a
similar bill, Nixon vetoed it. Congress then enacted legislation requiring
homeowners and businesses in flood zones to purchase subsidized insurance.9
Neither the president nor Congress addressed the most serious struc-
tural problem with disaster lending—the unpredictable diversion of agency
personnel. The progressive liberalization of disaster aid made the program a
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huge potential drain on agency resources (in 1973, the SBA approved 215,000
disaster loans, seven times the number of business loans). SBA administrators
and the Small Business Committees agreed that the program belonged in the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) or in a new disas-
ter-aid agency. Nonetheless, Congress never mustered the will to transfer the
program out of SBA.10
The Scandals of 1973
The battle over disaster aid was a trifle compared with the scandals of 1973.
During the Watergate committee hearings, Democrats charged that the White
House had pressured government agencies to place contracts with companies
that contributed to the Committee to Reelect the President (CREEP). The
Office of Minority Business Enterprise (OMBE) raised campaign funds and
awarded questionable grants to prominent African American entrepreneurs.
SBA officials denied that they succumbed to similar pressure and investiga-
tors failed to prove a corrupt relationship between CREEP and the agency.11
The SBA did not emerge unscathed from the Watergate-era congres-
sional investigations. In the fall of 1973, a House Subcommittee on Small
Business announced a series of shocking revelations of improper White House
intervention in agency affairs and internal administrative corruption. The
stench of scandal led a few members of Congress to call for the abolition of
the SBA, but cooler heads prevailed; the scandals did not affect the agency's
bottom line. Fearful of hurting small business, Congress treated the agency
with kid gloves.
The lead investigator for the House subcommittee, Curtis Prins, uncov-
ered evidence that the White House and the SBA under Sandoval had helped
black businesspeople with criminal records. The White House had ordered
the Internal Revenue Service and the SBA to back off their investigation of
Thomas W Matthew, a prominent African American businessman and sup-
porter of the president. Nixon pardoned Matthew in 1969, shortly after a jury
convicted him of income tax evasion. Despite his criminal record, the SBA
and other federal agencies had awarded him $1.2 million in loans, grants, and
contracts. He was later caught misusing SBA loans. An agency auditor recom-
mended prosecuting Matthew for theft of federal funds, but wrote that the
White House wanted to avoid embarrassing the president. This was not the
first time the White House had intervened on behalf of a convicted black busi-
ness owner; in 1969, the SBA informed presidential aide Robert J. Brown that
S.B. Fuller, earlier convicted of violating the securities law, was involved in an-
other "SEC proceeding." Brown offered White House assistance for Fuller, whom
he described as "a leading black businessman and a long-time Republican."12
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The SBA also tried unsuccessfully to rescue failing minority enterprises.
African American entrepreneur J. Wallace Gaines had defaulted on $50,000
in SBA loans and lied about the financial status of his business; nevertheless,
he received $800,000 in Section 8(a) contracts. Gaines's business folded after
completing only one-third of its contract work. The White House and the
SBA also came to the aid of the Watts Manufacturing Company, a highly
publicized firm established in the aftermath of the Watts riot. The company
hired the hard-core unemployed but was a business disaster. From 1966 to
1976, when the company filed for bankruptcy, it depended almost entirely on
government contracts. The Nixon administration secured millions of dollars
in Section 8 (a) contracts to keep the company alive. The president's chief
domestic advisor, John Ehrlichman, was skeptical. "The whole intention of
black capitalism," he wrote, "is to put the black man into competition with
the white on equal ground. The program will never be successful if the Federal
Government must always provide a backstop." But the viewpoint of presiden-
tial aide Leonard Zartman prevailed. Zartman argued that "this experiment in
minority business enterprise has had too much visibility to fail."13
These abuses resulted from institutionalized favoritism toward certain
racial groups. Double standards in the distribution of government assistance
produced double standards in law enforcement and the administration of this
politically sensitive program. It is tempting to lay the blame on a corrupt
presidency, but the abuses continued long after Nixon resigned. These cases
demonstrated another problem with the minority enterprise program—the
tendency to bail out unsuccessful firms. Political pressures subverted the ulti-
mate goal of the program, which was to make these companies competitive in
the open market.
The SBA was further embarrassed when the House subcommittee re-
ported that the head of die minority enterprise program, Arthur McZier, served
as director of a Bahamian bank controlled by Robert Vesco, a fugitive finan-
cier and major contributor to Nixon's reelection campaign. In 1972, the SEC
charged Vesco with misappropriating $200 million from his mutual funds,
and he fled to Costa Rica. During this time, McZier served as a Vesco direc-
tor, before resigning his SBA post to become a full-time bank official. McZier s
directorship was legal yet reflected badly on an agency that was enduring one
scandal after another.14
The worst scandal yet rocked the agency in December 1973, when the
subcommittee disclosed that Philadelphia regional director Russell Hamilton
was under investigation for allegedly taking kickbacks. Six months earlier,
Deputy Administrator Louis Laun had given Hamilton the option of resign-
ing or being fired. Faced with imminent dismissal, Hamilton launched coun-
tercharges claiming that he was the victim of a mob conspiracy involving
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Kleppe, the "Godfather of the Virgin Islands" and "people higher up in Gov-
ernment." FBI investigators debunked this conspiracy theory by confirming
that Kleppe had never traveled to the Virgin Islands.15
Hamilton tried to further distract the Central Office by charging that
the corruption in the Richmond, Virginia, district was "so wild nobody would
believe it." This revelation stunned the agency. The district director, Thomas
Regan, was a star employee. An investigator said that Regan was "one of the
most loyal, dedicated, government people I've ever come across. Everybody
loved him." But Regan operated in an intensely political environment. He
described his job as one of befriending "all the politicos in the state. . . . That
way, if there was any political need it would come through me." The close ties
between local SBA officials, bankers, and politicians gave the appearance of a
"fraternity chapter." Regan took advantage of these ties by borrowing money
from banks that had dealings with his office. Regan also approved $11 million
in loans to companies owned by his brother-in-law who, in turn, lent him
$300,000. The House subcommittee further alleged that Regan associated
with Mafia figures and that he made bad loans to individuals recommended
by the White House.16
Kleppe took decisive action, but the damage to the agency's reputation
was already done. He fired Hamilton and Regan in December 1973. A court
convicted Hamilton and his chief deputy of accepting kickbacks. A jury found
Regan guilty of fraud, racketeering, and bribery, and he and several of his
associates received lengthy prison terms. However, the scandal continued to
spread as the House subcommittee, the FBI, and the General Accounting
Office (GAO) investigated twenty-two other district offices. These investiga-
tions resulted in the conviction of seventeen borrowers and five SBA employ-
ees. Kleppe contended that there were "no more Richmonds," and further
investigation uncovered no new criminal cases. Yet the Milwaukee office had
received an official reprimand for throwing "wild parties" and displaying a
"lack of common business etiquette . . . lack of self-discipline . . . lack of
quality work effort." One Milwaukee loan officer openly defied his superiors
by making bad loans to meet his quotas. The committee also uncovered the
widespread practice of "bank bailouts" by which banks arranged to have de-
linquent borrowers refinance with SBA loans. Agency financial officers alleg-
edly looked the other way because these loans helped to meet their quotas.
SBA headquarters clearly lacked control of the regional and district offices.
The agency's decentralized field structure had taken on a life of its own.17
The unrestrained growth of the Nixon years fostered these abuses.
Monthly loan quotas encouraged SBA employees to emphasize volume, re-
gardless of the quality or legality of the loan applications. A former official
later recalled that the word was to "go out and scare up as many loans as you
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can. If they're bad, don't worry. . . . whatever sticks to the wall [as a sound
loan] is a bonus." Auditing controls were weak, and the agency lacked the
personnel needed to monitor the fast-growing loan portfolio. Yet these scan-
dals still had a certain beneficial effect—the institution of regular field audits
and an increase in Security and Investigation staff. Furthermore, to prevent
conflicts of interest, Kleppe and Laun created new district offices to replace
those operated by Regional Offices in their home states.18
In August 1974, the SBA received another blow to its already sullied
reputation when the Civil Service Commission (CSC) admonished the agency
for making politically motivated appointments of district directors. The CSC
did not charge Kleppe with wrongdoing but asserted that under his adminis-
tration "political interests were allowed to influence appointments in a style
that approximates a patronage system." The decentralization of the SBA meant
that field officers made many of these appointments; the Central Office had
little control over the hiring process.19
The events of 1973—1974 earned the agency a reputation as the "Small
Scandal Administration." Representative Frank Annunzio (D-Ill.) stated that
"prior to these hearings.. . I had always thought the initials SBA stood for the
Small Business Administration. But now I believe that the initials stand for
'Superior Bagman Agency.'" Representative Ed Koch (D-N.Y.) quipped, "SBA
sounds terrific, right? Always find a good name for a program, and it does not
make any difference what is beneath the good name." And Senator William
Proxmire (D-Wis.) included the SBA on a list of "useless agencies" that Con-
gress should eliminate. As a consequence, Kleppe was left pleading, "It's just
not true that we're all a bunch of crooks, a bunch of outlaws."20
Yet the scandals had surprisingly little effect on congressional relations.
The subcommittee investigation merely delayed by six months the passage of
a bill increasing the SBA's lending authority from $4.3 billion to $6 billion. At
first glance, the congressional reaction is puzzling. Why, despite years of scan-
dal, were critics such as William Proxmire unable to exploit these episodes of
corruption? The literature on political scandal suggests that government agen-
cies are relatively immune from punitive budget cuts when the affected con-
stituency is considered "deserving" of continued assistance. And, indeed,
Congress was unwilling to punish the small business community for the sins
of the SBA.21
The Firestorm over Minority Enterprise
Meanwhile, the SBA's minority enterprise program grew ever more controver-
sial. Congressional critics cried "reverse discrimination" and tried to legislate
race-neutrality into programs targeted at the "disadvantaged." Supporters
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claimed that the programs were technically color-blind and therefore immune
from constitutional challenge. This debate pitted a Republican president against
congressional Democrats who opposed racial preferences. The Nixon years
ended with no final resolution of this debate. It was evident, however, that the
programs were doing a poor job of preparing minority firms for the real world
of business.
Kleppe's inauguration coincided with a presidential drive to beef up the
minority enterprise program. Nixon deposited government funds in minority
banks in the hope that tliey would finance minority businesses. He also pressed
the SBA to act more aggressively. Economic Opportunity Loans (EOLs) be-
came less important as the SBA emphasized 8(a) set-asides, a program that
did not require congressional approval. Loans to minority firms leveled off at
$300 million in 1972-1973, then declined for the next several years. Section
8 (a) contract dollars, on the other hand, steadily increased from $68 million
to $272 million (fiscal year 1971-1974).22
Through his commitment to minority enterprise, President Nixon sought
to build his civil rights credentials. Yet many African American critics argued
that his minority enterprise agenda was insufficient. The Congressional Black
Caucus (CBC) demanded a one-billion-dollar development bank, a proposal
that Nixon rejected. Minority business owners also criticized the SBA for its
"frighteningly inadequate" commitment of resources. The chief problem, ac-
cording to these critics, was that the SBA had a conflict of interest in serving
both minority and nonminority businesses. As such, the agency was forced
into the unenviable position of having to take contracts away from small white-
owned businesses.23
The SBA was caught in the crossfire between those who maintained it
was doing too little and those who asserted it was doing too much. The Small
Business Committees, with Republican members dissenting, complained that
the agency was diverting loans, contracts, and personnel away from tradi-
tional programs to the minority enterprise division (the Republicans defended
the president's program, citing racial inequalities in business ownership). Kleppe
boasted that "we put about 11 times as much energy and personnel into help-
ing the average minority or disadvantaged firm as we do in helping the aver-
age majority firm." But, the committees argued, the results were anything but
positive. The EOL loss rate was 35 percent, more than ten times the loss rate
on regular business loans. Furthermore, the SBA awarded millions of dollars
in grants to management consultants and assigned them to minority firms
that were failing rather than those with a realistic chance of success.24
The committees reserved their harshest criticism for the Section 8 (a)
program. The goal of 8 (a) was to make firms competitive so that they would
no longer need no-bid subsidized contracts. Participants were supposed to
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"graduate" within approximately three years, but there were no formal guide-
lines, and only a tiny percentage ever graduated. Most 8 (a) companies were
not viable, because the program did not require them to compete. The few
successful companies denied that they were doing well so that they could
retain their government benefits. In addition, SBA officials were too busy
managing the high volume of 8 (a) contracts to supervise the progress of indi-
vidual firms. There were other problems with the program as well. Section
8 (a) was a "people-eater" that drained agency personnel from other assign-
ments. A few 8 (a) firms received the bulk of contract dollars, while others
received nothing. The biggest losers were nonminority firms who lost con-
tracts. Some of these companies survived by nominally transferring owner-
ship to black "fronts"; others employed "fronts" to exploit the opportunity for
no-bid contracts. Upon discovering that many 8(a) companies were in fact
"fronts," Kleppe issued requirements that"actual ownership and control must
be in the hands of the eligible minority" (italics in original), but it was diffi-
cult to prove that a black-white partnership was fraudulent.25
Racial discrimination was the fundamental issue raised by congressional
critics. Nixon argued that white business owners shared in the overall growth
of SBA business loans; therefore, they were not losing out to minority firms.
But opponents considered racial distinctions odious and constitutionally sus-
pect. The president's own Advisory Council on Minority Enterprise concluded
that preferences might violate the 14th Amendment's guarantee of equal pro-
tection. The council emphasized a class-based approach to deal with the "eco-
nomic insecurity of blue collar and lower-middle income whites" as well as
ethnic minorities. Similarly, the Small Business Committees urged the SBA to
assist disadvantaged businesses, regardless of race.26
Legal challenges to 8(a) led SBA administrators to declare the official
color-blindness of the program, yet they admitted that only a few disadvan-
taged whites participated and that most of the set-asides were contracts previ-
ously awarded to small white-owned businesses. Section 8 (a) officials failed to
enforce regulations ensuring that current contractors were not "significantly
affected adversely." Congressional hearings exposed the Orwellian rhetoric of
affirmative action, as Thomas Kleppe offered evasive definitions of "disadvan-
tage." He stated that skin color automatically qualified minorities as "disad-
vantaged," but that "no American is included or excluded . . . because of such
an irrational classification." Kleppe cited examples of white Appalachians who
might qualify as "socially and economically disadvantaged," yet remarked that,
in fact, most disadvantaged individuals were minorities. In 1973, the GAO
criticized the SBA for failing to develop clear eligibility requirements, but it
was this vagueness that allowed the program to survive court challenges.27
Proponents of color-blindness confronted a race-conscious president in
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1972, when Congress debated an administration bill granting the MESBIC
program statutory authority. White House aides thought they were "in the
favored strategic position of having proposed something to greatly help mi-
norities which Congress flatly refuses to act upon." Democrats charged that
the MESBIC program violated the Civil Rights Act and secured an amend-
ment eliminating the word "minority" from its title. Nevertheless, the SBA
continued to limit the program to racial minorities.28
By any measure, the various minority enterprise programs were abysmal
failures. The MESBICs were small and highly leveraged; they invested most
of their capital in cash and government securities. And by 1976, their net
losses exceeded 50 percent of their revenue. Furthermore, minority banks in-
vested federal deposits in government debt instead of minority enterprises.
Studies by economist Timothy Bates demonstrated that SBA loans to black
businesses benefited some middle-class borrowers, but lower-income blacks
were left worse off. It seemed apparent that the SBA based its minority lend-
ing decisions on short-term liquidity rather than the experience and credit
rating of a company. Bates concluded that the agency operated "with a time
horizon which would be appropriate for a loan shark." Moreover, the 8(a)
program not only failed to graduate competitive firms, it hampered govern-
ment procurement. In 1973, two-thirds of the 8 (a) companies were delin-
quent in fulfilling their contracts.29
The SBA and "New" Regulation
The excessive attention paid to minority enterprise concealed the emergence
of an issue that soon transformed the politics of small business: the growing
threat of big government. The Nixon years witnessed tremendous growth in
government regulation of health, safety, and the environment. Unlike the in-
dustry-specific regulation of the New Deal era, this "new" regulation encom-
passed the entire economy. There was a loud outcry among small business
owners complaining of the paperwork, time, and costs associated with "asi-
nine" regulations. For example, a furniture shop owner said, "OSFIA [the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Administration] worries the hell out of me. . . .
Did you know we've even got to paint the electrical outlets orange?" The
Small Business Committees were sympathetic; they held hearings and autho-
rized the SBA to make "economic injury" loans to help firms comply with the
new requirements.30
The SBA responded slowly to the problem of overregulation. In 1970,
the agency did not even testify before committees considering the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act. The SBA's post-hoc policies were equally inad-
equate. In 1974, the House Small Business Committee criticized the agency
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for making fewer than eighty economic injury loans. Although the SBA placed
a high priority on minority enterprise, the agency failed to challenge regula-
tions that effectively excluded minority firms from certain industries (e.g., the
Interstate Commerce Commission sanctioned a cartel that barred small and
minority firms from entering trucking). In 1974, Congress created a Chief
Counsel for Advocacy to serve as an ombudsman for small business owners.
But it remained an open question whether this new office would help the
SBA live up to its self-appointed title as "Court of Last Resort" for small
business.31
The SBA was a weak advocate partly because it felt no pressure from a
strong interest group of small business owners. The National Federation of
Independent Business (NFIB) was the largest small business association, but
autocratic founder C. Wilson Harder dominated the group from its establish-
ment in 1943 until his death in 1968. Members of Congress did not take the
NFIB seriously.32 But this changed in the mid-1970s as the NFIB, under new
leadership, exploited widespread disaffection with big government. By the
end of the decade, NFIB emerged as one of the most powerful lobbies in
Washington.
Conclusion
This study of the SBA confirms the revisionist interpretation of Nixon as an
"agent of change."33 Contemporary opponents, blinded by their hatred of
Nixon, failed to recognize the activist nature of his domestic agenda. Nixon
was a "liberal spender" who dramatically expanded many domestic programs.34
Motivated by partisan politics and his own presidential agenda, Nixon vied
with Congress to spend more on small business. He also overcame stiff con-
gressional opposition to racial preferences and thereby laid the foundation for
modern forms of affirmative action. But Nixon left a legacy of political cor-
ruption that undermined the operation and reputation of agencies such as the
SBA.
During the Nixon years, the SBA institutionalized unethical behavior in
its administration of the minority enterprise program. Flagrant insubordina-
tion to the will of Congress and the open violation of agency regulations
constituted a breach of professional norms. As Joseph Zimmerman notes in
his Curbing Unethical Behavior in Government, it has become more difficult to
restrain administrative agencies as the government has grown.35 Even with
congressional oversight, agency heads enjoy considerable independence. But
by misusing their authority, SBA administrators undermined their credibility
and reputation for fairness. Their prevaricating language belied racially dis-
criminatory practices, which the agency could not openly defend.
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The Richmond scandal highlighted the organizational weaknesses of
the SBA bureaucracy. The agency's decentralized field structure rendered it
vulnerable to corrupting influences. Furthermore, the tremendous growth of
the SBA outstripped the Central Office's ability to supervise operations in the
field. Yet, despite its operational shortcomings, the SBA remained popular with
members of Congress who exploited the responsiveness of the field offices.
Essentially, in the case of the SBA, a fragmented bureaucratic structure
produced an incoherent organizational culture. Management experts define
"organizational culture" as a sense of community based on "shared meanings
and shared values." Strong cultures inculcate "basic assumptions and beliefs"
thereby fostering a consensus on the "core mission" of the organization.36 But
rapid growth, erratic leadership, and disparate program objectives prevented
the SBA from developing a unified organizational culture. Lending officers
and SBIC officials reflected a "banker's mentality," while minority enterprise
officials—increasingly drawn from the ranks of civil rights activists—responded
to the activism of their political environment. The agency's procurement spe-
cialists were retired military officers who viewed their unit as the "stepchild"
of the SBA; thus, they tended to "circle the wagons" and remove themselves
from the "SBA family." Likewise, management assistance officers were clois-
tered "academic types" who wrote agency pamphlets but had little contact
with the small business community or the rest of the agency. The agency's
organization along separate program lines further reinforced parochialism
among the various divisions.37 In short, the SBA contained multiple, some-
times conflicting, subcultures.
For most of its history, the SBA operated in an interest-group vacuum;
small business owners remained aloof from the federal government. During
the 1970s, however, organizational activity among small business owners fi-
nally took off in reaction against big government. The government's inability
to deal with the severe recession of 1973—1974, coupled with the recent pro-
liferation of regulation, fueled small business activism in the second half of
the 1970s. Thus, the Ford and Carter years witnessed the rise of a powerful
small business lobby supported by renewed public concern for small enter-
prise and growing popular disenchantment with big government. Paradoxi-
cally, the SBA continued to grow in this anti-statist environment, despite its
weak advocacy of small business interests.
7SMALL BUSINESS IN AN AGE
OF BIG GOVERNMENT
During the 1970s, government agencies poured forth regulations affecting
nearly every aspect of business. The perceived threat of big government galva-
nized small business owners and fueled the rise of an influential interest group
led by the National Federation of Independent Business. However, the SBA
was a weak advocate for small business, largely because of its position within
the executive branch. On several important issues, the SBA allied with the
president against small business interests. Consequently, the agency gathered
little support from the small business lobby in Washington.
This period was critical for the development of the SBA's affirmative
action policies as Congress placed minority set-asides on firmer legal footing.
Nevertheless, the issue remained controversial. New groups demanded "dis-
advantaged" status, while critics charged the SBA with "reverse discrimina-
tion." By adding disaster-struck farmers to the agency's lengthy list of
constituencies, Congress made it even more difficult for the SBA to represent
such a conglomeration of interest groups. The agency entered the 1980s big-
ger than ever, plagued with administrative problems and vulnerable to attack
by a budget-cutting president.
The Ford Years, 1974 -1976
On 9 August 1974, President Richard M. Nixon resigned to avoid impeach-
ment by the House of Representatives on charges related to the Watergate
affair. His successor, Gerald R. Ford, inherited an economy suffering
"stagflation"—high inflation and unemployment coupled with negative
growth.1 Ford's economic policies initially derived from his economic conser-
vatism. In the end, however, political considerations caused Ford to reverse
his policy of restraint.
96 Big Government and Affirmative Action
As a member of the House of Representatives, Ford had built a record of
"consistent conservatism," voting against social welfare legislation, including
the War on Poverty and Medicare. The fiscally conservative president initially
accepted the theory that government deficits were responsible for both infla-
tion and unemployment; therefore, he asked Congress to cut spending. A
deadlock ensued as Congress passed spending measures that Ford vetoed.2
However, the president could moderate discretionary spending of some gov-
ernment agencies, including the Small Business Administration.
Reflecting his overall philosophy of resisting special interests, Ford main-
tained that his macroeconomic policies benefited small business more than
SBA spending. Officials at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
shared Ford's fiscal conservatism. Not only did they repeatedly deny Thomas
Kleppe's requests for up to one billion dollars in direct loans, but they consid-
ered direct loans an unwarranted interference in the financial markets.3 The
General Accounting Office (GAO) undermined the SBA's case for a budget
increase by publishing reports critical of agency programs, including 7(a) loan
guarantees, which suffered from adverse selection and a high delinquency rate.4
Ultimately, SBA lending activity declined substantially in fiscal year 1975,
due to Ford's austerity measures, a sluggish economy, and interest-rate ceil-
ings that made SBA loans unattractive to banks.5
President Ford continued Nixon's affirmative action policies. Section
8 (a) awards increased as the SBA relied heavily upon this off-budget measure.
Yet maintaining the status quo pleased no one. Advocates of affirmative ac-
tion demanded more assistance, and opponents cited a GAO report concluding
that SBA had achieved "minimal" success in making 8 (a) firms self-sufficient.
The report also showed that agency officials were violating the race-neutral
eligibility requirements. Remarkably, in its response to the GAO, the SBA
maintained the fiction of a color-blind program and noted the danger of iden-
tifying "disadvantage" with racial status: "this principle could have sweeping
implications through the social order. There might also be administrative prob-
lems in applying a purely racial or ethnic standard. Would a person who is
one-quarter Indian be eligible? One-sixteenth? How is racial background
proven? Who is a Spanish-speaking American?" All of these were good ques-
tions that the agency, in practice, ignored on a daily basis.6
As the presidential election of 1976 approached, White House aides
feared Ford was losing support among small business owners. Consequently,
Ford repeated the political cycle of agency growth by reversing his stringent
fiscal policy and requesting a one-third increase in SBA loan guarantees. He
also directed federal agencies "to pull out all stops" to help minority business.
In February 1976, Ford appointed a new administrator, Mitchell Kobelinski,
to replace Thomas Kleppe, whom Ford had named Secretary of Interior. Ford's
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selection of Kobelinski reflected his election-year concerns; he hoped that this
prominent Chicago banker would attract Polish American votes.7
Ford's opponent, Democratic presidential candidate Jimmy Carter, also
reached out to the small business voter by promising to "get the government
off his back." Carter stressed his small business background and repeatedly
announced that "if elected, I will be the first smalLbusiness man since Harry
Truman to serve as President." Moreover, early in his business career, Carter
had received an SBA loan, leading an agency administrator to later claim that
without this assistance, Carter "would not have made it to become President."8
The Carter Years
Carter's interest in small business proved fleeting, partly because the incom-
ing administration lacked confidence in the Small Business Administration.
A transition team report noted the agency's '"cry-baby and 'loser'" reputa-
tion, viewing the SBA as a "hostage to Congress" and a "necessary nuisance"
to the executive branch. Management assistance, the team said, was "window-
dressing busy-work that don't [sic] really help anyone." Furthermore, the Of-
fice of Advocacy was "run by lightweights and political appointees." Minority
and nonminority business owners were bitterly divided over the 8 (a) pro-
gram. "What the SBA needed, the team wrote, was a "Presidential 2X4 across
the balky Federal bureaucracy's forehead to get—and keep—its attention."
The team suggested that the president consider elevating SBA to the Cabinet
or merging it with the Commerce Department (Secretary of Commerce Juanita
Kreps requested the immediate transfer of SBA, but the White House decided
that this was politically inopportune). Finally, the team advised the president
to "get off to a flying start" by emphasizing small business issues during the
first one hundred days of his term. Nevertheless, Carter paid scant attention
to small business during his first three years in office, making only a few sym-
bolic gestures, such as supporting a White House Conference scheduled for
1980. Other issues—including a "stagflationary" economy and foreign policy
setbacks—crowded out any concern with small business.9
Carter's choice for SBA administrator was A. Vernon Weaver, a Naval
Academy classmate, banker, and insurance executive from Arkansas, who was
a friend of Budget Director Bert Lance.10 Weaver's first priority was to make
SBA loans more attractive to borrowers and banks. The chief gripe of loan
applicants was the long delay in processing—nearly four months from appli-
cation to disbursement. Bankers complained of excessive paperwork, which
discouraged many from making SBA loans. The agency simplified applica-
tion forms and established a pilot Bank Certification Program authorizing
banks with "excellent 'track records'" to handle all the paperwork, subject to
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an SBA audit. The agency also eased restrictions on loan purposes and liberal-
ized interest rates.11
These improvements did not assuage critics of the SBA, who noted that
the Central Office had little control over the regional "fiefdoms." Agency
politicos continued to base personnel decisions on party affiliation. It was also
clear that the SBA had too many responsibilities ("more functions than a Swiss
Army knife") and not enough employees to handle them. In addition,
understaffing and failure to follow procedures resulted in "unsound loans."
SCORE officials needed training in volunteer management, but SBA em-
ployees treated them as "second class citizens."12 Furthermore, the SBA's di-
saster program diverted personnel away from lending and management, a
problem that the Office of Personnel Management finally corrected in 1980
by authorizing the SBA to create a "cadre" of permanent disaster specialists.13
Most important, the SBA failed in its most basic task—defining "small"
business. In a 1977 report entitled What is a Small Business?, the Office of
Advocacy concluded that the agency had no clear idea. "Instead of focusing
on competition," the report stated, the SBA "incorporated five different units
of measurement into eight different definitions of a small business. Little
wonder that the SBA has had considerable difficulty in conveying to the Con-
gress and to the public, just what is meant by 'small business.'" In a follow-up
study, the GAO concluded that the size standards favored mid-sized firms at
the expense of smaller ones. The Senate Small Business Committee asked,
"how can either SBA or the Congress determine whether the agency's pro-
grams are effective" when the SBA could not define who it was supposed to
help? In response, the SBA proposed new size standards based on industry
concentration, but strong opposition from vested interests prevented imple-
mentation of an economically rational plan.14 Finally, in 1984, the SBA ac-
cepted the existing size standards based on "custom and general acceptance,"
while establishing criteria that applied only to future modifications. Signifi-
cantly, nearly all of these modifications resulted in higher size standards; low-
ering standards was almost unthinkable.15
However, Congress was to blame for many of the SBA's problems, in-
cluding understaffing and the inclusion of programs outside the agency's ex-
pertise. The disaster loan program, for example, became a major fiasco when
Congress admitted farmers and lowered the interest rate on loans to 3 percent
(previously, farmers were eligible only for Agriculture Department loans, which
were less generous and more difficult to obtain). Farm disaster aid skyrock-
eted when a summer drought hit large sections of the country in 1977, with
disaster loans growing from an estimated $750 million to over $3 billion.
Abuses were rampant; prosperous farmers borrowed money to purchase Cer-
tificates of Deposit. Further adding to these problems was the fact that SBA
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employees were ill-equipped to judge the losses from crop failures. Vernon
Weaver asked Congress to relieve the SBA of this unwanted burden. But the
political temptation to provide benefits to constituents was strong. In 1985,
Congress sacrificed the farm program only when confronted with a Reagan
administration trying to abolish the SBA (see chapter 8).16
In sum, during the Carter years the SBA achieved modest administra-
tive improvements by certifying lenders and establishing disaster "cadres."
These successes were offset by persistent problems in management assistance
and lending. Loan loss rates continued to increase, and SCORE remained an
orphan within the SBA family. The farm aid program offered a prime example
of Congress's predilection for dumping projects in the SBA that were unre-
lated to the agency's core mission. Meanwhile, the president and Congress
lent official approval to the SBA's disadvantaged programs. Affirmative action
finally emerged from the shadows of dubious legality, but many problems
remained, including a low graduation rate and an unending stream of groups
claiming "disadvantaged" status.
Affirmative Action Comes of Age
The rise of female entrepreneurs was one of the most important develop-
ments in the small business sector during the 1970s, as the number of women-
owned businesses more than doubled.17 Female entrepreneurs achieved this
rapid growth without government aid, yet the women's business lobby in-
sisted that societal discrimination was so severe that women required SBA
assistance. Consequently, the agency pioneered affirmative action for women-
owned businesses.
During the Ford years, newly formed associations representing female
business owners demanded women's entry into the 8(a) program. The U.S.
Civil Rights Commission also asked Ford to declare women a "disadvantaged"
class, but SBA officials dissuaded him; the prospect of allowing half the popu-
lation into the 8 (a) program gave administrators pause. Notwithstanding its
opposition to group eligibility for women, the SBA doubled the loans to fe-
male business owners and held special "Women in Business" workshops.18
Despite these efforts, women business activists were not satisfied and contin-
ued to lobby vigorously for increased government assistance.
Following through on a campaign promise, President Carter established
an Interagency Task Force on Women Business Owners in August 1977 to
study the challenges confronting female entrepreneurs. In its final report, the
task force cited "sexism" and a "history of discrimination" as reasons for the
government to promote women-owned businesses. In truth, female business
owners had a lot in common with their male counterparts. An SBA survey
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reported "their identification as small business owners beset with problems
common to all small business and not inclined to think of themselves as espe-
cially affected by gender." Nor was there evidence of widespread discrimina-
tion in the credit markets; like other small business owners, women relied
upon informal sources. Most of the women who applied for bank loans were
approved.19 Yet the charge of "sexism" had political appeal, because it allowed
activist policymakers to "do something" for women.
The president announced a National Women's Business Ownership
Campaign led by the SBA. Policy initiatives included a "mini-loan" program
to serve female entrepreneurs who wanted to borrow less than $20,000. The
SBA also licensed First Woman's SBIC, a company managed by a female presi-
dent. (The agency was embarrassed when the company failed and a court
convicted its top executives of grand larceny and conspiracy to defraud the
government. The SBA lost $3 million on the venture). Furthermore, in 1979,
Carter issued an executive order directing government agencies to take "affir-
mative action" on behalf of women-owned firms. He set a two-year goal of
quadrupling the procurement dollars awarded to women-owned businesses—
a "lowball" figure that was easily achieved.20
The Women's Business Campaign aroused no controversy, perhaps be-
cause there were no explicit set-asides excluding men. But minority assistance
was another matter. The Economic Opportunity Loan (EOL) program was
an open scandal. The GAO reported that only 15 percent of EOL borrowers
were still in business. The default rates were phenomenal. The survivors ex-
panded very little and employed few workers. The SBA lost $324 million
(excluding interest), one-third of the total amount disbursed. Sadly, the GAO
concluded that EOL borrowers "were in worse condition than before they
took on small business ownership."21
Meanwhile, the Section 8 (a) program came under attack from congres-
sional investigating committees. In February 1977, investigators for the Sen-
ate Small Business Committee reported that SBA employees were divided
between those hostile to the program and those who were enthusiastic but
lacked the business expertise that 8 (a) firms needed. The agency was also split
over whether "race" or "economic status" determined eligibility. The commit-
tee concluded that 8 (a) was "laced with problems, uncertainties, vague defini-
tions, questionable methods and procedures."22
In the summer of 1977, Senator Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.), chair of a
Government Affairs subcommittee, held hearings exposing widespread cor-
ruption and incompetence in the 8 (a) program. SBA officials accepted, and
even encouraged, the use of minority "fronts" by white-owned firms. Spurred
on by the need to meet rising quotas, the SBA found corporate sponsors for
minority companies, thus making them eligible for larger contracts. Many
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white firms lost contracts to 8 (a) set-asides and were eager to recoup. In fact,
SBA employees encouraged at least one contractor to "get yourself a black and
get on board." Some of these fronts marketed their services to white firms, but
others were "illiterate farmers or janitors" duped by their sponsors. Ineptitude
also marked the administration of 8(a). The Chiles committee asserted that
"SBA has a real problem in simply determining who is in the program." Mi-
norities with political influence secured 8 (a) contracts or positions as 8 (a)
administrators. The latter were "without exception totally unknowledgeable
of small business and Federal procurement procedures." The bottom line: of
the 15,000 firms that participated in 8(a), only 70 had graduated. Chiles
called the program a "monumental failure." His committee recommended
establishing "graduation" criteria and a net worth definition of "disadvan-
tage," as well as requiring competitive bidding to prepare 8(a) firms for the
rigors of the marketplace.23
Jimmy Carter was undeterred by these revelations. In September 1977,
he set a goal of doubling (later tripling) minority contract dollars within two
years. Carter blamed the program's past failings on the wrongdoing of a few
corrupt business owners and ordered an SBA investigation to root out fraud.24
The agency also established an 8(a) Review Board to improve the program.
The results were disappointing. The SBA turned over a handful of cases to the
Justice Department, but fraud was still rampant. Three years later, the review
board produced an internal report conceding that 8 (a) was a failure. Minority
firms operated in a "sheltered business environment" and were reluctant to
leave the cozy confines of 8(a). A few companies grabbed a large share of 8(a)
dollars. Carter's quotas worsened the situation by pressuring SBA officials to
set aside larger contracts. Small minority firms were left out in the cold. The
board recommended comprehensive business development, time limits on par-
ticipation, and requiring 8 (a) firms to secure competitive contracts. Publicly,
however, the SBA remained silent, leading Senator Chiles to comment that "the
situation there is as bad as ever. I'm really concerned about a cover up."25
The politics of 8 (a) reflected Carter's approach to civil rights. He was
passionate about promoting the progress of women and minorities. Further-
more, Carter owed his victory to black votes; consequently, the Congressional
Black Caucus was unrelenting in its demands for government assistance. Thus,
Carter was both a "trustee" president searching for "public goods" and an
appeaser of special interests.26 He failed to convey an overarching vision of the
national interest, yet his civil rights decisions established precedents for future
presidents.
Congressional response to the 8 (a) scandals was mixed, but abolition of
the SBA loomed as a serious option. Senator William Proxmire (D-Wis.) re-
vived his "final solution" for the struggling agency. The SBA's inability to
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reform itself exasperated many longtime agency supporters. Gaylord Nelson
(D-Wis.), chair of the Senate Small Business Committee, stated that if the
agency did not soon improve, he would propose "getting rid of every single
office in the U.S.," to which Vernon Weaver responded, "If we can't straighten
it out, I'll join with you." Yet no one really believed Congress would abolish
its pet agency. The White House debated transferring the SBA to the Com-
merce Department but feared a congressional backlash and the prospect of
Republican gains among small business voters.27
Other members of Congress fought to expand minority set-asides and
formalize group eligibility. During the Nixon and Ford years, Democrats had
contested racial preferences but came to terms with quotas under a Demo-
cratic president. In 1977, Representative Parren Mitchell (D-Md.), chair of
the Congressional Black Caucus, inserted an amendment in the Public Works
Employment Act setting aside 10 percent of contract dollars for businesses
owned by "Negroes, Spanish-speaking [sic], Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and
Aleuts." The Economic Development Administration was responsible for man-
aging these set-asides. This was the first congressional act since 1854 designat-
ing beneficiaries by race, yet there was virtually no discussion or debate.28
Nineteen seventy-eight was a critical year for affirmative action policies,
particularly with respect to minority set-asides. On 28 June, the U.S. Su-
preme Court upheld the principle of racial preferences in Bakke. This land-
mark decision inspired hard-line advocates of affirmative action. Parren Mitchell
introduced amendments to the Small Business Act creating a "rebuttable pre-
sumption" that blacks and Hispanics were "socially disadvantaged." The Sen-
ate Small Business Committee argued that a "rebuttable presumption" violated
constitutional guarantees of equal protection; therefore, the Senate bill di-
rected the SBA to consider disadvantage on a "case-by-case" basis. Mitchell
accused the Senators of "neo-racism," and ultimately his version found its way
into PL 95-507, signed by President Carter on 24 October 1978.29
PL 95-507 established a "three-track system" to determine 8(a) eligibil-
ity. The SBA considered Black, Hispanic, and Native American applicants
socially disadvantaged but could disqualify them if they were not also eco-
nomically disadvantaged. Other groups could petition for presumptive eligi-
bility by showing that "prejudice, bias, or discriminatory practices" had resulted
in "economic deprivation." Lastly, individuals regardless of race were eligible
if they proved social and economic disadvantage (the final Conference Com-
mittee report stated that a "poor Appalachian white person" could conceiv-
ably qualify for 8[a] status).30
This new system left many questions unresolved. When was a presump-
tive candidate disqualified on the basis of economic advantage? Two years
later, Vernon Weaver admitted that "It boils down to a judgment call. . . . I
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must have spent a hundred hours with my general counsel . . . discussing:
What the hell is 'economic disadvantage?'" It is not surprising riben that mi-
nority millionaires took advantage of 8(a). PL 95-507 also did not affect
loans. Weaver had to remind his employees that the Carter administration's
policy of targeting direct loans to the disadvantaged did not mean '"no money
for white male owned firms.'"31
The admission of new groups into the 8 (a) program proved conten-
tious. In 1980, the SBA developed a formal application process that became
"the most copied model for affirmative-action programs around the country."
Group eligibility depended upon a variety of factors, including "low income,"
"unfavorable location," and "limited education." In an illuminating article,
George R. LaNoue and John C. Sullivan concluded that there was no consis-
tent rationale for group admission other than a vague "'people of color' ideol-
ogy." In 1980, the SBA began admitting immigrant groups (Tongans and Sri
Lankans) who had just arrived in this country and therefore had no record of
past discrimination. But the agency rejected an application from Iranians,
because this group was "too narrow" and had not been in the country long
enough. The SBA originally denied a request from Asian Indians because they
were overrepresented in business, but accepted a second application that stressed
their dark skin color. Likewise, Indonesians enjoyed above-average income
and education but were admitted when they stressed their "yellow" skin. Dis-
abled veterans were entitled to 8 (a) status before Congress passed PL 95—507,
but the agency denied their application for readmission. In short, 99 percent
of 8 (a) business owners were "people of color," ignoring the high percentage
of whites who were also "disadvantaged" (and also ignoring the wide variance
in self-employment among the so-called "white" ethnic groups).32 The unin-
tended result of admitting so many dark-skinned immigrant groups was the
steady erosion of the African American share—the group for whom 8 (a) was
originally designed.33
But these events lay in the future. In the short term, the Carter admin-
istration had to deal with claims by Asians, women, and Jews that they, too,
were "disadvantaged." In 1979, Asian American senators lobbied for a new
8(a) category of "Asian and Pacific Americans." In fact, studies showed that
self-employed Asian business owners were not disadvantaged; tliey outper-
formed white and black businesses. Nor was there any evidence of credit
discrimination against Asian businesses. Their entry was due to their political
pull and their pre-1978 status as a preferred category under 8(a).34
During the late 1970s, some advocates of affirmative action sought to
build a coalition of the disadvantaged including women and minorities.35 In
reality, these two groups fought bitterly over the status of women. As early as
1977, Weaver informed the White House that "a confrontation was develop-
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ing between Blacks and Women over the 8-A program. Blacks think that the
8-A program belongs to them and Women want in on the program." The
Carter administration had promised to help both groups; now it found itself
in a no-win situation. An African American lobbyist stated that "if white women
join [8(a)], we can just wrap it up and go back to the plantation." Washington
Post columnist Jack Anderson voiced the opinion of female entrepreneurs who
complained that the SBA was "giving women the business figuratively but not
literally." Deputy Administrator Patricia Cloherty lamented that women and
minorities were "each other's worst enemies. Every time you propose some-
thing for one group, it gets knocked out of the park because the other thinks
it'll be bad for them. . . . We may end up with a program that's of no use to
anyone, and it can't create anything but bad feelings." In the end, the Con-
gressional Black Caucus prevented women from entering the program.36
The White House was also caught in the crossfire between Hasidic Jews
and the Black Caucus. The Hasidim presented a strong case of social and
economic disadvantage and had the support of many members of Congress.
SBA General Counsel Edward Norton was ready to rule for the Jews but
feared setting a precedent that would allow other groups to enter the pro-
gram. The zero-sum mentality of the Black Caucus defeated the Hasidim's
efforts to enter 8(a). Parren Mitchell was "sympathetic to the economic con-
ditions of the Hasidic Jews. . . . But there's a limited pie." Consequently,
Norton reversed his position by noting the "establishment-of-religion prob-
lems" that might ensue if the agency granted status to a religious group.37
These ethnic conflicts were the bitter fruit of a race-conscious program.
In the world of 8(a), some disadvantaged groups were more equal than others.
Yet the widespread belief that 8 (a) offered "something for nothing" belied the
negative impact it generally had on a firm's competitiveness. However, Sec-
tion 8 (a) served well the purposes of politicians catering to their ethnic con-
stituencies. The politicization of 8(a) also extended to the placement of contracts
with well-connected firms. Thus, the idealism that originally motivated the
creators of 8 (a) gave way to divisive racial politics.
The Rise of the Small Business Lobby
During the Carter years, a powerful interest group of small business owners
finally emerged in response to the perceived failure of big business and big
government. The National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) ex-
ploited the disaffection of business owners "fed up" with inflation, taxes, and
government regulation. The NFIB and other business associations disregarded
the SBA, because the agency failed to voice the antigovernment concerns of
these small business owners.
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The late 1970s witnessed an amazing transformation in the public im-
age of small business, from dying anachronism to dynamo. Throughout the
1950s and 1960s, social commentators had extolled a "big-is-better" myth of
the economy, ignoring the important contributions of the small business sec-
tor. For example, in his best-selling New Industrial State (1967), the econo-
mist John Kenneth Galbraith asserted that large corporations were nearly
invincible because they controlled production and manipulated consumer
demand through advertising.38 The economic crisis of the mid-1970s shook
public confidence in the invincibility of big business. Opinion surveys re-
vealed widespread public distrust of large corporations and a counterposing
confidence in small business. Writers across the ideological spectrum praised
the virtues of smallness. In Small is Beautiful (1973), the New Left economist
E.E Schumacher offered small enterprise as an antidote to the alienation pro-
duced by a "monster economy." The conservative National Review agreed that
"small is beautiful" because small firms created new jobs; therefore, "what was
good for small business was good for America."39
This last theme—small business as "engine" of economic growth—cap-
tivated policymakers searching for solutions to stagflation. Contemporary stud-
ies found that small firms produced a disproportionate share of jobs and
technological innovations. In pioneering research, the economist David Birch
claimed that very small firms (those with fewer than twenty employees) cre-
ated two-thirds of net new jobs, while large firms (over five hundred employ-
ees) created less than 15 percent. The economic and political circumstances of
the 1970s were ripe for a new small business ideology, one that promised to
counter the downsizing of large corporations and reinvigorate the American
dream of entrepreneurship. This new ideology stressed the economic benefits
rather than the moral character of small enterprise. Small business was now a
means to an end.40
Yet policymakers confronted a paradox: if small business was so produc-
tive, why was it losing market share? Between 1963 and 1977, medium-sized
firms (those with 20—499 employees) maintained their share of Gross Na-
tional Product (GNP), but smaller companies (0—19 employees) lost substan-
tial ground. In the retail and service sectors, firms with fewer than five employees
lost one-third of their sales share. Zero-employee retailers ("Mom and Pops")
lost 50 percent. The rate of small business innovation also slowed consider-
ably.41 This decline coincided with a wave of governmental activism, leading
many to blame big government for the deteriorating fortune of small busi-
ness. The new small business ideology held that these firms could only achieve
their full potential if freed of government regulation. In short, small business
was a dynamo in chains. This paradox contributed to a crisis mentality: the
future of small business—and thus the American economy as whole—was
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either bright or inauspicious, depending upon the policymaking decisions
made in the late 1970s.42 This revival of crisis rhetoric, after decades of relative
calm, helped small business advocates plead their case.
The image of the small business owner "beset, bothered, and beleaguered"
by big government was a staple of the business and popular press during the
Carter years. Small business owners complained loudly of inflation, high in-
terest rates, rising payroll taxes, and "ridiculous" regulation. The regulatory
burden fell especially hard on small firms that lacked the wherewithal to meet
the requirements of OSHA and other government agencies. Many entrepre-
neurs complained of the "mental burden" of having to fill out paperwork. The
appeal of self-employment was "being your own boss," but increasingly gov-
ernment encroached on the business owner's autonomy.43 The aggrieved small
businessperson served as a useful symbol for the conservative critique of the
welfare state, yet she also appealed to moderates and liberals. There was no
better example of the transformation in liberal thinking than the mea culpa
offered by John Kenneth Galbraith. The Harvard economist now noted the
dynamic potential of small business and advocated exempting small compa-
nies from government regulation.44
However, the SBA was an ineffective advocate for deregulation, because
the Carter administration forced it to defend positions that conflicted with
the perceived interests of small business. In 1977, for example, the "White
House supported a labor reform bill backed by unions but opposed by small
business groups. The administration also endorsed the creation of a Con-
sumer Protection Agency, another measure unpopular among small business
owners. In both cases, the SBA Office of Advocacy issued critical reports, but
Weaver squelched the findings and reported that they did not represent the
agency's official position.45
Clearly, small business owners needed to organize to defend their inter-
ests. Their growing disaffection with government made this possible. As late
as 1975, the conservative political commentator Irving Kristol described the
small businessperson as "The New Forgotten Man," whose voice was unheard
in Washington. But the threat of regulation soon galvanized small business
activists at all levels. The phrase "mad as hell" described their feelings about
big government. They wanted government to "leave us alone." One small
manufacturer complained that "we have been badgered, intimidated, stone-
walled, and ignored by government." Politicians jumped on the small busi-
ness bandwagon en masse. Governor Richard Lamm (D-Colo.) declared,
"There is a tidal wave behind me. Its name is small business. And any poli-
tician who does not look over his shoulder at that wave will be a politician
out of a job." By the end of the decade, small business was the "'in thing'" in
Washington.46
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Antigovernment sentiment fueled the growth of small business lobbies,
with NFIB membership doubling to 600,000 during the 1970s. Under the
direction of James D. ("Mike") McKevitt, a former congressman, the NFIB
grew increasingly sophisticated in its lobbying, including the creation of a
Political Action Committee to fund candidates and a Research Department
to study policy issues. The NFIB also enlarged its Washington staff and em-
ployed lobbyists in every state, using its ratings of voting records to reward
allies and target opponents for defeat. But the chief advantage of the NFIB
was its grassroots influence. The NFIB provided members of Congress with
its membership surveys, listing how individual business owners voted. A lob-
byist observed: "You give a Congressman a list of people in his district, he
invariably looks down it to see whom he knows. He knows the prominent
business people in his district. He can't ignore them." Other business lobbies,
including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, enjoyed similar gains in member-
ship and political clout by emphasizing small business issues.47
The emergence of a powerful small business lobby posed a problem for
the Carter administration. Many observers considered the NFIB a "conserva-
tive Republican operation" (a White House aide called it the "enemy camp").
Furthermore, small and big business lobbies displayed unprecedented unity
in opposition to the labor reform bill and the Consumer Protection Agency,
two measures defeated in Congress. The business lobby also overcame presi-
dential opposition to a massive capital-gains tax cut. Political commentators
stressed the important role of small business in achieving these legislative victo-
ries. To overcome congressional suspicion of big business motives, corporate
lobbyists worked closely with small business activists. As one writer put it, "These
days the big guys may actually need the little guys more than vice versa."48
The political influence of small business culminated in January 1980,
with the long-awaited White House Conference on Small Business. The theme
of the Conference was clear: Arthur Levitt Jr., chair of the White House Con-
ference Commission, stated, "We are here to petition for less. . . . We're look-
ing for less interference and less harassment." The conferees recommended
tax cuts, regulatory reform, and capping federal spending at 15 percent of
GNP (a substantial reduction from the then-current 22.5 percent). They
scarcely mentioned the SBA, other than asking for a dramatic expansion of
advocacy activities.49
The White House Conference kicked off a banner year for small busi-
ness advocates as both the president and Congress responded to the crescendo
of complaints about big government. Carter directed federal agencies to re-
duce the regulatory burden on small firms.50 Meanwhile, Congress passed
three acts making it easier for small companies to deal with the federal govern-
ment. The Regulatory Flexibility Act exempted very small companies from
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some new regulations. The Equal Access to Justice Act ordered agencies to pay
the legal costs of firms that successfully challenged their rulings. The Prompt
Payments Act required government agencies to pay their bills within thirty
days or be liable for late charges.51 A fourth act established Small Business
Development Centers (SBDCs) as clearinghouses of technical expertise for
small companies.52
These political triumphs did little to brighten the economic outlook for
small business. By the summer of 1980, double-digit interest rates and infla-
tion squeezed profits, depleted capital, and increased business failures. The
economy was the number-one issue in the fall election. President Carter cited
SBA lending and regulatory relief as evidence of his administrations concern
for small business. In the opposing camp, Republican presidential candidate
Ronald Reagan pledged to dramatically reduce the size of government through
tax and budget cuts, deregulation, and "sunset laws." A survey of small busi-
ness executives found two out of three supported Reagan. He also had the
support of the leading small business associations, including the NFIB. Reagan's
rhetoric appealed to small business owners fed up with big government. His
candidacy promised them a "revolution" in the relationship between business
and government. By reducing the state role in the economy, Reagan hoped to
unleash the "animal spirits" of businesses large and small.53
Looking Backward: 1970-1980
The Carter years closed a decade of growth for the SBA. The agency partici-
pated in the "federal credit explosion" of the 1970s. Between 1970 and 1980,
new loan guarantee commitments increased from $450 million to $3.6 bil-
lion. By the early 1980s, the SBA provided 40 percent of intermediate-term
small business credit. Economists argued that loan guarantees and subsidies
distorted the credit markets and weakened monetary policy, yet the political
virtues were irresistible. The chief appeal of SBA loan guarantees was the le-
veraging of agency resources and the cooperation of bankers who were once
hostile to the agency.54
Other SBA programs also enjoyed substantial growth. Two new man-
agement assistance programs—the Small Business Institute and the Small
Business Development Centers—expanded the services available to small firms.
The 8 (a) program mushroomed from $22 million in contract awards to $1.3
billion in 1980.55 In addition, congressional liberalization of disaster aid pro-
duced a spectacular increase in spending.
Paradoxically, the agency's expansion paralleled rising discontent with
government. The small business lobby was the immediate beneficiary of this
grassroots movement against big government. The rise of the NFIB confirmed
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James Q. Wilson's thesis that business associations enjoy their greatest growth
during times of crisis, such as the Great Depression or the regulatory outburst
of the 1970s. Thousands of small business owners reacted by joining the NFIB
and other trade associations, thus establishing a strong interest-group pres-
ence in Washington, D.C., and the various state capitals. It is important not
to exaggerate the extent of small business activism, as even after the impressive
membership gains of the 1970s, the NFIB and the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce represented less than 10 percent of business owners. In fact, we know
surprisingly little about the political attitudes of small business owners; the
subject deserves further investigation. Nevertheless, those who were politi-
cally active held a laissez-faire view of government. They were, as historian
David Horowitz describes them, "populist insurgents" against the centralized
power of big government.56
The new small business ideology embodied elements of laissez-faire. In
the past, small business ideologues blamed big business for the decline of
independent enterprise. They sought government aid—including antitrust
prosecutions and financial assistance through the SBA—to preserve a tradi-
tional way of life. Economic arguments were secondary; small business own-
ers were worth protecting because they embodied independence, considered
key to the maintenance of democracy. By the 1970s, however, Americans had
grown accustomed to big business and no longer viewed it as a fundamental
threat to American democracy. An emerging literature depicted small busi-
ness as potentially the most vibrant sector of the economy, if only freed of
government regulation. This interpretation turned the older view upside down:
small enterprise was dynamic, not dying, and needed less, not more, govern-
ment intervention in the economy.
The Reagan presidency tested the small business lobby's commitment to
laissez-faire. By first reducing and later proposing the elimination of the SBA,
the Reagan administration challenged NFIB members to act on their prin-
ciples. Not surprisingly, the White House's economy drive met fierce opposi-
tion from the Congressional Small Business Committees. The presidential assault
on the SBA provides a valuable study of the difficulties faced by budget-cutters
in a modern welfare state.
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In 1979, Ronald Reagan told an audience of small business owners that "a
government program . . . is just about the nearest thing that we know of to
eternal life."1 As president, Reagan tried unsuccessfully to abolish the SBA,
thus illustrating the apparent inevitability of government growth. Yet this epi-
sode also underscored die agency's weak interest-group support; small busi-
ness owners were indifferent to the fate of their federal representative. In other
areas, such as affirmative action, Reagan abandoned his commitment to lim-
ited government by expanding quotas. In short, the Reagan years offered a
mix of principle, pragmatism, and political expediency. During the years that
followed, the agency continued to grow, making the Reagan Revolution look
even less impressive in retrospect.
The Reagan Revolution, 1981-1984
In his inaugural address, Ronald Reagan announced the theme of his "revolu-
tion" by stating that "government is not the solution to our problem; govern-
ment is the problem." On domestic policy, Reagan pledged to cut taxes,
deregulate the economy, and reduce government spending. His economic
advisers shared Reagan's staunch conservatism. For example, Budget Director
David Stockman had once penned an essay describing the federal government
as a "social pork barrel" doling out unneeded benefits to large blocs of middle-
class voters.2
The Reaganites applied their laissez-faire theory to small business assis-
tance. The chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, Murray Weidenbaum,
advocated eliminating all federal credit subsidies, including SBA loans. "Gov-
ernment credi t . . . is no free lunch," Weidenbaum wrote, because it crowded
out private borrowing and raised overall interest rates. Thus, "the small busi-
ness sector would be a great deal healthier without [SBA subsidies]." Simi-
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larly, a transition task force on small business recommended ending ^//prefer-
ences for small and minority-owned firms, leading a Republican congressional
aide to wonder at this "blue-sky, ivory-tower kind of stuff."3
Reaganomics produced significant budget cuts at the SBA- In Reagan's
first fiscal year, business loan approvals declined 50 percent, from $3.5 billion
to $1.8 billion. An Interagency Task Force on Small Business Finance ratio-
nalized that SBA lending was less important, because private sources of credit
had substantially improved. President Reagan argued that his massive tax cuts,
passed in 1981, benefited small business more than SBA loans. The National
Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) supported the tax cuts and did
not oppose the reduction in SBA spending.4
In his second budget, Reagan proposed eliminating direct SBA loans. A
muckraking series by the St. Louis Globe-Democrat bolstered the president's
case. The newspaper reported that the agency lost one-third of the money it
lent to borrowers but covered up the damaging statistics by offering gratu-
itous deferments. Perversely, the direct loans left many disadvantaged borrow-
ers worse off, a fact not lost on SBA loan officers. Phoenix District Director
Thomas Trimboli stated that "putting many of these people into business in
the first place is like putting them in the ring with Muhammad Ali. Once they
start to take a beating, there's not much we could do." Even before Reagan
took office in October 1980, a nationwide gathering of field representatives
recommended abolishing all direct loan programs. Congress held hearings on
the issue and subsequently approved deep cuts in direct lending.5
The White House selected Michael Cardenas, a prominent Hispanic
businessman, to head the SBA, primarily because of his ethnicity and strong
financial background. Cardenas had the unenviable task of carrying out the
first significant budget cuts in the agency's history. He abolished lending "quo-
tas" and spent less than Congress authorized. In line with his economy drive,
Cardenas emphasized advocacy, management assistance, and further "whole-
saling" of loans through an expanded Lender Certification Program.6
However, Cardenas's budget cuts caused less controversy than his per-
sonal management of the SBA. Internal critics charged that he micromanaged
the agency by personally approving routine matters. Supporters considered
him "bright" and "capable" but a poor public relations person. Cardenas an-
gered the women's business lobby by remarking that "having special programs
for women is discriminating." His attempt to clean up the 8(a) program added
to his unpopularity. When Cardenas blocked an improper contract award to a
politically well-connected African American firm, the owner accused him of
placing the contract with a Mexican American business in Cardenas's home-
town (the SBA Inspector-General cleared Cardenas of all charges). His refusal
to award a contract to another 8 (a) company, Wedtech, may have provoked
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the White House to demand his resignation in February 1982, though it
leaked that he was "incompetent" to run the agency.7
One of Cardenas's staunchest critics, associate administrator James Sand-
ers, replaced him as SBA head. Sanders was a retired businessman and friend
of deputy White House chief of staff Michael Deaver. At his nomination
hearing, Sanders expressed a desire to serve as a "conduit" between Congress
and the Reagan administration. In practice, however, Sanders had no access to
the president and sided with Congress in opposing further cuts in the SBA
budget. He reduced the agency workforce and restricted direct lending but
dramatically increased loan guarantees, leading conservative critics to charge
that he subverted the Reagan Revolution.8
The severe recession of 1982 strengthened the hands of those who ar-
gued for more government spending on small business. During the election
campaign, congressional Democrats tried to capitalize on the widespread mis-
ery in the small business community.9 Meanwhile, Republican supporters of
the SBA cited political factors as reason to reverse the budget cuts of 1981.
James Sanders argued that the OMB's "stubborn opposition" to agency fund-
ing requests was doing political damage. Within the Reagan administration,
Elizabeth Dole, head of the Office of Public Liaison, wrote a memorandum
entitled "Big versus Little: A Strategy for Small Business," which she pro-
moted throughout 1982. Dole characterized the months leading up to the
election as "this Administration's 'Valley Forge.'" There was a widespread per-
ception that "this Administration favors the 'bigs over the smalls,"' even though
small business provided the president with "a huge block of supporters" in
1980. Dole promoted a range of initiatives to demonstrate concern for this
neglected constituency, but the president offered only token gestures. Nonethe-
less, with congressional support, the SBA significantly increased its lending ac-
tivity between 1982 and 1934, regaining much of the ground lost in 1981.10
Overall, Ronald Reagan's first term in office produced no rollback of
government. Real spending increased due to congressional opposition and
the president's reluctance to demand sacrifice from various interest groups. In
this context, the SBA budget cuts were particularly harsh, especially since
Republicans considered small business one of their key constituencies. James
Sanders believes that Reagan took small business for granted; the Democrats,
with their "big government" reputation, were unappealing to groups like the
NFIB. Yet ideological factors played a larger role in determining Reagan ad-
ministration policy toward the SBA. OMB officials displayed a visceral hatred
of the SBA, which to them represented all that was wrong with the federal
government. In fact, as early as 1982, the OMB contemplated transferring
the SBA to the Commerce Department but deferred doing so until a more
politically opportune time.11
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Reagan Champions Quotas
The SBA budget debate was mild compared with the controversy surround-
ing racial preferences in government contracting. The election of Ronald
Reagan aroused legitimate fear among civil rights activists that he would do
away with minority set-asides and other forms of affirmative action. During
the campaign, Reagan voiced strong rhetorical opposition to racial prefer-
ences. He appointed opponents of affirmative action to the Justice Depart-
ment and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Yet
the Reagan administration was deeply divided. Conservatives urged the presi-
dent to repeal the prior executive orders underlying race-sensitive programs.
Moderates, including Secretary of Labor William Brock, Elizabeth Dole, and
her husband, Senator Robert Dole (R-Kans.), argued to retain preferences.
They had the support of corporate executives who had learned to live with
affirmative action. Small contractors, on the other hand, opposed set-asides.
Ultimately, the Reagan administration eschewed color-blindness and expanded
contracting quotas. The administration hoped that set-asides would attract
minority voters or, at the very least, defend Republicans from charges of rac-
ism. Thus, the president sacrificed his small business supporters and chased
the chimera of black Republican votes.12
President Reagan had an ideal opportunity to renounce set-asides both
on principle and on practical grounds. By the early 1980s, there was a consid-
erable literature documenting the shortcomings of the 8(a) program.13 The
Reagan administration also faced political pressure from small business asso-
ciations to eliminate minority set-asides. The White House received many
letters from small contractors describing the losses they endured as a result of
8(a). One such writer, Louisiana contractor Kirk Fordice, wrote to Represen-
tative Trent Lott (R-Miss.) pleading, "We've got to get this to the President.
We both know that he couldn't condone this affront to free enterprise if he
knew the details and the mortal harm being done to [those small business
owners] who supported him so staunchly." In a separate letter to the presi-
dent, he wrote that 8 (a) "is snowballing along with quotas doubling and tri-
pling as though there had been no election." Obviously, Fordice and others
expected Reagan to deliver on his promise of color-blind government.14
The president faced countervailing pressure from administration mod-
erates to show "compassion" for the disadvantaged. Elizabeth Dole's Office of
Public Liaison lobbied for more minority set-asides. Dole argued that the
"'lack of compassion' issue" had hurt the president's image not only among
African Americans and Hispanics but also "the elderly, women and moderates
of all parties." The Justice Department's opposition to affirmative action "an-
tagonized" minority groups and "caused the President to be perceived in a
114 Big Government and Affirmative Action
negative manner." Set-asides benefited business, the only minority group with
Republican political potential. Dole therefore urged Reagan to "make conces-
sions in order to gain increased support."15
In December 1982, over the opposition of his conservative advisers,
Reagan announced a three-year procurement goal of $15 billion. He also re-
quired federal grant recipients to award $6 billion in contracts to minority
firms. According to historian Nicholas Laham, this order "represents perhaps
the most sweeping expansion in the minority set-aside program ever under-
taken by any president." In January 1983, he signed the Surface Transporta-
tion Act, a bill that established a 10 percent quota for "disadvantaged"
businesses. Six months later, he issued an executive order directing federal
agencies to establish annual "objectives" to increase minority procurement.
These measures were necessary, Reagan declared, because the slow-moving
"economic train" of the 1970s had deprived minorities of their chance to
achieve the American Dream. Minority set-asides were "designed to get the
train moving again."16 Thereafter, Reagan touted his support of set-asides,
proudly announcing that "we've put our money where our mouth is."17
Conservative administration officials were upset at the president's con-
tinuing support for quotas. Three years later, the White House squashed a
Civil Rights Commission report calling for the elimination of minority set-
asides. Commission chair Clarence Pendleton Jr. protested that "the adminis-
tration has to make up its mind whether it •wants opportunities for all or
preference for some, and stop speaking with a double voice." The liberal New
Republic also noted the irony of an anti-quota president who was "an enthusi-
astic promoter" of the "spectacularly corrupt" 8 (a) program. The journal dubbed
8(a) "affirmative action for the rich."18
The presidential initiative boosted 8 (a) contract dollars by 30 percent in
fiscal year 1984. The SBA added five hundred new firms to the program, the
largest cohort since 1969. But the continued commitment to 8(a) did not
render it any more manageable. All attempts by Cardenas and Sanders to
reform the system met with howls of protest from the Congressional Black
Caucus. For example, one of the agency's chief goals was to "graduate" firms
to make room for new entrants. In 1980, Congress directed the SBA to set
"fixed program participation terms." And in 1981, Cardenas established terms
that varied from one to five years, depending upon the viability of the firm.
The SBA also conducted size determinations to remove companies that had
grown beyond the agency definition of "small." Representative Parren Mitchell
(D-Md.) responded by denouncing Cardenas's "heartless attack" on minority
business. He thought that the 8 (a) firms needed up to twenty years of benefits
to become viable.19
The situation did not improve under Sanders' administration. In July
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1982, the GAO ruled that the SBA had to expel two-dozen firms that had
grown too large for the 8 (a) program. The White House feared the public
relations consequences of this order. Elizabeth Dole recommended adminis-
trative changes to delay the inevitable. After losing on appeal, Sanders issued
a six-month stay-of-execution, which ran out on 14 February 1983. African
American leaders, including Parren Mitchell and Jesse Jackson, termed this
the "St. Valentine's Day Massacre" and attacked the SBA for waging "eco-
nomic genocide" on black Americans. Ultimately, through creative rule-bend-
ing and a nod from minority enterprise officials, most of the companies
remained in the program.20
The Wedtech Scandal
Reagan's racial politicking contributed to one of the greatest scandals of the
1980s, a fiasco involving the Welbilt Corporation (later renamed Wedtech).
This 8 (a) firm exemplified the worst defining features of minority set-asides:
contracting based on race, rather than merit; political connections substitut-
ing for performance; minority "fronts"; and a president and SBA bureaucracy
willing to look the other way in the name of a good cause. The scheme col-
lapsed when muckraking journalists exposed the web of corruption surround-
ing the company. Congress passed legislation reforming the 8 (a) program, but
fundamental problems remained.
South Bronx businessmen John Mariotta and Fred Neuberger estab-
lished the Welbilt Corporation in 1970. Five years later, they learned of the
8 (a) program and decided to "milk Mariotta's Hispanic heritage for all it was
worth." The two partners each owned 50 percent of the company but drew up
a falsified document stating that Mariotta owned two-thirds. The SBA ap-
proved their 8 (a) application in September 1975.21
As late as 1980, Welbilt was little more than a small metal-stamping
company, but the partners had grand ambitions to secure multimillion dollar
8 (a) contracts. Realizing that they could not compete with established firms,
the partners exploited the political appeal of helping a struggling company in
"bombed-out" South Bronx. In 1980, Reagan had made a campaign stop in the
Bronx promising to revive the inner-city economy. Welbilt's slogan, "OfifWel-
fare, On Welbilt," appealed to Reagan's conservative sensibilities. In January
1982, presidential aides invited Mariotta to a White House conference and sat
him beside the president, who was deeply impressed with Mariotta's welfare-to-
work vision. Two years later, at a campaign fundraiser, Reagan toasted the suc-
cess of Welbilt, stating that "people like John Mariotta are heroes for the eighties."
Thus, Welbilt became a symbol of the Reagan Revolution in the inner-city.22
Welbilt based its success entirely on political influence. The company
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corrupted procurement officers, accountants, members of Congress, SBA of-
ficials, and White House aides. Welbilt's partners in crime included Represen-
tative Mario Biaggi (D-N.Y.), a "Hero Cop" turned "congressman on the
take." Biaggi reportedly had a "solid hold" over the New York regional office
of the SBA. Representative Robert Garcia (D-N.Y.), former chair of the Con-
gressional Hispanic Caucus, had a reputation as "one of the city's last honest
politicians," yet he, too, peddled his influence to Wedtech. Two associates of
presidential counselor Edwin Meese III—friend E. Bob Wallach and deputy
James Jenkins—received stock, cash, and promises of post-government work
for pleading the company's case. Welbilt also employed former presidential
speechwriter Lyn Nofziger as company lobbyist.23
With help from its friends in government, Welbilt secured 8 (a) con-
tracts that it could not perform and on which it lost money. The Ponzi scheme
depended upon the acquisition of ever larger contracts. Initially, Michael
Cardenas stood as an obstacle in the company's path. In January 1982, two
presidential aides attended an SBA meeting to discuss Welbilt's $30 million
bid for an engine contract. Army officials informed Cardenas that Welbilt's
price was too high and that the company was not qualified to fulfill the con-
tract. Therefore, despite presidential pressure, Cardenas denied Welbilt the
award. Several weeks later, the White House demanded his resignation. Deputy
Administrator David Gonzalez recalled that "afterward, we both looked at
each other and said, 'What did we do wrong?' Reagan hired us to clean the
[SBA] up. We tried to do that, and they fired us."24
White House intervention continued under Sanders' administration. In
May 1982, presidential aide James Jenkins convinced Sanders to award the
engine contract to Welbilt. One year later, Welbilt changed its name to Wedtech
and became the first 8 (a) firm to go public. The company maintained its 8 (a)
eligibility by conducting a phony stock deal giving Mariotta a majority share.
In 1984, Sanders set aside a $134 million pontoon contract for Wedtech, the
largest set-aside in SBA history. Later, despite failing to deliver a single pon-
toon, the Navy awarded the company another $51 million contract. By now,
the SBA had too much at stake to let Wedtech drown in its own incompe-
tence. The agency failed to graduate the company, because it "made the whole
8(a) program look good." As one SBA official put it, "We weren't looking for
a way to say no. We were looking for a way to say yes."25
The end seemed near in late 1984, when House Small Business Com-
mittee chairman Parren Mitchell caught wind of possible misdeeds at Wedtech.
Mitchell sent a list of twelve questions to the SBA. Wedtech had Peter Neglia,
New York Regional Administrator, prepare a carefully crafted response that
covered up Wedtech's tracks (the company rewarded Neglia with a job at the
Biaggi law firm). Wedtech also offered bribes to Parren Mitchell's nephews,
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Clarence and Michael, which they readily accepted. Soon thereafter, the House
committee dropped its probe.26
This sordid state of affairs might have continued indefinitely but for the
work of investigative reporters at the Wall Street Journal and the New York
Daily News. In February 1986, the Journal reported that Mariotta's partners
had fired him and that he owned only 23 percent of company stock. This
revelation forced the SBA to begin 8 (a) decertification procedures. Rather
than fight the agency, Wedtech withdrew itself from the program. Before the
news hit the street, company officials dumped $5 million worth of stock. In
October, the Daily News ran a series of articles exposing the full extent of
Wedtech corruption. Two months later, the company filed for bankruptcy.27
Juries convicted the principals on numerous counts of bribery, rack-
eteering, tax evasion, and fraud. Clarence and Michael Mitchell were con-
victed of mail fraud and impeding a congressional investigation, but their
uncle escaped prosecution and retired from Congress in 1986. He continued
his work with the Minority Business Legal Defense Fund, an organization he
founded to defend set-asides against court challenges. Independent Counsel
James McKay investigated Meese's role in the affair but found no evidence
that Meese knew of E. Bob Wallach's financial ties to Wedtech. Nevertheless,
the cloud of scandal reportedly led Meese to resign his post in August 1988.28
Congress reacted to the Wedtech scandal by passing reform legislation
in 1988. The SBA pushed for tough reforms, including mandatory term lim-
its and a "business-mix" requirement that 8 (a) firms acquire non—8 (a) busi-
ness. The original bill contained a strong "business-mix" provision, but the
Senate accepted Lowell Weicker's (R-Conn.) plea for flexible "targets" rather
than mandatory goals. The final bill required competitive bidding only on
contracts exceeding $3 million ($5 million for manufacturing contracts). The
act also directed the SBA to establish net worth limits for "economic disadvan-
tage"; new agency regulations set three-phase limits of $250,000 (Phase 1);
$500,000 (Phase 2), and $750,000 (Phase 3). The SBA was unhappy with the
weak business-mix and competitive bid requirements. Deputy Director of
Congressional Affairs Joan Bready lamented, "We want [firms] to work in the
world outside of 8(a), and a lot of them can't."29
The 1988 reforms did not eliminate the abuses or longstanding prob-
lems with 8(a). Ten years later, the SBA official who wrote the new agency
regulations was still not optimistic about achieving real reform. Likewise, James
Sanders believes that the problem of corruption is "almost unsolvable," given
the political dynamics. The abuses continued as 8 (a) officials failed to enforce
the eligibility and net worth requirements. "Fronts" remained a fact of life. A
few large firms reaped the lion's share of contracts, while a majority of 8 (a)
companies received no awards.30
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Wedtech was not an aberration; it was the embodiment of the corrup-
tion inherent in the 8(a) program.31 The original goal of 8(a) was to promote
"black" and "brown" capitalism, but program incentives encouraged compa-
nies and SBA officials to merely play at capitalism by showering a few favored
firms with contracts. Prodded by quota-minded presidents, 8(a) officials consid-
ered only volume; they did not develop these firms into competitive companies.
Not surprisingly, business owners with political connections thrived in this arti-
ficial environment. Politicians wrapped themselves in the mantle of minority
enterprise, presumably a good cause that excused the program's shortcomings.
President Reagan's enthusiastic embrace of minority set-asides and his
refusal to repeal affirmative action call into question his reputation as a prin-
cipled conservative who placed ideology above party interests. Faced with
opposition in his own party, Reagan appeased the moderates and abandoned
conservatives. Critics on the left depicted Reagan as a cynical politician who
sought white votes by trying to "turn back the clock" on affirmative action.32
However, there is no documentary evidence to support this interpretation.
More important, these critics ignore his set-aside policy, which "represents
perhaps the most obvious and blatant racial quota of any federal affirmative
action program." In fact, opponents of racial preferences were deeply disap-
pointed with Reagan. For them, it seemed as if nothing had changed. One
such critic, Nicholas Laham, concludes that Reagan was "just another shrewd,
pragmatic, and even unprincipled, politician."33
Reagan also failed to challenge procurement preferences for small busi-
ness. Set-asides accounted for half of all small-firm procurement dollars. These
preferences decreased competition, benefited larger firms, and encouraged
companies to act as "fronts" for big corporations. In many fields, small busi-
nesses were competitive and therefore did not need set-asides. Yet there was
no movement to reform small business set-asides as there was with race-based
affirmative action. Thus, it is not surprising that Reagan left these set-asides
intact. On the other hand, he signed the Small Business Innovation Research
Act (1982), despite opposition from congressional conservatives. This act set
aside 1.25 percent of research-and-development grants for small business, a
percentage that steadily increased over time. Although politically popular, the
SBIR grants supplanted private R&D investment and produced "the illusion
of success but no real economic gains." In short, the revolutionary rhetoric of
1980 gave way to political pragmatism. Quotas and social engineering thrived
during the height of the "Reagan Revolution."34
For conservatives, Reagan's first term was discouraging. His landslide
victory in 1984 renewed their hopes for a counterrevolution against big gov-
ernment. In 1985, Budget Director David Stockman made a desperate last
stand for deep budget cuts and received the president's go-ahead to abolish
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the Small Business Administration. The SBA thus enjoyed the dubious dis-
tinction of being one of the few agencies targeted for elimination. Contempo-
raries considered the SBA battle a test case for the "Reagan Revolution." If the
president could not kill an agency with such a checkered past, then truly the
conservative crusade for limited government was futile.
The Battle to Abolish the SBA, 1985-1987
Reagan's reelection coincided with an economic upturn that altered the social
and political environment of small business. During the mid-1980s, fears of a
small business crisis dissipated as smaller companies enjoyed faster-than-aver-
age growth. Judging from the contemporary literature, this was a golden age
of small business. Economists, business writers, and politicians of all stripes
praised small firms for creating jobs and advancing technology. Clearly, as
economist Bennett Harrison puts it, "Small was bountiful. Small was beauti-
ful. Small was zVz."35
The political implications of the new small business ideology were am-
biguous. Democratic small business advocates sought more government spend-
ing, arguing that it was "better to lend than spend" to create new jobs. But
Reagan exploited the laissez-faire element of the ideology. In his view, small
business substituted for welfare and government job creation. "It's small busi-
ness . . . not the Federal Government," he declared, "which created four out of
five new jobs. . . . It's small business, not the Federal Government, which can
best rebuild our inner cities." Freed of government interference, small busi-
ness was a dynamo unbound. Small business was thriving, Reagan maintained,
because his administration was "getting the Government out of the way."36
Reagan's landslide victory in 1984 emboldened budget-cutters deter-
mined to reduce the growing federal deficit by attacking domestic programs.
They considered 1985 "the make-or-break year for a second-term Reagan
Revolution." OMB Director David Stockman compiled a list of programs
diat "could be attacked on principle"; the SBA was at the top of his "hit" list.
James Sanders was aware that OMB officials considered SBA "the worst of all
the agencies" but was taken aback when told of White House plans to elimi-
nate his agency. Although Sanders promised to support the president's deci-
sion, he publicly made it clear that he opposed abolition. Meanwhile, the
threat of termination did not faze most agency employees, who thought that
Congress would never allow it.37
Stockman launched a cogent attack on the rationale for SBA lending.
He termed the SBA a "billion-dollar waste—a rathole" that benefited only a
tiny percentage of small businesses. In February 1985 congressional testimony,
he argued that SBA loans crowded out private-sector borrowing and reallo-
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cated funds "from more creditworthy to less creditworthy firms." Most SBA
loans went to companies in low-growth sectors, rather than the "sunrise in-
dustries." In the concentrated industries, SBA lending was "virtually non-exis-
tent"(italics in original).) High loss rates rendered the SBA a "money-losing
bank." The original rationale for SBA loans—a "credit gap" in small business
financing—no longer existed; private credit sources were abundant. Disaster
loans were also unnecessary, because homeowners and businesses could get
federal disaster insurance. Stockman estimated that selling the SBA loan port-
folio would raise $3 billion in revenue. He favored retaining SCORE and
transferring it to the Commerce Department, which would henceforth repre-
sent all businesses, large and small.38 Later studies of SBA loan programs con-
firmed elements of Stockman's critique.39 President Reagan meanwhile
characterized the SBA as "another example of government poking its nose
into areas where it has no business." "If programs like these can't be cut," he
declared, "we might as well give up hope of ever getting government spending
under control."40
While expressing support for the president's proposal, Sanders testified
that many SBA programs were successful, including loan guarantees and the
SBICs, which provided small businesses with long-term financing. Sanders
defended the agency from Stockman's "slander" and disputed his assertion
that SBA loans "crowded out" private lending. In April, he told the Washing-
ton Post that Stockman was "an embarrassment" to the White House. The
Budget Director was "surrounded by fanatics [who] have no real life experi-
ence." Sanders was clearly determined to survive Stockman's onslaught.41
The struggle over the SBA exposed the agency's lines of support and
opposition. Opponents included federal procurement officials, who were "al-
most unanimously" in favor of abolishing the SBA. They resented SBA inter-
ference and opposed set-asides. Two leading business groups—the National
Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce—also backed
Stockman's plan. Hard-core support came mostly from conservative activists,
who favored total elimination of the SBA rather than gradual cutbacks, be-
cause they feared the agency would later regain lost ground. A Heritage Foun-
dation spokesman stated that the SBA was "like a cancer—if you don't cut it
out altogether, it will grow back in a year."42
The NFIB was ambivalent. A 1984 survey found that two out of three
NFIB members favored "ending all lending activities of SBA." An even larger
majority opposed SBA programs for "disadvantaged groups." The NFIB fol-
lowed this unscientific survey with a representative poll that was less devastat-
ing. Still, most respondents were unfamiliar with agency programs; the SBA
was the "Great Unknown" to small business. Apathy and indifference typified
the attitude of most business owners. Very small businesses (gross receipts
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under $100,000) supported SBA programs, while the "not-so-smalls" opposed
them, thus confirming Richard Hamilton's earlier findings (see chapter 1).
When asked what the government should do for small business, the majority
endorsed tax incentives, competitive bidding, management assistance, and
strong advocacy of small business interests. The Federation leadership with-
held its support from Stockman until April, when he agreed to a compromise
measure eliminating all lending programs but maintaining the SBA as an ad-
vocate for small business.43
Support for the SBA came primarily from banks and Congress. The
attitude of bankers had turned completely around since the 1950s, when the
American Banking Association opposed SBA intervention in the credit mar-
kets. What transformed the banking community from enemy to ally was the
agency's use of loan guarantees. SBA guaranteed loans were profitable and
nearly risk-free, and an active secondary market allowed banks to turn over
their portfolio rapidly. A GAO survey of bankers found that 82 percent would
have refused to make some loans to small business borrowers or would have
imposed more difficult terms without the loan guarantee.44
The SBA enjoyed overwhelming congressional support, with only a few
exceptions. Senator William Proxmire (D-Wis.), a longtime critic, character-
ized the SBA as one of "Washington's 10 Worst Boondoggles." In the House,
Representative David Dreier (R-Calif.) introduced a bill to "sunset" the SBA,
but not one Republican senator sponsored companion legislation. At the same
time, the Small Business Committees mounted a vigorous defense. In March,
they held hearings to rally support for the SBA. The House Committee gath-
ered a petition signed by all former SBA administrators opposing the "junk-
ing or crippling of a useful Government agency." The chair of the Senate
committee, Lowell Weicker, put the party leadership on notice that "they were
going to have a war" if they tried to eliminate the SBA. Regardless, in April
the White House negotiated an omnibus budget bill that included a provision
abolishing the SBA. With the agency forced to the brink of extinction, Weicker
offered an amendment authorizing deep cuts in SBA spending over three years.
Reagan needed Weicker's tie-breaking vote to pass the omnibus budget and
therefore relented. The final legislation cut $2.5 billion in SBA spending over
three years, but most of the savings came from programs that were not central
to the agency mission, such as farm disaster loans. Weicker stated that "frankly,
it hasn't been cut very heavily at all."45
Thus, the SBA survived its first near-death experience, but the Reagan
administration still planned to eliminate it. In January 1986, tired of fighting
the White House, Sanders announced his resignation effective 31 March. The
president then installed conservative activist Charles Heatherly as his "hit man"
in the SBA. Rather than face a Senate confirmation hearing, Reagan appointed
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Heatherly acting administrator. Heatherly was the editor of Mandate for Lead-
ership, a 1981 manual considered the "bible" of the Reagan administration.
Mandate stated that "it is possible to remove all or most of the personnel and
functions from a given organizational unit, thus making it much more ame-
nable to control, dispersal, and eventual elimination." Heatherly carried out
this destroy-from-within policy at the SBA. On 1 April, his first day in office,
Heatherly fired six regional administrators who opposed Reagan's death sen-
tence ("If they're not supporting the President, they shouldn't be there"). Crit-
ics termed this the "April Fool's Day Massacre" and called Heatherly the "Angel
of Death." On 2 April, he sent a memo to SBA employees directing them "to
prepare the agency for an orderly transition to . . . the Department of Com-
merce." He spoke of "transfer," rather than elimination, noting that all agency
functions except lending were moving to the Commerce Department.46
Not surprisingly, Heatherly's blunt and brash manner antagonized mem-
bers of Congress. In newspaper interviews, he labeled Congress as being "with-
out discipline and without guts." The SBA lending programs were "just
middle-class entitlements the nation can no longer afford." In committee hear-
ings, Weicker and his colleagues berated Heatherly for his "mean-spirited com-
ments" and "smug or sarcastic" attitude. Heatherly apologized for his "facetious
or lighthearted" remarks, but the damage was done. By June, the White House
realized that Congress was not going to surrender. Furthermore, the ongoing
public relations fiasco threatened to embarrass the president at a forthcoming
White House Conference on Small Business scheduled for August. Therefore,
two days before the conference, Reagan announced that he would name a
permanent SBA administrator. Four months later, he chose former U.S. Sena-
tor James Abdnor (R-S.Dak.) to head the agency. Abdnor took office in March
1987, thus ending a critical chapter in the history of the SBA.47
James Abdnors two years in office (1987—1988) were relatively unevent-
ful. The main controversy concerned SBIC attempts to privatize their indus-
try. During the 1980s, the SBICs suffered high interest rates, low rates of
return, serious regulatory violations, and a declining presence in the booming
venture capital market. The SBICs were frustrated with SBA red tape and the
unstable budgetary environment; consequently, as early as 1983, they sought
the creation of a federally chartered Corporation for Small Business Invest-
ment (COSBI). The Reagan administration opposed COSBI, because it au-
thorized SBICs to borrow funds from the Treasury Department and provided
weak supervision of an industry long plagued with violations. Citing the re-
cent savings-and-loan debacle, Abdnor warned that "when a regulator is weak
and the credit is too easy, there are going to be attempts to take advantage of
that." Thus, the COSBI bill languished in Congress.48
Abdnor lobbied for the president's agenda of lower guarantee rates and
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higher user fees on SBA services but admitted that "Congress won't buy it."
The Reagan battle for budget cuts was over. The Small Business Committees
now fought to regain lost ground. During fiscal year 1988, business loan ap-
provals inched upward to $3.3 billion.49
What "Revolution"?
The failed attempt to abolish the SBA provides a valuable case study in the
political bankruptcy of the "Reagan Revolution." After a sustained attack last-
ing eighteen months, the president secured only modest cuts in the SBA bud-
get. Contemporary observers considered the SBA's survival "a metaphor" for
the failed experiment in conservative governance. "As the case of the SBA
seems to show," wrote National Journal writer Jonathan Rauch, "the heady
days of the Reagan Revolution . . . are over." The chair of the Senate Budget
Committee, Pete Domenici (R-N.Mex.), also called it a "bellwether. . . . If
you cannot get rid of [the SBA] when you have this kind of [deficit] problem
. . . it sort of tells us something about. . . our willingness to really cut." More
generally, conservative and libertarian activists were bitterly disappointed with
the president's inability to eliminate agencies such as die SBA. While liberals
bemoaned the supposed rightward turn in politics, conservatives questioned
whether their quixotic crusade against big government would ever achieve
results.50
Why was the Reagan Revolution such a failure? Some of Reagan's revo-
lutionaries blamed administration moderates for betraying the cause. They
argued that entrenched bureaucrats also sabotaged their best efforts to repeal
government programs. Paul Craig Roberts sums up this view: "The first year
of the Reagan Administration was a struggle between a few people in govern-
ment who wanted change and a government full of people who did not."
Within a year, those favoring the status quo had gained the upper hand. In a
postmortem on his sojourn in government, Charles Heatherly cited short-
comings in personnel management. The bureaucracy was the "permanent
embodiment of the liberal agenda"; therefore, the loyalty of political appoin-
tees was crucial. Too often, Heatherly lamented, agency heads "go native" by
becoming "defenders of their own little fiefdoms." Heatherly and Roberts
agreed that Reagan delegated authority to people opposed to his revolution.
His primary concern was with preserving party unity. Always a minority, even
within the Republican Party, conservatives were left carping from the side-
lines.51
According to this interpretation, moderates kept Reagan "from being
Reagan." The "real" Reagan waged rhetorical assaults on big government. Yet,
in reality, Reagan was a pragmatic politician. He never seriously contemplated
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sweeping reductions in government. Eliminating the SBA was Stockman's
idea, not the president's. In 1986, New Republic columnist Fred Barnes noted
that Reagan had spoken favorably of the SBA in the past. Moreover, he "never
demonizes it in his speeches. He scarcely mentions it." In his bitter memoir,
Stockman acknowledged that "ridding Big Government of the SBA was not
on the President's real agenda after all."52
Several commentators emphasized the influence of an "iron triangle"
consisting of the Small Business Committees, the SBA bureaucracy, and "tiny
businessmen interested in latching on to the loot."53 Yet small business sup-
port for the agency was notoriously weak, even among borrowers, who lost
interest once they received their loans. The NFIB actually supported Stockman's
plan; the association was more interested in economy-wide measures such as
deregulation and tax cuts than defending loans that benefited relatively few
firms. The SBA bureaucracy was in the hands of abolitionist Charles Heatherly.
Thus, two of the three triangle legs supported elimination of the SBA. A
history of scandals and an extensive body of literature critiquing various SBA
programs strengthened the intellectual case for abolition. In short, far from
being a typical example of an "iron triangle," the SBA offered a good scenario
for determined budget-cutters.
But Congress, the third leg of the triangle, presented insurmountable
opposition. Members of Congress supported small business—and by exten-
sion the SBA—because it was held in high public esteem, second only to
farming in its universal appeal. Furthermore, without the SBA, the Small
Business Committees lost their primary reason for being. Unfortunately for
the Reagan administration, two die-hard liberals—Lowell Weicker and Parren
Mitchell—chaired the Senate and House committees. Weicker's disdain for
Reaganomics was well-known ("the trickle down idea is a bunch of bananas,"
he said in 1981). His vote played a crucial role in rescuing the SBA from
Stockman's chopping block.54
Blaming a liberal Congress for Reagan's defeat would be misleading,
however. The conservative chronicler David Frum wrote that the SBA "exem-
plified everything that's wrong with the modern state," yet conservatives failed
to support the president's proposal. As one White House official put it, "They
say it's an uphill battle, so why fight it?" This pusillanimous response reflected
the superficial nature of congressional conservatism. Like their president, Re-
publican members of Congress feared being perceived as "mean" by propos-
ing deep budget cuts. In an apt phrase, Fred Barnes described Republican
leaders as "big government conservatives" who had come to terms with levia-
than. Conservative officeholders succumbed to the temptations of power.
Herbert Stein observed that "a revolution can hardly be engineered from out-
side the government, and even conservative governments when in office do
Eternal Life 125
not want to limit their own powers. So the radical conservative revolution is
the dream of conservatives out of office, but not the practice of conservatives
in office."55 Thus, Stockman and Heatherly were on a fool's errand; abolishing
the SBA was not within their grasp.
The Bush-Clinton Years
The Reagan legacy looks even less impressive in retrospect. Reagan's successor,
George Bush, brought a government-friendly attitude to the "White House.
He declared that "I do not hate government.... A government that serves the
people . . . is a good and needed thing." During the Bush years, nondefense
spending grew rapidly. The SBA more than doubled its business loan approv-
als, from $3.3 billion to $7.2 billion. Bush also established a "microloan"
project to "empower" the poor. However, those who remembered the failed
Economic Opportunity Loan program cautioned against high expectations.56
The SBIC industry collapsed during the recession of 1991, resulting in
several hundred million dollars in losses to the government. The economic
downturn compounded longstanding problems of a high debt burden and lax
oversight. In 1992, Congress passed legislation tightening up licensing re-
quirements and creating a new "participating security" similar to preferred
stock. The early results were promising, although the rush of new money into
the SBIC industry was no doubt related to the sizzling stock market of the
1990s.57
The Clinton years brought further growth in SBA lending; business
loan approvals hit $9.5 billion in 1994. With the election of a Republican
Congress, a few conservatives advocated eliminating the SBA, but the Repub-
lican "revolution" of 1994 was no more real than the Reagan Revolution. The
SBA continued to increase its general business loans, approving a record $ 11.4
billion in 1999. The presidents proposed budget for fiscal year 2000 would
raise this figure to $14 billion, nearly five times the level when Reagan left
office.58
The Section 8 (a) program remained mired in difficulties. Although mi-
nority businesses made tremendous strides, 8 (a) helped few of them.59 A 1990
survey of "disadvantaged" businesses reported that they were disappointed
with government assistance. The typical respondent thought procurement
preferences only "helped a little," and many thought that the programs did
not help at all. Obsessed with meeting numerical goals, the SBA provided
little practical assistance. Not surprisingly, 8 (a) firms experienced high post-
graduation failure rates. Meanwhile, the original target beneficiaries, African
Americans, steadily lost their share of 8(a) to Asian American business own-
ers, who were better capitalized and better educated than their black and white
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counterparts. Nevertheless, the program was politically inviolable; there was
no serious move by Congress or the president to repeal 8(a).60
Minority set-aside programs did face court challenges. In two impor-
tant cases, Croson (1989) an&Adarand (1996), the U.S. Supreme Court sub-
jected local, state, and federal set-asides to a "strict scrutiny" test. The Court
ruled that government agencies must document past discrimination before
establishing set-asides. These decisions gave birth to an industry of consult-
ants producing studies offering crude statistical disparities to "prove" that dis-
crimination existed. President Clintons promise to "mend, not end" affirmative
action amounted to similar stonewalling. Denying that 8 (a) was based on
race, Clinton claimed that the program was theoretically color-blind and there-
fore not subject to the strict standards set forth by the Court. In practice,
however, 8 (a) was explicitly race-conscious; no white person, no matter how
"disadvantaged," had a fair chance of being admitted to the program (in 1996,
there were only eight white women in the program).61
In 1996, two presidential candidates—Republican Robert Dole and
Democrat Bill Clinton—were implicated in embarrassing incidents involving
SBA minority enterprise programs. Dole campaigned for an end to 8(a), stat-
ing that "it has been abused." Yet Washington Post reporters alleged that he was
one who had abused the program. In 1988, Dole's office pressured the SBA to
award 8 (a) contracts to a firm run by John Palmer, a former aide. Several years
later, beginning in 1994, an independent counsel investigated charges that
Clinton pressured David Hale, owner of a MESBIC, to illegally lend $300,000
to Susan McDougal, a woman who was hardly "disadvantaged" (she and her
husband had a net worth exceeding $2 million). Hale charged that McDougal
used the loan to purchase land for the Whitewater Development Corpora-
tion, an enterprise owned by the Clintons and the McDougals. Juries con-
victed the McDougals and Hale of fraud in 1996; the investigation of the
president continues as of this writing. Regardless of the outcome, the fraudu-
lent loan was fresh proof of the corruption associated with the minority enter-
prise programs.62
Regulation surged upward in the Bush-Clinton years, renewing small
business complaints about heavy-handed government. Previous reforms, in-
cluding exemptions for very small businesses and cost-benefit analysis, failed
to reduce the burden on medium-sized companies. The NFIB and the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce continued to attract new members by railing against
big government. In 1993, they played a pivotal role in defeating President
Clinton's proposed national health care plan (pushed unconvincingly by the
SBA). The Republican "revolutionaries" of 1994, led by Representative Newt
Gingrich (R-Ga.), strongly associated themselves with small business. The
small business lobby also benefited from the bipartisan belief in the job-creating
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powers of small business. By 1997, the NFIB ranked as the most powerful
business lobby and the fourth most influential lobby overall.63
It would be wrong to overstate the benefit or harm the federal govern-
ment does to small business. The enterprise of millions of businessmen and
women will determine the future of small business. As these business owners
enter the twenty-first century, they face new challenges—global competition,
Internet commerce, and an aging workforce. As always, there are advantages
and disadvantages to being small. There is no guarantee that small business
will flourish in the years ahead, yet the lesson of the twentieth century is that
rumors of its death were greatly exaggerated.
CONCLUSION
The history of the Small Business Administration is a microcosm of American
government in the last half of the twentieth century. From the partisan bud-
get battles of the 1950s to the Reagan Revolution of the 1980s—with stops
along the New Frontier, the War on Poverty, and the populist backlash of the
1970s—the agency participated in the broader movements of the American
body politic. This concluding chapter considers important historical themes
and the changing relationship between small business and government.
Interest-Group Representation
The modern American state is premised on the notion that government can
and should serve as a broker between organized interest groups. In the twen-
tieth century, groups claiming to represent both the "special" and "public"
interests sought to advance their agendas through governmental programs.
Once regarded as a necessary evil, interest groups became a public good when
tied to the pluralist model of political equilibrium. Democracy thus became a
"product of group conflict." The increased role of government in American
life, in turn, provoked additional interest groups to organize and defend them-
selves against perceived threats.1
However, the Small Business Administration does not fit this Broker
State theory. Unlike other government agencies, the SBA represents no strong
client; rather, it embodies a public sentiment favoring small enterprise, an ill-
defined interest group. One of the ongoing problems the SBA has faced is
that the intellectual expression of this sentiment has changed over time. The
original Jeffersonian ideology extolled the virtue of self-reliance; independent
enterprise was a bulwark against an overreaching state. But in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, fearing the imminent decline of small
business, antitrusters necessarily sought government assistance to counter the
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"trusts." The Small Business Administration evolved from this antitrust tradi-
tion; Congress hoped that positive assistance to small business would "level the
playing field." In the past quarter-century, the public has come to appreciate the
resiliency of small enterprise. Pundits now praise the economic dynamism of
small business, while politicians in both parties proclaim "small is beautiful."
Yet, even after the establishment of the SBA in 1953, policymakers con-
tested the small business ideology and debated the existence of a "small busi-
ness interest." Conservatives, including President Dwight D. Eisenhower and
David Stockman, considered this form of federal aid to "free enterprise" a
contradiction. Commerce Department officials, meanwhile, disputed the con-
cept of an arbitrary line separating "small" and "big" business. Preferences for
one class of business owner, they argued, placed others at a disadvantage. How,
then, did congressional supporters of the SBA reconcile government assis-
tance with the supposed independence of small business, the very basis for its
popular appeal? Earlier generations argued that small firms were victims of
"institutionalized discrimination" in the marketplace and government; the
SBA countered the effects of such discrimination. More recently, members of
Congress have characterized SBA loans as a sound investment in a growing
sector of the economy.
Nonetheless, the symbolic value of the SBA—as the embodiment of
public support for the "little guy"—was undercut by the agency's inability to
define "small" business. SBA size standards were arbitrary and susceptible to
political pressure from members of Congress.2 More important, the size stan-
dards deviated sharply from the public definition of small business, thus lend-
ing support to Senator William Proxmire's criticism that the SBA is "a
medium-size or even a big business administration." Little has changed since
the 1950s, when one author wrote that "discussions of'small business' almost
always turn out to be about medium-sized business."3 The SBA's definition of
"small" encompasses nearly 99 percent of the business population, from sole
proprietors to corporations with thousands of employees. An extreme example
of this bias toward the "not-so-smalls" was the awarding of small business
status to auto giant American Motors Corporation. Periodic efforts to lower
the size standards faltered because of congressional opposition. In short, the
SBA and the Congressional Small Business Committees benefited from mis-
placed public support.
This expansive definition of "small" business had important policy con-
sequences. The agency devoted much of its resources to the "not-so-smalls,"
the segment of the small business community least in need. Firms with more
than twenty employees maintained their market share, while the very smalls,
especially those with fewer than five employees, lost significant ground. "Mom
and Pop" have seen better days.4
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How well does the SBA represent its constituency? Does small business
now have an influential voice within the Broker State? For most of its history,
the SBA, together with the Small Business Committees, acted as the small
business lobby in "Washington. But the agency was a weak advocate for small
business. During the 1960s, SBA administrators failed to represent the inter-
ests of small firms affected by urban renewal and the riots. The following
decade witnessed a small business backlash against government regulation,
but the SBA frequently placed itself on the side of big government. Congress
created an Office of Advocacy to take independent stands on controversial
issues, but SBA executives vetoed position statements that conflicted with
those of the incumbent administration.
The emergence of a powerful small business lobby, led by the National _
Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), filled this interest-group vacuum.
Since the late 1970s, the NFIB has been an effective advocate for small busi-
ness interests. Unlike most organized interest groups, the NFIB was indiffer-
ent to the fate of its representative agency; the association supported Ronald
Reagan's attempts to eliminate all SBA functions except advocacy. Politically
active small business owners were as conservative as their 1950s counterparts.
Their antigovernment animus overcame the "free rider" problem inherent in
organizing a large, heterogeneous group. It bears stressing that small business
is not a conservative monolith. Our knowledge of small business attitudes
toward government is limited. Richard Hamilton's study of small business in
the 1950s and early 1960s remains the only in-depth analysis of this impor-
tant issue.5 Further research is needed to clarify whether NFIB members rep-
resent the norm or whether small business owners divide along income or size
lines. A Gallup poll taken in 1995 found no significant differences between
the attitudes of NFIB members and the general small business population,
although the survey questions dealt only with SBA programs. A second Gallup
survey found small business owners were strongly Republican and conserva-
tive, but the report did not break down responses by income class.6
The Reagan administration's battle to abolish the SBA showed that the
agency's strongest support—its real constituencies—were die Small Business
Committees and the nation's banks, not the organized small business lobby.
The SBA socialized the risks of small business finance, thus turning banks
from staunch opponents into avid supporters of government lending. The
political appeal of investment guarantees was obvious: Congress could mag-
nify the apparent government contribution to small business investment and
co-opt a leading opposition group. Loan guarantees also concealed and de-
ferred the costs to the taxpayers.
Why was Congress so interested in small business and the SBA? Many
members were sincerely interested in small business issues. Others used their
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committee membership to strengthen ties with the business community. The
SBA was a useful conduit for the constituent work of the Small Business Com-
mittees, a dumping ground for politicos, and a "petty cash drawer" for the pet
schemes of Congress. The agency's extensive field structure served many con-
gressional districts; the field directors were "often as loyal to their district Con-
gressman as to the agency."7 It is little wonder, then, that Congress was so
fond of the SBA.
The Small Business Administration also served the political needs of
various presidents. Dwight D. Eisenhower used the agency to deflect criti-
cism that he favored big business. John F. Kennedy backed the SBA to chal-
lenge the notion that he was "antibusiness." Richard M. Nixon had the agency
promote his vision of "black capitalism." Yet presidential support has been
uneven. Presidents Johnson, Ford, and Carter paid little attention to the SBA.
Ronald Reagan's administration tried unsuccessfully to eliminate it.
In sum, the SBA was a highly politicized agency that served the interests
of politicians in both parties. However, the agency's support among small
business owners was notoriously weak. Even with the great expansion in loan
guarantees, the SBA reached a tiny segment of the small business community.
Thus, thirty years after the agency's establishment, the SBA was still the "Great
Unknown" among small businesspeople.
Affirmative Action
Few Americans are aware that the Small Business Administration pioneered
racial preferences. Inspired by the March on Washington, SBA administrator
Eugene Foley launched a pilot loan project targeted at African Americans.
Foley inserted his "Economic Opportunity Loan" (EOL) program in the en-
abling legislation for the "War on Poverty." The goal was to combat poverty
and create role models in the ghetto. The riots of the mid-1960s transformed
EOL into a "black-oriented" program to deal with the "root causes" of the
urban crisis. Unfortunately, rather than create success symbols, EOL high-
lighted the failure of poor entrepreneurs. The program left borrowers worse
off than before they entered business. This failed experiment illustrated the
naivete of SBA officials who let idealism and guilt cloud their thinking about
social policy.
The history of 8 (a) contracting preferences demonstrated that affirma-
tive action made for strange bedfellows. This controversial program was origi-
nally a response to the inner-city turmoil of 1968. A crusading administrator,
Howard Samuels, exploited the urban crisis by advocating "compensatory capi-
talism." Under Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act, Samuels began to "set
aside" no-bid contracts for minority firms. President Richard M. Nixon dra-
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matically increased the use of these set-asides. Theoretically color-blind but
practically race-conscious, 8 (a) bred dishonesty and deception in a program
designed for the "socially and economically disadvantaged." Ironically, the
Republican Party, now a rhetorical opponent of affirmative action, made ex-
plicit racial quotas in government contracting. Congressional Democrats de-
nounced this "reverse discrimination," but by the late 1970s, they too were
promoting the new racialist regime. Ronald Reagan, who preached "color-
blindness" in government, betrayed his conservative supporters by further
expanding 8 (a) set-asides.
The consequences of the 8 (a) program were perverse. A few well-con-
nected firms received the bulk of the set-asides, while others received nothing.
Obsessed with quotas, the SBA provided little practical assistance; indeed, its
minority enterprise officials, many of them former civil rights activists, lacked
business experience. Not surprisingly, most 8 (a) firms never developed into
viable enterprises. In a classic case of robbing Peter to pay Paul, the SBA took
contracts from some of the least advantaged white companies and gave them
to minority firms. The agency also applied its eligibility criteria inconsistently,
admitting affluent immigrant groups with dark skin and denying the applica-
tions of disadvantaged light-skinned peoples. The program provoked con-
flicts among African Americans, whites, women, Jews, and other ethnic groups.
Political favoritism and corruption were rampant.
Polls taken in the U.S. and Europe show strong opposition to explicit
preferences based on race or gender. Two leading students of the subject con-
clude that "proposing to privilege some people . . . on the basis of a character-
istic they were born with, violates a nearly universal norm of fairness."8
Nevertheless, despite repeated scandals and failure to meet its objectives, the
8 (a) program is entrenched as a racial pork barrel used by Democrats and
Republicans alike to demonstrate their civil rights credentials. The massive
resistance to adverse court decisions reflects the ingrained nature of affirma-
tive action. Liberalism has become its opposite: where once it stood for equal-
ity before the law, now it defends "benign" violations of that principle.
Conservative politicians, fearful of being tagged racists and eager to attract
minority votes, have sent a mixed message: expressing public opposition to
preferences but implementing them once in office. This hypocritical stance
has won them neither the respect of their opponents nor the admiration of
their supporters.9
Minority businesses were not the only beneficiaries of procurement pref-
erences; small firms benefited from set-asides, too. In the late 1950s and early
1960s, advocates of small business advanced arguments for preferential treat-
ment that bore striking resemblance to later justifications for minority set-
asides. They argued that small firms deserved a "fair proportion" of government
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contracts equal to their share of private-sector sales. The underrepresentation
of small business was prima facie evidence of past and present discrimination
by procurement officers, large corporations, and banks. The discrimination
against small business was subtle, often unconscious and pervasive; therefore,
it could not be corrected with educational campaigns. Quotas and set-asides
countered institutional discrimination and promoted "economic diversity."
The rationale for size-based preferences was dubious. Congress exagger-
ated the underrepresentation of small firms by relying on crude statistical
disparities. Aggregate statistics obscured the SBA concentration of set-asides
in industries already dominated by small business; consequently, size prefer-
ences did not affect very large corporations. The chief victims of this well-
intentioned program were the "not-so-small" companies, large by industry
standards but small in comparison to the national economy. A third party—
the not-so-small company—lost business to compensate for the alleged dis-
crimination of procurement officials.
The parallels with affirmative action for ethnic minorities are obvious,
yet policymakers took this "reverse discrimination" for granted. Virtually no
one, other than procurement officers, objected to this special treatment of
small business. The unquestioning acceptance of size preferences suggests that
the American people and their representatives "take for granted" the inherent
value of small business. The core values represented by small business—indi-
vidualism and equal opportunity—legitimize "benign" discrimination favor-
ing small companies. Is such discrimination justified? Or is this another example
of unequal treatment in the name of equality? Are the losses imposed on tax-
payers and medium-sized businesses worth the benefits that accrue to an arbi-
trarily defined group of "small" companies? Opponents of racial preferences
ought to reconsider other forms of "reverse discrimination."10
Government Growth
Finally, this study illuminates another important theme in modern American
politics: the growth of the federal government. In 1900, the federal govern-
ment consisted of a handful of agencies responsible for delivering the mail,
providing national defense, issuing currency, regulating trade, and conduct-
ing diplomatic relations. Since then, the federal policy agenda has expanded
to include nearly every aspect of modern life. An attitudinal shift accompa-
nied this government growth. The classical liberal abhorrence of government
interference gave way to widespread sentiment that "there ought to be a law"
to deal with a panoply of issues once considered private.
In his seminal Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of
American Government (1987), the economic historian Robert Higgs empha-
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sizes the importance of crisis and ideology—two factors that contributed to
the growth of the Small Business Administration. Congressional sponsors of
the SBA believed that small business faced a competitive crisis that could only
be met with government assistance. Without government aid, small firms
might succumb to the market power of large corporations. Later, in the 1960s,
SBA administrators exploited the "urban crisis" to justify their commitment
to minority enterprise. The "stagflationary" economy of the 1970s provided
yet another rationale for SBA lending. Throughout this period, SBA officials
used the small business ideology to secure political support.
Nevertheless, economic and racial crises cannot explain the agency's ex-
pansion during "normal" times. Other factors, including partisan presidential
politics and bureaucratic entrepreneurship, also contributed to the SBA's
growth. During most presidential election years, the SBA stepped up its loan
activity. Several important programs—including SCORE and the Small Busi-
ness Institutes—were the product of strong administrators such as Eugene
Foley (1963-1965) and Thomas Kleppe (1971-1975), thus confirming po-
litical scientist James Q. Wilsons theory that bureaucratic innovations are
"heavily dependent on executive interests and beliefs." These bureaucratic
entrepreneurs typically emerge during periods when public or elite opinion is
favorable to government action.11
Agency growth also involves preserving policy gains from governmental
rivals. The SBA maintained its autonomy despite takeover attempts by the
Commerce Department. In his study of Bureaucracy (1989), James Q. Wilson
offers several "rules of thumb" for agencies to achieve bureaucratic autonomy.
Successful agencies "seek out tasks that are not being performed by others."12
Congress created the SBA to perform a task—lending—that Commerce offi-
cials thought inappropriate. Later, the SBA took the initiative in a variety of
areas, including management assistance and minority enterprise. By the mid-
1960s, the SBA had outstripped its older, less innovative rival. Envious of the
SBA's success, the Commerce Department tried to acquire the upstart agency
but faced insurmountable opposition from the Congressional Small Business
Committees.
The SBA's growth created considerable problems. Wilson advises ad-
ministrators to "avoid taking on tasks that differ significantly" from their core
mission and "avoid tasks that will produce divided or hostile constituencies."13
Yet the indeterminate dividing line between "small" and "big" business pro-
duced perennial conflicts over size standards and set-asides. Disaster loans
diverted personnel from the SBA's regular business programs until the agency
set up a separate disaster unit in 1980. The 8(a) program was a "people eater"
that drained agency resources and engendered bitter conflicts based on race,
gender, and ethnicity.
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The multiplication of missions—lending, venture capital, contracting,
disaster aid, etc.—led the SBA to neglect functions that produced no imme-
diate payoff, such as advocacy and management assistance. While the number
of programs proliferated, the number of employees remained the same.
Understaffing, lax oversight, and a highly decentralized agency structure fos-
tered repeated scandals. The pursuit of disparate program objectives also pro-
duced a schizophrenic agency culture, with the various divisions serving
different interest groups: "Mom-and-Pop" businesses, medium-size govern-
ment contractors, venture capitalists, disaster victims, and groups defined by
race, ethnicity, or gender.
Reinventing Government
The problems associated with government growth have raised concerns about
the desirability of big, bureaucratic government. Conservatives and libertar-
ians view the federal leviathan as a threat to individual freedom. As govern-
ment grows, people become less self-reliant, more dependent, and more likely
to view themselves as victims of circumstances beyond their control. Moder-
ates and liberals have also expressed concern that government agencies be-
come sclerotic and therefore fail to adjust to changing circumstances. Moreover,
the asymmetry of government growth—with births greatly outnumbering
deaths—creates an imbalance between organized interest groups and a diffuse
opposition. And the fragmented structure of American government further
frustrates efforts to repeal programs that have outlived their usefulness.14
The Reagan administration's ill-fated attempt at abolishing the SBA high-
lighted the difficulties faced by budget-cutters in a modern welfare state. Con-
servatives have long argued that the only way to reduce spending is to do it all
at once. The cuts have to be deep enough so that the benefits (lower taxes) are
visible to the public.15 Yet visible cuts provoke strong responses from the af-
fected interest groups, making them difficult to achieve. Thus, when David
Stockman cobbled together programs that he could attack "on principle" he
had no illusions about his chances of success. His frontal assault on the SBA—
one of the few agencies targeted for elimination in the Reagan years—demon-
strated the futility of the conservative crusade to cut spending and abolish
government programs. Despite a long history of scandals and arguable policy
failures, the SBA survived the White House challenge. Stockman was right:
with one or two exceptions, there were no real conservatives in Congress. By
the late 1980s, it dawned on many conservatives that, as columnist George
Will wrote, "The doctrine of [limited government] is as dead as a doornail.
The modern state is a sprawling, palpitating fact, and here to stay."16
The political center emerged stronger in the aftermath of the Reagan
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Revolution. Policymakers on the left and right found their options limited to
"fiddling on the margins." The goal was to "rationalize" government pro-
grams to make them more efficient and responsive to changing conditions.17
Skeptics questioned whether government was capable of "reinventing" itself.
The historian Jonathan Hughes, for example, wrote that "one can hardly be-
come enthusiastic about government solving problems the government largely
created."18 Others expressed a more hopeful view.19
The SBA has a long history of reinventing itself, thus preventing it from
becoming an out-and-out boondoggle, as the critics charged. Staffing limits
forced the agency to do more with less. From the mid-1960s onward, the SBA
increased its reliance on loan guarantees, thus shifting part of the work bur-
den to bank loan officers. Because excessive paperwork discouraged many
financial institutions from participating, the SBA established its Certified
Lender programs granting banks wide latitude in approving loans. The devel-
opment of a secondary market in SBA loans made them more attractive to
banks and investors. These improvements in the loan guarantee program il-
lustrate what economist Charles L. Schultze termed "the public use of private
interest."20
Management assistance provides another good example of the SBA rely-
ing on private resources. The Service Corps of Retired Executives (SCORE)
exploited the vast potential of retired business owners. The Small Business
Institutes (SBIs) and Small Business Development Centers (SBDCs) drew on
the expertise of university professors and students. These programs were not
perfect, and the SBA often took them for granted. Nevertheless, they are widely
considered successes.
The modest reinventing of the SBA is unlikely to resolve the tension
that persists between small business and big government. Overall, the busi-
ness community remains suspicious and hostile toward government initia-
tives.21 Although pragmatic accommodation is common, business attitudes
have not changed much in the past fifty years. A 1994 survey of Fortune 500
chief executive officers found overwhelming support for reductions in gov-
ernment spending and greater deregulation of the economy.22 The available
evidence suggests that politically active small business owners hold similar
views. Moreover, the small business owner burdened by regulation is a sympa-
thetic figure and useful symbol for opponents of big government.23 Thirty
years ago, the historian Richard Hofstadter wrote that antitrust had become
"one of the faded passions of American reform." The movement against big
business was over.24 Yet many small business owners continue to battle gov-
ernmental intrusion. Leviathan ruled the twentieth century. Perhaps the twenty-
first century belongs to the Lilliputians?
APPENDIX A: CHRONOLOGY
1953 Small Business Administration established
1958 Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) program created.
SBA made a permanent agency.
1961 President John F. Kennedy orders procurement quotas for small
contractors.
1962 Stock market crash sends SBIC prices plummeting.
1964 SBA administrator Eugene Foley launches pilot loan project for
minority businesses. Congress incorporates this concept into the
War on Poverty by authorizing Economic Opportunity Loans.
Service Corps of Retired Executives (SCORE) established.
1965 Watts riot fuels demands for more "black capitalism" aid.
1966 SBIC investigation reveals widespread fraud and corruption.
American Motors Corporation declared a "small" business.
1967 The Detroit riot, the worst of the decade, results in the destruc-
tion of 2,500 businesses.
1968 Republican candidate Richard Nixon makes "black capitalism"
a key issue in his presidential campaign.
SBA officials use Section 8 (a) of the Small Business Act to set
aside government contracts for minority businesses.
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1969 Nixon creates the Office of Minority Business Enterprise (OMBE).
Newspapers report SBA loans to mafia figures.
Minority Enterprise Small Business Investment Company
(MESBIC) program provides subsidies to investment firms spe-
cializing in "disadvantaged" businesses.
1970 Occupational and Health Safety Act mandates workplace regu-
lations. Complaints of "asinine" regulation spark growing un-
rest among small business owners.
1973 Huge expense of Hurricane Agnes leads to reform of disaster
loan program.
Scandals involving minority enterprise programs and Richmond,
Virginia, office.
1977 President Jimmy Carter announces a National Women's Busi-
ness Ownership Campaign led by the SBA.
Congressional committee, chaired by Senator Lawton Chiles
(D-Fla.), investigates Section 8 (a) fraud and incompetence.
1978 Public Law 95—507 establishes preferred categories for 8(a) eli-
gibility. African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans
considered "presumptively" eligible.
1980 White House Conference on Small Business highlights grow-
ing political influence of small business.
1982 President Ronald Reagan orders massive increase in minority
set-asides.
1985 Reagan administration tries to abolish the Small Business Ad-
ministration.
1986 Second attempt at abolishing the SBA.
Wedtech scandal. Congress passes weak reforms of the 8(a) pro-
gram in 1988.
1992 SBIC industry collapses. Reforms spark an investment boom in
the 1990s.
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1994 Election of Republican Congress. Despite talk of eliminating
the SBA, Congress steadily increases loan authorizations.
An independent counsel investigates charges that President Bill
Clinton pressured David Hale, head of a MESBIC, to illegally
lend $300,000 to one of his partners in the Whitewater Devel-
opment Corporation.
2000 Clinton's proposed budget authorizes $14 billion in business
loans, nearly five times the level when Reagan left office.
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Section 8(a) Contracts
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Sources: U.S. Small Business Administration; U.S. Senate Small Business
Committee, Federal Minority Business Development Program, hearing, 24 March
1983, table II; U.S. President, State of Small Business (1987), table 6.12.
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